Contemporary conceptions and practices regarding complicity have led to the surprising emergence of citizens who seek rather than flee complicity. The purpose of this is to gain standing to challenge controversial state practices. As in the recent Hobby Lobby decision, such attempts to demonstrate complicity are not motivated by a desire to take ownership over state actions, but to justify institutional reforms or individual opt-outs that would not be legitimized absent such a finding of complicity. This article highlights the danger (...) posed by the proliferation of claims of this sort and works to unpack and critique the logic of such efforts to demonstrate complicity. Such claims rely upon implied political meanings of complicity, which affirm a strong connection between complicity, standing, and sovereignty. These political meanings of complicity are embedded in familiar conceptions of liberal democratic citizenship, but upon examination prove to be in tension with core liberal principles. By bringing to the surface the connection between complicity, standing, and sovereignty, this logic may be reformulated in such a way as to contribute to healthier modes of democratic participation. (shrink)

In his paper “The Social Diffusion of Warrant and Rationality,” Sanford Goldberg argues that relying on testimony makes the warrant for our beliefs “socially diffuse” and that this diminishes our capacity to rationally police our beliefs. Thus, according to Goldberg, rationality itself is socially diffuse. I argue that while testimonial warrant may be socially diffuse (because it depends on the warrants of other epistemic agents) this feature has no special link to our capacity to rationally police our beliefs. Nevertheless, I (...) endorse Goldberg’s claim about rationality and I propose that a Foley-style account of rationality might help to better articulate Goldberg’s proposal. (shrink)

Many people have the intuition that the failure to impose punishment on perpetrators of such serious human rights violations as murder, torture and rape that occurred in the course of violent conflict preceding a society’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy amounts to an injustice. This intuition is to an appreciable extent accounted for by the retributivist outlook of a high proportion of those who share it. Colleen Murphy, however, though she accepts that retributivism may justify punishment of offenders in stable (...) democracies, claims in her recent book on transitional justice that retributivism is inapplicable in the circumstances of transitional justice. I argue that the four arguments she provides in support of this claim are unsuccessful and that retributivism, assuming it to be a tenable rationale for punishment, justifies the subjection of perpetrators of at least some serious human rights abuses to sanctions in at least some transitional societies. (shrink)

Some instances of right and wrongdoing appear to be of a distinctly collective kind. When, for example, one group commits genocide against another, the genocide is collective in the sense that the wrongness of genocide seems morally distinct from the aggregation of individual murders that make up the genocide. The problem, which I refer to as the problem of collective wrongs, is that it is unclear how to assign blame for distinctly collective wrongdoing to individual contributors when none of those (...) individual contributors is guilty of the wrongdoing in question. I offer Christopher Kutz’s Complicity Principle as an attractive starting point for solving the problem, and then argue that the principle ought to be expanded to include a broader and more appropriate range of cases. The view I ultimately defend is that individuals are blameworthy for collective harms insofar as they knowingly participate in those harms, and that said individuals remain blameworthy regardless of whether they succeed in making a causal contribution to those harms. (shrink)

Social movements are ubiquitous in political life. But what are they? What makes someone a member of a social movement, or some action an instance of movement activity? Are social movements compatible with democracy? Are they required for it? And how should individuals respond to movement calls to action? Philosophers have had much to say on issues impinging on social movements but much less to say on social movements as such. The current article provides a philosophical overview of social movements. (...) To do so it canvasses contemporary work on the nature of shared agency and collective action, social epistemology, democratic theory, and the theory of individual responsibility for structural injustice. The article finds that contemporary analytic philosophy has considerable work to do if it is to account for the nature, epistemology, ethics, and politics of social movements. There may be more things in the streets than are dreamt of in our philosophy. (shrink)

