: According to Kuhn, theory choice is not governed by algorithms, but by values, which influence yet do not determine theory choice. Cladistic hypotheses, however, seem to be evaluated relative to a parsimony algorithm, which asserts that the best phylogenetic hypothesis is the one that requires the fewest character changes. While this seems to be an unequivocal evaluative rule, it is not. The application of the parsimony principle is ultimately indeterminate because the choice and individuation of characters that figure in (...) parsimony computations are indeterminate. The cladistic approach is Kuhnian because the application of parsimony depends on persuasion, background, training and tradition. (shrink)

The Darwinian theory of evolution is itself evolving and this book presents the details of the core of modern Darwinism and its latest developmental directions. The authors present current scientific work addressing theoretical problems and challenges in four sections, beginning with the concepts of evolution theory, its processes of variation, heredity, selection, adaptation and function, and its patterns of character, species, descent and life. The second part of this book scrutinizes Darwinism in the philosophy of science and its usefulness in (...) understanding ecosystems, whilst the third section deals with its application in disciplines beyond the biological sciences, including evolutionary psychology and evolutionary economics, Darwinian morality and phylolinguistics. The final section addresses anti-Darwinism, the creationist view and issues around teaching evolution in secondary schools. The reader learns how current experimental biology is opening important perspectives on the sources of variation, and thus of the very power of natural selection. This work examines numerous examples of the extension of the principle of natural selection and provides the opportunity to critically reflect on a rich theory, on the methodological rigour that presides in its extensions and exportations, and on the necessity to measure its advantages and also its limits. Scholars interested in modern Darwinism and scientific research, its concepts, research programs and controversies will find this book an excellent read, and those considering how Darwinism might evolve, how it can apply to the human sciences and other disciplines beyond its origins will find it particularly valuable. Originally produced in French (Les Mondes Darwiniens), the scope and usefulness of the book have led to the production of this English text, to reach a wider audience. This book is a milestone in the impressive penetration by Francophone scholars into the world of Darwinian science, its historiography and philosophy over the last two decades. Alex Rosenberg, R. Taylor Cole Professor of Philosophy, Duke University Until now this useful and comprehensive handbook has only been available to francophones. Thanks to this invaluable new translation, this collection of insightful and original essays can reach the global audience it deserves. Tim Lewens, University of Cambridge. (shrink)

The role of scientific theories in classifying plants and animals is traced from Hennig's phylogenetics and the evolutionary taxonomy of Simpson and Mayr, through numerical phenetics, to present-day cladistics. Hennig limited biological classification to sister groups so that this one relation can be expressed unambiguously in classifications. Simpson and Mayr were willing to sacrifice precision in representation in order to include additional features of evolution in the construction of classifications. In order to make classifications more objective, precise and quantitative, numerical (...) pheneticists limited themselves to representing degrees of phenetic similarity. Finally, present-day cladists can be separated into phylogenetic cladists, who retain much of Hennig's theory of classification, and pattern cladists, who have stripped Hennig's system down to its bare essentials. (shrink)

Although our concepts of “Mama,” “milk,” and “mice” have much in common, the suggestion that they are identical in structure in the mind of the prelinguistic child is mistaken. Even infants think about objects as different from substances and appreciate the distinction between kinds (e.g., mice) and individuals (e.g., Mama). Such cognitive capacities exist in other animals as well, and have important adaptive consequences.

The paper offers a new understanding of induction in the empirical sciences, one which assimilates it to induction in geometry rather than to statistical inference. To make the point a system of notions, essential to logically sound induction, is defined. Notable among them are arbitrary object and particular property. A second aim of the paper is to bring to light a largely neglected set of assumptions shared by both induction and deduction in the empirical sciences. This is made possible by (...) appealing to the logic of common nouns and applying it to the logic of natural-kind terms.This strategy yields a new insight into the concept of natural kinds. While the strategy reveals deep affinity between empirical induction and deduction it also reveals two problems peculiar to induction. This helps to explain the intuition that induction is the more problematic of the two. The paper does not set out ‘to solve the problem of induction’. 1The paper has benefited from the support and critical comments of several friends: Steven Davis, Kevin Dunbar, Anil Gupta, Michael Hallett, Ray Jackendoff and Storrs McCall. Two friends, however, deserve special thanks, Michael Makkai and Gonzalo Reyes. Many of the points made in the paper, otherwise unacknowledged, are due to their generosity and patience. In fact, the paper can be seen as an application of the logic of kinds on which Gonzalo Reyes has been working for several years. (shrink)

Four ordering systems have been used most frequently in taxonomy: (1) special purpose classifications, (2) downward classifications (identification schemes), (3) upward or grouping classifications (traditional), and (4) Hennigian phylogenetic systems. The special properties of these four systems are critically evaluated. Grouping classifications and phylogenetic systems have very different objectives: the former the documentation of similarity and closeness of relationship, the latter of phylogeny. Both are legitimate ordering systems.

