In this paper I put forward a new micro realistic, fundamentally probabilistic, propensiton version of quantum theory. According to this theory, the entities of the quantum domain - electrons, photons, atoms - are neither particles nor fields, but a new kind of fundamentally probabilistic entity, the propensiton - entities which interact with one another probabilistically. This version of quantum theory leaves the Schroedinger equation unchanged, but reinterprets it to specify how propensitons evolve when no probabilistic transitions occur. Probabilisitic transitions occur (...) when new "particles" are created as a result of inelastic interactions. All measurements are just special cases of this. This propensiton version of quantum theory, I argue, solves the wave/particle dilemma, is free of conceptual problems that plague orthodox quantum theory, recovers all the empirical success of orthodox quantum theory, and at the same time yields as yet untested predictions that differ from those of orthodox quantum theory. (shrink)

After surveying the strengths and weaknesses of several well-known approaches to wisdom, I argue for a new theory of wisdom that focuses on being epistemically, practically, and morally rational. My theory of wisdom, The Deep Rationality Theory of Wisdom, claims that a wise person is a person who is rational and who is deeply committed to increasing his or her level of rationality. This theory is a departure from theories of wisdom that demand practical and/or theoretical knowledge. The Deep Rationality (...) Theory salvages all that is attractive, and avoids all that is problematic, about theories of wisdom that require wise people to be knowledgeable. (shrink)

Are probabilism and special relativity compatible? Dieks argues that they are. But the possible universe he specifies, designed to exemplify both probabilism and special relativity, either incorporates a universal “now”, or amounts to a many world universe, or fails to have any one definite overall Minkowskian-type space-time structure. Probabilism and special relativity appear to be incompatible after all. What is at issue is not whether “the flow of time” can be reconciled with special relativity, but rather whether explicitly probabilistic versions (...) of quantum theory should be rejected because of incompatibility with special relativity. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere[1], is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is (...) to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve. [Back to Top]. (shrink)

Incommensurability was Kuhn’s worst mistake. If it is to be found anywhere in science, it would be in physics. But revolutions in theoretical physics all embody theoretical unification. Far from obliterating the idea that there is a persisting theoretical idea in physics, revolutions do just the opposite: they all actually exemplify the persisting idea of underlying unity. Furthermore, persistent acceptance of unifying theories in physics when empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted means that physics makes a persistent (...) implicit assumption concerning unity. To put it in Kuhnian terms, underlying unity is a paradigm for paradigms. We need a conception of science which represents problematic assumptions concerning the physical comprehensibility and knowability of the universe in the form of a hierarchy, these assumptions becoming less and less substantial and more and more such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all, as one goes up the hierarchy. This hierarchical conception of science has important Kuhnian features, but also differs dramatically from the view Kuhn expounds in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In this paper, I compare and contrast these two views in a much more detailed way than has been done hitherto. I show how the hierarchical view can be construed to emerge from Kuhn’s view as it is modified to overcome objections. I argue that the hierarchical conception of science is to be preferred to Kuhn’s view. (shrink)

. Many organizations continually search for new business models and ways to conduct business ethically, yet profitably. Kirk Cheyfitz (2003) proclaims that organizations should not waste time trying to create new business models because the rules of commerce never change. Instead of searching for new business models, organizations can improve business practices by looking at different paradigms or mental models for seeing how to build practices that lead to long-term success. The employment elements of wisdom as paradigms for developing sound (...) structures and practices that will encourage management behaviors that are ethical and lead to profitability. First, a theory of wisdom is developed. Then, the elements of wisdom are applied to the design of a general business structure and to refocusing some basic business practices. (shrink)

Steven Pinker's book Enlightenment NOW is in many ways a terrific book, from which I have learnt much. But it is also deeply flawed. Science and reason are at the heart of the book, but the conceptions that Steven Pinker defends are damagingly irrational. And these defective conceptions of science and reason, as a result of being associated with the Enlightenment Programme for the past two or three centuries, have been responsible, in part, for the genesis of the global problems (...) we now suffer from, and our current inability to deal with them properly. There is not a glimmering of an awareness of any of this in Pinker’s book. This flaw in Enlightenment NOW is serious indeed. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Howard Stein makes a number of criticisms of an earlier paper of mine ('Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible?', Phil. Sci., 1985), which explored the question of whether the idea that the future is genuinely 'open' in a probabilistic universe is compatible with special relativity. I disagree with almost all of Stein's criticisms.

