Philosophical defenses of cognitive/evolutionary psychological accounts of racialism claim that classification based on phenotypical features of humans was common historically and is evidence for a species-typical, cognitive mechanism for essentializing. They conclude that social constructionist accounts of racialism must be supplemented by cognitive/evolutionary psychology. This article argues that phenotypical classifications were uncommon historically until such classifications were socially constructed. Moreover, some philosophers equivocate between two different meanings of “racial thinking.” The article concludes that social constructionist accounts are far more robust (...) than psychological accounts for the origins of racialism. (shrink)

_Investigates the impact of theories of reproduction and heredity on the emerging concepts of race and gender at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries._.

Franco Andrea Bonelli, a disciple of Lamarck, was one of the few naturalists who taught and disseminated transformism in Italy in the early nineteenth century. The explanation of the history of life on Earth offered by Lamarck’s theory was at odds with the Genesis narrative, while the issue of man’s place in nature raised heated debates. Bonelli sought to reconcile science and religion through his original interpretation of the variability of species, but he also focused on anthropological subjects. Following Blumenbach’s (...) studies, he investigated the differences within the human species and explored the topic of humans’ alleged superiority over animals. The origin of human beings, their history, and their relationship with the rest of life were thus read in light of transformism. According to Bonelli, such questions would not do irreparable damage to the new theory. On the contrary, he considered evolution not only acceptable but even necessary to protect the Holy Texts from certain dangerous trends in anthropological and zoological research. (shrink)