The legal doctrine of ‘common purpose’ in South African criminal law considers all parties liable who have been in implicit or explicit agreement to commit an unlawful act, and associated with each other for that purpose, even if the consequential act has been carried out by one of them. It relieves the prosecution of proving the causal link between the conduct of an individual member of a group acting in common purpose, and the ultimate consequence caused by the action of (...) the group as a whole. The National Prosecuting Authority’s controversial and vociferously challenged decision to charge 270 demonstrators at Lonmin Platinum Mine in Marikana with the murders of 34 colleagues under the ‘common purpose’ doctrine, implying liability by association or agreement, raises the question as to the constitution and characteristics of the crowd and of the public, respectively. This article outlines the history of the application of the common purpose rule in South Africa, to then examine ‘common purpose’ within the philosophical parameters of group psychology and collective intentionality. It argues for methodological individualism within a psychoanalytic theorisation of group dynamics, and a non-summative approach to collective intentionality, in addressing some problems in the conceptualisation of group formation. (shrink)

In Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics Catherine Lu endorses the idea that those who contribute to the reproduction of structural injustice have responsibilities to address that injustice. However, in the book, Lu does not explore the grounds and justification for recognising such a responsibility. In order to address this deficit, this paper proposes that those likely to contribute to the reproduction of structural injustice, in the future, have precautionary duties, in the present, that require them to take action aimed (...) at preventing their future contribution. It is proposed that these ‘collectivization duties’ require them to act responsively with a view to forming a collective that can end the structural injustice in question. This account recommends a collective-action solution alongside recognising that each socially connected agent is obliged to act. However, it does not entail that amorphous groups bear responsibilities and is appropriate in its attribution of blame, thus avoiding both Nussbaum’s critique of perpetually forward-looking accounts and the ‘agency objection’. (shrink)

Commonsense moral thought holds that what makes terrorism particularly abhorrent is the fact that it tends to be directed toward innocent victims. Yet contemporary philosophers tend to doubt that the concept of innocence plays any significant role here, and to deny that prohibitions against targeting noncombatants can be justified through appeal to their moral innocence. I argue, however, that the arguments used to support these doubts are ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, the philosophical positions in question tend to misunderstand the justification of (...) both the prohibition against targeting noncombatants, and that of the permission to attack combatants, for which the paper offers a new account. Such misunderstandings make it all too easy to justify both terrorist actions and morally objectionable actions on the part of nations at war. Taking proper account of the role of innocence in the context of armed conflict will alter our ordinary ways of thinking about the ethics of war, with respect to both jus in bello and jus ad bellum. (shrink)

Jeff McMahan famously defends a moral inequality of combatants, where liability to be attacked and potentially killed in war, should be grounded in the individual combatant’s moral responsibility for posing an unjust threat. In a response, Seth Lazar shows that McMahan’s criterion for liability leads to an unacceptable dilemma between “contingent pacifism” and “total war”, i.e. between war being practically infeasible, or implausibly many civilians being legitimate targets. The problem is that McMahan grounds liability mainly in the individual’s causal responsibility (...) for posing an unjust threat, but where a large proportion of combatants and civilians are approximately equally causally responsible. Recently, Saba Bazargan has come to the aid of McMahan by injecting an alternative supplementary criterion for liability, namely the individual’s complicity in a group act. This criterion is supposed to uphold the noted moral inequality, while avoiding the responsibility dilemma, by grounding moral incrimination in the individual’s participatory intention, instead of her causal contribution. I argue that the complicity account fails to resolve the dilemma. It fails because complicity grounded in a causally inert participatory intention is insufficient for liability. Further, I show why this reveals a deeper problem with the complicity account itself, namely that though it purports to ground incrimination non-causally, it fails to do so to any serious extent. (shrink)

Why, exactly, should we punish children who commit crimes more leniently than adults who commit the same offenses? Gideon Yaffe thinks it is because they cannot vote, and so the strength of their reasons to obey the law is weaker than if they could. They are thus less culpable when they disobey. This argument invites an obvious objection: why not simply enfranchise children, thereby granting them legal reasons that are the same strength as enfranchised adults, and so permitting similarly severe (...) punishment? Yaffe answers this question by arguing that child enfranchisement would objectionably undermine the values of political equality and self-government. This article explores some serious doubts about these arguments. It closes by questioning Yaffe’s reliance on a retributivist theory of punishment, contending that, once we reject retributivism in favor of more humane and productive alternatives, the thesis that child criminals deserve a break—which Yaffe assumes to be undeniably correct—becomes less plausible. (shrink)