Three big philosophical problems about consciousness are: Why does it exist? How do we explain and understand it? How can we explain brain-consciousness correlations? If functionalism were true, all three problems would be solved. But it is false, and that means all three problems remain unsolved (in that there is no other obvious candidate for a solution). Here, it is argued that the first problem cannot have a solution; this is inherent in the nature of explanation. The second problem is (...) solved by recognizing that (a) there is an explanation as to why science cannot explain consciousness, and (b) consciousness can be explained by a different kind of explanation, empathic or “personalistic” explanation, compatible with, but not reducible to, scientific explanation. The third problem is solved by exploiting David Chalmers“principle of structural coherence”, and involves postulating that sensations experienced by us–visual, auditory, tactile, and so on–amount to minute scattered regions in a vast, multi dimensional “space” of all possible sensations, which vary smoothly, and in a linear way, throughout the space. There is also the space of all possible sentient brain processes. There is just one, unique one-one mapping between these two spaces that preserves continuity and linearity. It is this which provides the explanation as to why brain processes and sensations are correlated as they are. I consider objections to this unique-matching theory, and consider how the theory might be empirically confirmed. (shrink)

This paper outlines the rationale underpinning the conception of science education as sociopolitical action, and then presents a critique of such a conception from the perspective of liberal education. More specifically, the paper discusses the importance of the conception of science education as sociopolitical action and then raises questions about the content of school science, about the place and value of scientific inquiry, and about the opportunities students have for self-directed inquiry. The central idea behind the critique is that a (...) conception of science education as sociopolitical action downplays the importance of knowledge for its own sake and totally neglects the personal/aesthetic dimension of science. (shrink)

Focusing on Nicholas Maxwell’s thesis that “science, properly understood, provides us the methodological key to the salvation of humanity”, the article discusses Maxwell’s aim oriented empiricism and his conception of Wisdom Inquiry as advocated in Maxwell’s (2009b, pp.1–56) essay entitled “How Can Life of Value Best Flourish in the Real World?” (in Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Studies in the Philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell 2009, edited by Leemon McHenry) and in Maxwell (2004 & 2009a).

Women themselves, for the most part, think of themselves as the sensible sex, whose business it is to undo the harm that comes of men's impetuous follies. For my part, I distrust all generalizations about women, favourable and unfavourable, masculine and feminine, ancient and modern; all alike, I should say, result from paucity of experience.

Patricia White; Self-respect, Self-esteem and the ‘Management’ of Schools and Colleges, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pag.

There is no problem more paradigmatically philosophical than the mind-body problem. Nevertheless, I will argue that the problem is empirical. I am not even suggesting that conceptual analysis of the various mind-body theories be abandoned – just as I could not suggest it be abandoned for theories in physics or biology. But unlike the question, ‘Is every even number greater than 2 equal to the sum of two primes?’ the mind-body problem cannot be solved a priori, by analysis alone; though (...) I will not argue this thesis here, it is nearly obvious, since purported solutions must make matter of fact claims, heavy with existential import, about the real world. By contrast, an investigation of the sensitivity of the mind-body problem to empirical evidence will show that purported solutions to the problem are empirically testable, to a degree consistent with philosophy giving a clarified mind-body problem to the sciences. I offer the bold outlines of such an investigation here. (shrink)

In the Preface to Rationality, Steven Pinker remarks that “we are smart enough to have … articulated the rules of reason that we so often flout” (p. xiv). Unfortunately, Pinker does not get the rules of reason right in this book. Pinker defends a damagingly irrational conception of reason. But despite this rather drastic failure, there is much of interest in this book, even if at a rather elementary level.

A collective understanding that traces a debate between 'what is science?’ and ‘what is a science about?’ has an extraction to the notion of scientific knowledge. The debate undertakes the pursuit of science that hardly extravagance the dogma of pseudo-science. Scientific conjectures invoke science as an intellectual activity poured by experiences and repetition of the objects that look independent of any idealist views (believes in the consensus of mind-dependence reality). The realistic machinery employs in an empiricist exposition of the objective (...) phenomenon by synchronizing the general method to make observational predictions that cover all the phenomena of the particular entity without any exception. The formation of science encloses several epistemological purviews and a succession of conjectures cum refutation that a newer theorem could reinstate. My attempt is to advocate a holistic plea of scientific conjectures that outruns the restricted regulation of experience or testable hypothesis to render the validity of a chain of logical reasoning (deductive or inductive) of basic scientific statements. The milieu of scientific intensification integrates speculation that loads efficiency towards a new experimental dimension where the reality is not itself objective or observers relative; in fact the observed phenomenon divulges in the constructive progression of preferred methods of falsifiability and uncertainty. (shrink)

The paper discusses Lehrer's pioneering approach to the topic of wisdom. His pithy proposal, that wisdom is preference of merit justified by an evaluation system and undefeated by error, fits well within the grand philosophical tradition of thinking about wisdom, offering a very clear and original formulation of its target. The first part of the paper puts it on a map of philosophical options concerning wisdom (anthropo-, theo- and cosmo-centric ones) and then raises questions about it: does preference have to (...) motivate, what is the relation between factual and evaluative knowledge in the evaluation system, and how is the objectivity of merit secured? The second part briefly develops an alternative proposal inspired by Lehrer's work. It is a two-level picture. Wisdom combines the virtues of the first-order production of decision and action (reliability and practical validity) with second-order reflective endorsement of the first-order picture. The first-order production yields phronesis-generated action-guiding desires which constitute practical wisdom in the narrow sense, and the second level the more refined and sophisticated wisdom of philosophers and their kin. (shrink)

The criticisms levelled at the notion of truth by an anti-realist and an entity-realist are critically examined. The upshot of the discussion will be that whilst neither of the two anti-truth philosophers have succeeded in establishing their cases against truth, for entity-realists to reject the notion of truth is to throw out the baby with the bath water: entity-realism without the notion of correspondence truth will degenerate into anti-realism.

