Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta is largely dismissive of ritual action, in part because the metaphysical position of non-duality erodes any independent existence of the individual as a ritual agent, and because knowledge of non-duality is thought to be independent of action. However, a close reading of Śaṅkara shows that he does accept forms of devotional practice that have remained largely marginalized in studies of Advaita Vedānta. This article compares and contrasts contemplative devotion, in the form of visualized meditations on īśvara, with (...) knowledge-like contemplation of non-duality. The challenge is that the Upaniṣads provide no clear distinctions between the two, and these upāsanas appear indistinguishable from nididhyāsana because they incorporate a conceptual identity with brahman or appear to affirm non-duality in some sense. Furthermore, the practices of both are rather obscure despite their significance in Śaṅkara’s system. Analyzing Śaṅkara’s interpretations of their underlying Upaniṣadic sentence structures in terms of grammatical apposition and reconstructing their use of visualization, superimposition, and negation, provides clues to properly delineate these practices, and to understand their epistemological functions and potential religious experiences. (shrink)

This article analyzes Śaṅkara’s use of dreaming in Advaita Vedānta. For Śaṅkara, dreaming functions philosophically as a direct phenomenal inquiry into mind and consciousness. Dreaming also functions as a syllogistic illustration. While dreaming, we experience unreal objects that do not exist apart from our minds. Dreaming thus illustrates the waking world’s nonrealism despite perceiving it as real, and that waking objects are consciousness alone. However, the dream illustration raises several questions: In what ways does illusory dream reality extend to waking (...) objects? And does Śaṅkara view the objective waking world as the individual’s cognitive construction similar to the dream, or as īśvara’s cosmological construction? This article argues that for Śaṅkara, the individual’s waking cognitive construction is primarily epistemological rather than an external ontological power akin to a creator deity; however, distinctions between individual and īśvara are ultimately indeterminable and lose meaning from the standpoint of nondual brahman. (shrink)

0 0 1 152 943 Lewis & Clark College 21 2 1093 14.0 Normal 0 false false false EN-US JA X-NONE Regarding each philosophy as a variation of that of Spinoza , t his article compares the German Idealism of Schelling and Hegel with the Indian Ved ā nta of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, as well as Abhinavagupta’s Kaśmiri Śaivism. It argues that only Hegel’s philosophy does not fail. For Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Abhinavagupta, and Schelling, the experience of ultimate reality—Brahman for Śaṅkara (...) and Rāmānuja, Śiva for Abhinavagupta, the Absolute for Schelling—is self-authenticating and so excludes the possibility of error. However, there is also no possibility of truth as no criterion distinguishes truth from error when individuals make contradictory claims. By contrast, Hegel’s Geist is an extended mind that potentially encompasses the human community. Geist develops historically. Experience is conceptual and concepts must be socially recognized to be legitimate. Experience is fallible, for Hegel, and better accounts are obtained through mutual criticism. Although disagreement represents an impassible impasse for Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja , Abhinavagupta, and Schelling, it is the road forward for Hegel. (shrink)

This paper primarily focuses on a pivotal argument within "The Great Learning" between Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming. Specifically, this argument revolves around whether one should prioritize investigating things before cultivating the sincerity of will or vice versa. In simpler terms, does genuine sincerity need to precede the exploration of a matter one deeply cares about, or does sincerity naturally evolve due to the initial investigation of the issue? Through thoroughly exploring various issues stemming from Chu Hsi's perspective, I contend (...) that Wang Yang-ming's stance, asserting that the sincerity of one's will should precede the investigation of things, appears more compelling than Chu Hsi's viewpoint. Furthermore, I extend this argument to draw parallels with Śaṅkara's "A Thousand Teachings," which similarly underscores the necessity of sincerity of will preceding the examination of matters, given Śaṅkara's stringent criteria for his students. (shrink)

This article explores the way in which Madhva (1238–1317), the founder of the Dvaita Vedānta system of Hindu thought, reformulates the traditional exegetic practice of nirukta or “word derivation” to validate his pluralistic, hierarchical, and Vaiṣṇava reading of the Ṛgvedic hymns. Madhva’s Ṛgbhāṣya (RB) is conspicuous for its heavy reliance on and unique deployment of this exegetical tactic to validate several key features of his distinctive theology. These features include his belief in Viṣṇu’s unique possession of all perfect attributes (guṇaparipūrṇatva) (...) and His related conveyability by all Vedic words (sarvaśabdavācyatva). Such an understanding of Vedic language invokes the basic nirukta presupposition that words are eternally affiliated with the meanings they convey. But it is also based onMadhva’s access to a lexicon entitled Vyāsa’s Nirukti with which his critics and perhaps even his commentators seem to be unfamiliar.While the precise status of this text is the subject of ongoing debate, Madhva’s possession of special insight into the sacred canon is established in part by his unique claim to be an avatāra of the wind god Vāyu and a direct disciple of Viṣṇu Himself in the form of Vyāsa1. Thus, Madhva’s use of nirukta invokes his personal charisma to challenge not only conventional understandings of the hymns but traditional exegetic norms. Madhva’s provision of an alternative tradition of nirukta provoked sectarian debate throughout the Vijayanagara period over the extent to which one could innovate in established practices of reading the Veda. Articulating the Veda’s precise authority was a key feature of Brahmin debates during this period and reflects both the empire’s concern with promoting a shared religious ideology and the competition among rival Brahman sects for imperial patronage that this concern elicited. By looking at how two of Madhva’s most important commentators (the 14th-century Jayatīrtha and the 17th-century Rāghavendra) sought to defend his niruktis, this article will explore how notions of normative nirukta were articulated in response to Madhva’s deviations. At the same time, however, examining Madhva’s commentators’ defense of his niruktis also demonstrates the extent to which Madhva actually adhered to selected exegetic norms. This reveals that discomfort with Madhva’s particular methods for deriving words stemmed, in part, from a more general ambivalence towards this exegetical tactic whose inherent open-endedness threatened to undermine the fixity of the canon’s very substance: its language. (shrink)