If the criminal trial is aimed simply at ascertaining the truth of a criminal charge, it is inherently problematic to prevent the prosecution from adducing relevant evidence on the ground of its unlawful provenance. This article challenges the starting premise by replacing the epistemic focus with a political perspective. It offers a normative justification for the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence that is rooted in a theory of the criminal trial as a process of holding the executive to the rule (...) of law. On this theory, it is the admission rather than exclusion of such evidence that is inherently problematic. The differences between this theory and others that are in currency will be noted, as will its implications and limitations. (shrink)

The paper develops a responsibility-based account of professional ethics in banking. From this perspective, bankers have duties not only toward clients—the traditional focus of professional ethics—but also regarding the prevention of systemic harms to whole societies. When trying to fulfill these duties, bankers have to meet three challenges: epistemic challenges, motivational challenges, and a coordination challenge. These challenges can best be met by a combination of regulation and ethics that aligns responsibilities, recognition, and incentives and creates what Parsons has called (...) “integrated situations”. Professional associations play an important role for this purpose, especially as spaces in which peer recognition is earned. But financial incentives equally need to be brought in line, for example, through deferred bonuses or claw backs. Such measures can create a new culture of accountability in banking. (shrink)

Do I cause global warming, climate change and their related harms when I go for a leisure drive with my gas-guzzling car? The current verdict seems to be that I do not; the emissions produced by my drive are much too insignificant to make a difference for the occurrence of global warming and its related harms. I argue that our verdict on this issue depends on what we mean by ‘causation’. If we for instance assume a simple counterfactual analysis of (...) causation according to which ‘C causes E’ means ‘if C had not occurred, E would not have occurred’, we must conclude that a single drive does not cause global warming. However, this analysis of causation is well-known for giving counterintuitive results in some important cases. If we instead adopt Lewis’s analysis of causation, it turns out that it is indeterminate whether I cause global warming when I go for a single drive. Still, in contexts where we seek to control or understand global warming, there is a pressure to adopt a more fragile view of this event. When we adopt such a view, it turns out that a single drive does cause global warming. This means that we cannot like Sinnott-Armstrong and Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong reject the idea that I should refrain from going for a leisure drive simply because such a drive does not cause global warming. (shrink)

Individuals are often causally inconsequential parts of highly consequential wholes. If each individual is causally inconsequential, and what she does makes no causal difference, we may be inclined to absolve each of causal responsibility for the consequences of what occurs as a result of the larger whole of which each is a part. But there is another form of responsibility – constitutive responsibility. Whatever the causal consequences may be, each individual constitutes part of that whole and each therefore bears responsibility (...) of at least that sort for the whole. (shrink)

Responsibility is a key theme of recent debates over the ethics of international society. In particular, rising powers such as Brazil, China, and India regularly reject the idea that coercion should be a feature of world politics, and they portray military intervention as irresponsible. But this raises the problem of how a society's norms can be upheld without coercive measures. Critics have accused them of “free riding” on existing great powers and failing to address the dilemma of how to deal (...) with actors undermining societal values. This article examines writing on responsibility and international society, with particular reference to the English School, to identify why the willingness and capacity to use force—as well as creative thinking in this regard—are seen as important aspects of responsibility internationally. It then explores statements made by Brazil, China, and India in UN Security Council meetings between 2011 and 2016 to identify which actors they see as responsible and how they define responsible action. In doing so, it pinpoints areas of concurrence as well as disagreements in their understandings of the concept of responsibility, and concludes that Brazil and India have a more coherent and practical understanding of the concept than China, which risks incurring the label “great irresponsible.”. (shrink)