We may think of the city as a kind of symbol of what most characterises our era: if it is true that our era is most characterised by complexity and uncertainty, it is also true that the city may be what can most clearly show what complexity and uncertainty actually mean. Our era’s harshest lesson is precisely that, when we move from the village to the city, specifically contemporary cities becoming not only exponentially big but also exponentially interconnected, complexity and (...) uncertainty increase as our era’s equally harsh global challenges, from climate change to pandemics to wars. Yet, contemporary cities’ global challenges may be not only harsh lessons but also unmissable opportunities. In what follows, as a philosopher, I shall work on at least two reasons why contemporary cities, specifically their future as what is likely to further increase complexity and uncertainty, may teach us something key from an epistemological perspective: first, to abstract more and, second, to be wiser, which are two epistemological capabilities that may be more crucial than ever in the future. (shrink)

In this article, I describe the need for tomorrow's scientists to be tutored in a personal ethic that values ethical responsiveness as the core, organizing principle for guiding research, teaching, application, and career direction. To address this need, I describe a teaching approach that instills science students with an understanding that moral reflection and action are the core tenets of scientific thinking and practice. The approach empowers students to reflect openly and discuss ongoing, ethical concerns as they face them in (...) their research and scholarship. Out of this, students naturally see the urgency to explore ethical issues and thinking from multiple perspectives, to develop and refine their ethical thinking, and to make moral choices in their routine scientific activities. (shrink)

This paper presents a synthesis of time-honoured pedagogical approaches to develop wisdom suitable to address the urgent problem-solving requirement of the modern university. During these last 30 years, I have employed a range of critical, interpretivist, qualitative research methods to examine archival and archaeological evidence and conduct cross-cultural and often comparative and international case studies to study wisdom. My central concern has been to understand how teachers across diverse locations throughout history have learned to develop wisdom and how they have (...) educated others to such understandings. As part of this work, I examined the modern university and its capacity to engage with local knowledge and wisdom. Over the course of analysis, I find that one of the constraints of scaling up institutions for learning wisdom into the now global model of the university is that universities have forgotten how to develop wisdom in the race towards industrialisation, colonisation, and neo-liberalism within the scientific paradigm. One of the early sacrifices of such scaling up was the ability of the university to preserve an intention to develop the wisdom of its students. Therefore, distant memory now is the ideation of wisdom that many societies and civilisations, and their institutions of higher learning, are in danger of forgetting the pedagogical pathway to do so. The paper begins with an examination of the long history of pedagogies for the development of wisdom. I then briefly discuss the methodological aspects of this paper and explain my key terms: information, knowledge and wisdom, followed by an examination of wisdom through the lens of the teaching and learning modalities of the _Oral_, _Written_, and _Printing_. My synthesis of wisdom artefacts and stories about pedagogy suggests that while wisdom is individually sensed, understood, and lived phenomenologically, its meaning is latent, socially agreed, and constrained in terms of how and if universities might cultivate its essential elements. Taking a Janussian backward- and forward-looking view, I propose a remembering and reconnecting approach to educating for wisdom through purposeful consideration of what we know about time-honoured pedagogies for teaching and learning wisdom, what are its current constraints, and what are its future opportunities in the university into the new postmodern, planetary, _virtual_ education era. (shrink)

This is a review of Craig Dilworth's The Metaphysics of Science (Dordrecht, Springer, 2007). The book propounds an immensely important idea. Science makes metaphysical presuppositions. Unfortunately, Dilworth ignores work that has been done on this issue which takes the matter much further than he does.

In our complex and highly connected world, educating for life—that is, educating students with knowledge, skills, and competences infused with practical wisdom (PW) and ethical and moral values—is essential. The paper seeks to answer the question: _how could university education facilitate the progress to a wiser and better world?_ The methodology involves case study research (CSR) based on both secondary and primary data. The missions, visions, and values of fourteen public Finnish universities are analyzed for PW. The findings demonstrate that (...) universities, by becoming more open, unbounded, and enacting organizations, and by enhancing collaboration with businesses, could foster the cultivation of PW in higher education (HE). The novelty of this paper is the creative communication of the case study, where _kairos_, _logos_, _pathos_, and _ethos_ are used to explore a new reality for HE. The article contributes to the contemporary discourses in the literature on the future of HE. Educators in HE need to transform from knowledge workers to wise leaders, wisdom workers, creators, empathizers, pattern recognizers, and meaning makers. The context of the case study research makes it difficult to generalize. Therefore, international, comparative research is used to complement the findings. The eight-stage change process applied to universities and HE could help in solving the urgent problems of society and facilitating progress to a wiser and better world. (shrink)