Many bioethicists promote and defend the ‘bedside rationing paradigm’; a pertinent example is the recent publication by Morten Magelssen and colleagues, in which they attack my previous criticism in the field. The present response focuses on what I consider to be the main side-effects of the ‘bedside rationing paradigm’: the ignorance towards intentions and societal roles, the crumbling of political practice, and the fiduciary loss in the physician–patient relationship. Further, I claim that these side effects are related to certain underlying (...) presumptions, such as the conception of fairness as equivalent with distributive justice and the belief in the presence of universally valid, context-independent moral principles. These presumptions are characteristics of modernist ethics; thus, the ‘bedside rationing paradigm’ illustrates some fundamental shortcomings of this moral theory. I argue that an ethics of virtue is better suited to the practice of medicine as well as to the rationing dilemmas. (shrink)