Moral problems such as climate change and global poverty result from widespread human action, and hence, are unaffected by changes in any individual's behavior—for instance, the harms of climate change will obtain whether I drive my car or not. This problem of causal impotence seems potentially devastating for consequentialists, but more easily addressed by deontologists. The deontologist can argue that (e.g.) even if our acts will have no effect on climate change, our using fossil fuels makes us complicit in, and (...) hence, blameworthy for, these wrongs. We argue that, despite initial appearances, appeals to complicity do not extricate deontologists from this problem. When our actions do not make a difference, we cannot be held responsible for being complicit in wrongs such as climate change and global poverty. As a result, we conclude that the problem of causal impotence is as vexing for deontologists as it is for consequentialists. (shrink)

Henry Shue has led the charge among moral philosophers in arguing that harms stemming from anthropogenic climate change constitute violations of basic rights and are therefore prohibited by duties of justice. Because frameworks such as Shue’s argue that duties of justice are at stake, one could object that the special urgency of those duties threatens to overrun the normatively protected space in which an agent makes her life her own. We argue that an alternative conception of how moral reasons combine (...) to produce duties is required to respond to the demandingness objection, providing normatively protected space to pursue one’s projects while yielding numerous strict obligations of justice. (shrink)

This paper makes the case for the permissibility of post-conflict amnesties, although not on prudential grounds. It argues that amnesties of a certain scope, targeted to certain categories of perpetrators, and offered in certain contexts are morally permissible because they are an acknowledgment of the difficulty of attributing criminal responsibility in mass violence contexts. Based on this idea, the paper develops the further claim that deciding which amnesties are permissible and which ones are not should be decided on a case-by-case (...) basis. Against what seems to be an increasingly popular assumption of some international actors, just as "blanket" amnesties are impermissible, so is an absolutist rejection of all types of amnesties. (shrink)

The contemporary global crisis can be explored in different perspectives. This text focuses on constitutionalism. It asks whether constitutionalism still matters. Responding to this question requires revisiting the basic analytical and normative concepts that shape individual autonomy, polity, law and democracy in the context of globalization. Part I of the article introduces the question of the crisis of constitutionalism. It briefly explores the dispute between proponents of state and post-state constitutionalism, and proceeds with an analysis of societal constitutionalism. The critical (...) reading of this theory prepares the ground for a positive normative argument. Part II of the article argues for the return to the moral core of constitutionalism. It defends the claim that justice at the global stage requires establishing a minimum common denominator that would be composed of universalizable substantive principles. The institutional question follows. Its focus should be on the authoritative identification, protection and advancement of the core values of constitutionalism in the social and legal-political realms of the world society. (shrink)

How does precarious work entail social vulnerabilities and moral complicities? Theorists of precarity pose two challenges for analysing labour conditions in Asia. Their first challenge is to distinguish the new kinds of social vulnerability which constitute precarious work. The second is to assign moral responsibility in the social network that produces vulnerability in depoliticised and morally detached ways. In this article, the social and normative dimensions of precarious work are connected through a conceptual investigation into how Singapore allocates responsibility for (...) managing temporary migrant labour. First, it analyses how various management strategies, driven by globalisation and government deregulation, increase worker vulnerabilities. These strategies intensify relations of dependence, disempowerment and discrimination, which the workers may accommodate or resist in limited ways. Second, it assesses why the strategies leave the state, employers, agents and others complicit in producing the vulnerabilities. These actors enable, collaborate with, or condone the production of precarity. Their complicity is complicated by varying support or resistance to reforms. The result is a novel conceptual scheme for analysing the complicit network behind precarious work, which can be used in other sites of precarity where some are complicit in the vulnerability of others. (shrink)

