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Paternalism and self-interest

Journal of Value Inquiry 14 (3-4):195-216 (1980)

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  1. (1 other version)Autonomy and Paternalism.Robert Young - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 8:47-66.
    Paternalism has generally been thought of as forcible or coercive interference with a person's liberty of action which is justified because it will prevent harm to that person's welfare interests or the like. Opposition to paternalistic interference with adults, whether it involves the intervention of the state or another adult individual, has usually been based on a concern to preserve human autonomy or self-determination. More strictly it is opposition to so-called ‘strong’ paternalism - interventions to protect or benefit a person (...)
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  • (1 other version)Autonomy and Paternalism.Robert Young - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (sup1):47-66.
    Paternalism has generally been thought of as forcible or coercive interference with a person's liberty of action which is justified because it will prevent harm to that person's welfare interests or the like. Opposition to paternalistic interference with adults, whether it involves the intervention of the state or another adult individual, has usually been based on a concern to preserve human autonomy or self-determination. More strictly it is opposition to so-called ‘strong’ paternalism - interventions to protect or benefit a person (...)
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  • (1 other version)Normative systems and medical metaethics Part II: Health-maximizing and persons.Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh - 1981 - Metamedicine 2 (3):343-359.
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  • (1 other version)Normative systems and medical metaethics part II: Health-maximizing and persons.Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh - 1981 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2 (3):343-359.
    Two common medical-ethical axions, the health-maximizing axiom and the personhood-respecting axiom, are discussed. On the basis of a philosophical analysis of personhood and freedom of the will it is shown that these two axioms are incompatible. The rejection of the first axiom is suggested.
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