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The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment: Empirical and Philosophical Developments

Joshua May, Clifford I. Workman, Julia Haas & Hyemin Han

In Felipe de Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Neuroscience and philosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. pp. 17-47 (2022)

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Moral Rationalism on the Brain.Joshua May - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (1):237-255.details I draw on neurobiological evidence to defend the rationalist thesis that moral judgments are essentially dependent on reasoning, not emotions (conceived as distinct from inference). The neuroscience reveals that moral cognition arises from domain-general capacities in the brain for inferring, in particular, the consequences of an agent’s action, the agent’s intent, and the rules or norms relevant to the context. Although these capacities entangle inference and affect, blurring the reason/emotion dichotomy doesn’t preferentially support sentimentalism. The argument requires careful consideration of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Examining Phronesis Models with Evidence from the Neuroscience of Morality Focusing on Brain Networks.Hyemin Han - forthcoming - Topoi:1-13.details In this paper, I examined whether evidence from the neuroscience of morality supports the standard models of phronesis, i.e., Jubilee and Aretai Centre Models. The standard models explain phronesis as a multifaceted construct based on interaction and coordination among functional components. I reviewed recent neuroscience studies focusing on brain networks associated with morality and their connectivity to examine the validity of the models. Simultaneously, I discussed whether the evidence helps the models address challenges, particularly those from the phronesis eliminativism. Neuroscientific (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Reinforcement learning: A brief guide for philosophers of mind.Julia Haas - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (9):e12865.details I argue for the role of reinforcement learning in the philosophy of mind. To start, I make several assumptions about the nature of reinforcement learning and its instantiation in minds like ours. I then review some of the contributions of reinforcement learning methods have made across the so-called 'decision sciences.' Finally, I show how principles from reinforcement learning can shape philosophical debates regarding the nature of perception and characterisations of desire. Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Reinforcement learning: A brief guide for philosophers of mind.Julia Haas - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (9):e12865.details In this opinionated review, I draw attention to some of the contributions reinforcement learning can make to questions in the philosophy of mind. In particular, I highlight reinforcement learning's foundational emphasis on the role of reward in agent learning, and canvass two ways in which the framework may advance our understanding of perception and motivation. Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Public Value, Psychology, and Neuroscience.Hyemin Han - 2021 - Journal of Public Value 1:23-32.details Research on public value is inevitable interdisciplinary in its nature due to its aim and purpose. Both philosophical and empirical approaches are necessary to conduct such research in a successful manner. In the present paper, I intend to discuss the importance of empirical approaches in research on public values, particularly psychological and neuroscientific approaches with concrete examples. I proposed that such empirical approaches are essential in better understanding the processes and mechanisms associated with how people address issues engaging in public (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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