Vaikka suurin osa viimeaikaisesta ilmaston lämpenemisestä on ihmisten aiheuttamaa antropogeenista lämpenemistä, yksittäisten ihmisten kausaalinen vaikutus ilmastonmuutokseen on minimaalinen, jopa mitätön. Tämän takia jotkut väittävät, että on harhaanjohtavaa pitää yksilöitä vastuussa ilmastonmuutoksesta. Tällainen argumentointi perustuu perinteisiin vastuutulkintoihin ja -käsitteisiin, joissa vastuun perustana painotetaan toimijan näkökulmaa ja hänen kausaalista rooliaan: jos toimijan teot tai tekemättä jättämiset eivät vaikuta lopputulokseen, hän ei ole vastuussa siitä. Ilmastonmuutoksessa on toinenkin vastuukäsitysten kannalta ongelmallinen seikka, intentionaalisuus eli tahallisuus: ihmiskunta tai yksittäiset ihmiset eivät ole tietoisesti lähteneet muuttamaan (...) ilmastoa. Päinvastoin ilmastonmuutos on syntynyt teollistumisen ja nykyisen elämäntyylimme tahattomana – ja pitkään myös tiedostamattomana – sivuvaikutuksena. Koska omien tekojemme kausaalinen vaikutus sekä niiden tahallisuus tai tahattomuus on luonnollisesti keskiössä arvioidessamme omaa vastuutamme, mahdollinen osallisuutemme vahingon tuottamiseen jää helposti vähemmälle huomiolle. -/- Keskityn tässä artikkelissa osallisuusvastuun (complicity) käsitteeseen ja argumentoin samalla liian yksilökeskeistä ajattelua vastaan. Kollektiivinen toimijuus on otettava huomioon siinä missä yksilökeskeinenkin. Vastuunkantaja ja vastuun peruste ovat analyyttisesti erillisiä käsitteitä, ja niiden tarkastelu voi valottaa vastuukeskustelua ilmastonmuutoksesta. Vastuun peruste voi olla yksilöllinen silloinkin, kun vastuunkantaja on kollektiivinen. Lisäksi argumentoin, että vastuusta puhuttaessa ei riitä katsoa asiaa vain toimijan itsensä kannalta, vaan myös uhrin ja sivustakatsojan näkökulmat on otettava huomioon. Vasta kun vastuukäytäntöjä tarkastellaan ihmisten keskinäisten (usein monimutkaisten) verkostojen ja linkitysten kautta, voidaan saada tasapainoinen kuva vastuumme määrästä ja sen rajoista. -/- Yksilön vastuu ei poista vastuuta kollektiiveilta, kuten valtioilta, ja voimme tehokkaimmin hillitä ilmastonmuutosta esimerkiksi lainsäädännön kautta. Ennen kuin kollektiiviset ratkaisut ilmastonmuutoksen hillitsemiseksi saadaan toimimaan, vastuu palautuu kuitenkin yksilöille. Vastuun peruste on aina yksilötasolla ja sitä voidaan ainoastaan delegoida kollektiiveille. Ilmastonmuutoksen kohdalla delegointi ei ole vielä toiminut. (shrink)

En este artículo discuto dos tesis que Thomas Pogge deriva de su concepción institucional de los derechos humanos: la tesis de la culpa y la tesis de la violación global. La tesis de la culpa asevera que los ciudadanos que contribuyen a sostener un régimen institucional que viola derechos humanos sin realizar compensaciones en beneficio de las víctimas, se convierten ellos mismos en violadores de derechos humanos. Por su parte, la tesis de la violación global asevera que al imponer regulaciones (...) injustas que tienden a generar pobreza extrema, el régimen internacional actual viola los derechos humanos de los pobres del mundo. Mi intención será probar que ambas tesis son insostenibles ya que se basan en presupuestos errados en materia de responsabilidad. Esto no nos conducirá, sin embargo, a abandonar la concepción institucional de los derechos humanos. Por el contrario, una vez depurada de sus problemas, se trata de una concepción que puede ayudarnos a pensar adecuadamente sobre la responsabilidad por los derechos humanos en un mundo globalizado. In this paper, I discuss two theses that Thomas Pogge derives from his ins-titutional conception of human rights: the thesis of guilt and the thesis of global violation. The thesis of guilt states that citizens who contribute to support an institutional regime that violates human rights without awarding the victims any compensation become themselves human rights violators. The thesis of global violation, on the other hand, states that, by imposing unfair regulations that tend to generate extreme poverty, the current international regime violates the human rights of the world's poor. My intention is to prove that both theses are untenable because both of them are based on wrong assumptions concerning responsibility. This will not lead us, however, to leave the institutional conception of human rights. On the contrary, once debugged of its problems, it can be considered a conception that can help us to think properly about responsibility for human rights in a globalized world. (shrink)