Since Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, the idea of descent with modification came to dominate systematics, and so the study of morphology became subgugated to the reconstruction of phylogenies. Reinstating the organism in the theory of evolution (Ho & Saunders, 1979; Webster & Goodwin, 1982) leads to a project inrational taxonomy (Ho, 1986, 1988a), which attempts to classify biological forms on the basis of transformations on a given dynamical structure.Does rational taxonomy correspond to thenatural system that Linnaeus and (...) his contemporaries as well as all pre-Darwinian morphologists had in mind? Here, we examine how rational taxonomy and the natural system can coincide in the dynamics of processes generating forms during development, which conferexclusivity, genericity androbustness to the forms that do exist. We use the example of segmentation, especially inDrosophila, as an illustration to explore the implications of rational taxonomy for evolution and systematics, and the relationship between ontogeny and phylogeny. (shrink)

The progress towards mathematization or, in a broader context, towards an increased “objectivity” is one of the main trends in the development of biological systematics in the past century. It is commonplace to start the history of numerical taxonomy with the works of R. R. Sokal and P. H. A. Sneath that in the 1960s laid the foundations of this school of taxonomy. In this article, I discuss the earliest research program in this field, developed in the 1920s by the (...) Russian entomologist and biometrician Eugen (Evgeniy Sergeevich) Smirnov. The theoretical and methodological grounds of this program are considered based on the published works of Smirnov as well as some archival sources. The influence of Smirnov’s evolutionary (mechano-Lamarckian) convictions on the development of this project of “exact systematics” is analyzed as well as the author’s attempts to establish a novel concept of “mathematical essentialism” in animal taxonomy. The probable causes of the failure of Smirnov’s project are viewed from both externalist and internalist perspectives, including the opposition to the use of quantitative methods in biology by some of the Lysenkoist ideologists in the USSR. A brief comparison of Smirnov’s research program with that developed 40 years later by Sokal and Sneath is provided. (shrink)

Ernst Mayr''s scientific career continues strongly 70 years after he published his first scientific paper in 1923. He is primarily a naturalist and ornithologist which has influenced his basic approach in science and later in philosophy and history of science. Mayr studied at the Natural History Museum in Berlin with Professor E. Stresemann, a leader in the most progressive school of avian systematics of the time. The contracts gained through Stresemann were central to Mayr''s participation in a three year expedition (...) to New Guinea and The Solomons, and the offer of a position in the Department of Ornithology, American Museum of Natural History, beginning in 1931. At the AMNH, Mayr was able to blend the best of the academic traditions of Europe with those of North America in developing a unified research program in biodiversity embracing systematics, biogeography and nomenclature. His tasks at the AMNH were to curate and study the huge collections amassed by the Whitney South Sea Expedition plus the just purchased Rothschild collection of birds. These studies provided Mayr with the empirical foundation essential for his 1942Systematics and the Origin of Species and his subsequent theoretical work in evolutionary biology as well as all his later work in the philosophy and history of science. Without a detailed understanding of Mayr''s empirical systematic and biogeographic work, one cannot possibly comprehend fully his immense contributions to evolutionary biology and his later analyses in the philosophy and history of science. (shrink)

The field of knowledge organization (KO) can be described as composed of the four distinct but connected layers of theory, systems, representation, and application. This paper focuses on the relations between KO theory and KO systems. It is acknowledged how the structure of KO systems is the product of a mixture of ontological, epistemological, and pragmatical factors. However, different systems give different priorities to each factor. A more ontologically-oriented approach, though not offering quick solutions for any particular group of users, (...) will produce systems of wide and long-lasting application as they are based on general, shareable principles. I take the case of the ontological theory of integrative levels, which has been considered as a useful source for general classifications for several decades, and is currently implemented in the Integrative Levels Classification system. The theory produces a sequence of main classes modelling a natural order between phenomena. This order has interesting effects also on other features of the system, like the citation order of concepts within compounds. As it has been shown by facet analytical theory, it is useful that citation order follow a principle of inversion, as compared to the order of the same concepts in the schedules. In the light of integrative levels theory, this principle also acquires an ontological meaning: phenomena of lower level should be cited first, as most often they act as specifications of higher-level ones. This ontological principle should be complemented by consideration of the epistemological treatment of phenomena: in case a lower-level phenomenon is the main theme, it can be promoted to the leading position in the compound subject heading. The integration of these principles is believed to produce optimal results in the ordering of knowledge contents. (shrink)

One general principle in the construction of classification schemes is that of grouping phenomena to be classified according to their shared origin in evolution or history (phylogenesis). In general schemes, this idea has been applied by several classificationists in identifying a series of integrative levels, each originated from the previous ones, and using them as the main classes. In special schemes, common origin is a key principle in many domains: examples are given from the classification of climates, of organisms, and (...) of musical instruments. Experience from these domains, however, suggests that using common origin alone, as done in cladistic taxonomy, can produce weird results, like having birds as a subclass of reptiles; while the most satisfying classifications use a well balanced mix of common origin and similarity. It is discussed how this could be applied to the development of a general classification of phenomena in an emergentist perspective, and how the resulting classification tree could be structured. Charles Bennett's notion of logical depth appears to be a promising conceptual tool for this purpose. (shrink)