We are responsible for some things but not for others. In this thesis, I investigate what it takes for an entity to be responsible for something. This question has two components: agents and actions. I argue for a permissive view about agents. Entities such as groups or artificially intelligent systems may be agents in the sense required for responsibility. With respect to actions, I argue for a causal view. The relation in virtue of which agents are responsible for actions is (...) a causal one. I claim that responsibility requires causation and I develop a causal account of agency. This account is particularly apt for addressing the relationship between agency and moral responsibility and sheds light on the causal foundations of moral responsibility. (shrink)

Multiculturalism has become a hot topic in political philosophy. This thesis investigates the philosophical foundations of multicultural theories through examining the key concepts commonly relied upon. A careful examination of each concept and the way in which they are interconnected, reveals an interesting strategy that the multiculturalist employs. It is my contention that the multiculturalist relies on a complex web of nebulous concepts which fools the reader into thinking that their theory rests on strong foundations. However, when we clear away (...) the fog of confusion, we can see that the multiculturalist has presented us with an illusion, and none of the concepts remain strong enough to hold any of the normative weight they need them to. Multiculturalism relies on grandiloquent rhetoric and muddled thinking, and will ultimately fail to achieve the liberal goals it purports to. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of collective intentionality typically rely on members to form a personal intention of sorts, viewed as a mental state. This tendency is opposed by recent economic literature on team-directed reasoning, which focuses on the reasoning process leading up to the formation of the members’ intentions. Our formal analysis bridges these paradigms and criticizes the team- directed reasoning account on two counts: first, team-directed reasoning is supposed to transcend traditional game and decision theory by adopting a certain collectivistic reasoning (...) method. However, we show that team-directed reasoning yields the same action recommendations as a certain I-mode we-intention type. Accordingly, an important part of we-mode reasoning can be reduced to I-mode reasoning with certain preferences. Second, contrary to the claims of team-directed-reasoning theorists, we refute that team-directed reasoning surpasses pro-group intentions in selecting cooperatively rational solutions. That is, in some scenarios team-directed reasoning fails to guarantee successful cooperation whereas pro-group intentions succeed in doing so. We therefore propose to revise team-directed reasoning and introduce a third we-intention type, called participatory intentions. We prove that participatory intentions guarantee that a best group action is performed whenever either team-directed reasoning or pro-group intentions do. (shrink)

Recent philosophical research on normativity has clarified the nature and dynamics of social norms. Social norms are distinguished from legal and moral norms on the basis of their scope, their grounds, their characteristic forms of accountability, or some combination of these features. Because of their distinct character, social norms can reinforce practical prescriptions, prohibitions, and permissions provided to particular actors by legal or moral norms. They also can conflict drastically with those prescriptions, prohibitions, and permissions resulting in serious practical dilemmas. (...) The identification of normative principles capable of resolving practical dilemmas arising from conflicts between different kinds of norms is a major aim of contemporary moral and political philosophy. This dissertation contributes to this aim by establishing the significance of conflicts between social norms and legal or moral norms during mass atrocities and liberalizing political transitions. The dissertation argues that social norms, and changes in social norms, are critical components of accurate descriptions and responsible evaluations both legal and moral of the actions of individuals and groups before, during, and after mass atrocities. The dissertation contends, further, that distinct principles of justice may apply to transitional efforts by non-state actors to transform social norms in societies recovering from large-scale crimes. Three principal results follow from this dissertations effort to integrate the conceptual framework of social norms into the study of mass atrocity. First, the dissertation clarifies and extends the historiographical thesis of norm transformation, according to which participation by ordinary individuals in mass atrocities is at least partially explained by transformations in basic norms that structure social and political life. Second, the dissertation identifies a novel basis on which to apportion legal and moral accountability for mass atrocities between individuals and groups or collectivities i.e. on the basis of the specific contributions of social norms. Third, the dissertation provides new support for the disputed claim that distinct principles of justice apply to the various actors involved in liberalizing political transitions. (shrink)