The concept of brain birth has assumed a position of some significance in discussions on the status of the human embryo and on the point in embryonic development prior to which experimental procedures may be undertaken on human embryos. This paper reviews previous discussions of this concept, which have placed brain birth at various points between 12 days' and 20 weeks' gestation and which have emphasised the symmetry of brain birth and brain death. Major developmental features of brain development are (...) outlined, including the gradualness with which new features generally appear, and also the electroencephalogram (EEG) characteristics of premature infants. From this it is concluded that, if the concept of brain birth is a valid one, it should be placed at 24-28 weeks' gestation. More importantly, it is concluded that the differences between brain development and brain death throw doubt on the concept itself. (shrink)

Recent years have witnessed a concern among theological bioethicists that secular debate has grown increasingly "thin," and that "thick" religious traditions and their spokespersons have been correspondingly excluded. This essay disputes that analysis. First, religious and theological voices compete for public attention and effectiveness with the equally "thick" cultural traditions of modern science and market capitalism. The distinctive contribution of religion should be to emphasize social justice in access to the benefits of health care, challenging the for-profit global marketing of (...) research and biotechnology to wealthy consumers. Second, religion and theology have been and are still socially effective in sponsoring activism for practical change, both locally and globally. This claim will be supported with specific examples; with familiar concepts like subsidiarity and "mid- dle axioms"; and with recent analyses of "participatory democracy" and of emerging, decentralized forms of global governance. (shrink)

Background In 1926, Fritz Jahr described bio-ethics (German: bio-ethik) as “the assumption of moral obligations not only towards humans, but towards all forms of life.” Jahr summarized his philosophy by declaring, “Respect every living being on principle as an end in itself and treat it, if possible, as such!.” Bioethics was thus originally an ethical system concerned with the “problems of interference with other living beings… and generally everything related to the balance of the ecosystem” according to the 1978 Encyclopedia (...) of Bioethics. This definition was predicated on the work of Fritz Jahr, Menico Torchio, and Van Rensselaer Potter. Methods In order to proceed with depthful analysis of the origin and major bioethical flare up, we will use critical analysis of existing literature, followed by a study trip to relevant bioethical localities (collecting photo and other documentations regarding Menico Torchio). Results While Jahr and Potter are typically given intellectual credit for developing the field of bioethics, the eco-ethical contributions of Menico Torchio have been forgotten.This article will first trace the origins of “bioethics” – now commonly bifurcated into “biomedical ethics” and “environmental bioethics.” The former was developed by Tom Beauchamp from the Philosophy Department and James Childress of the Religious Studies department at Georgetown University and is based on principlism, with a narrow focus on medical settings. The latter addresses the environmental impact of the medical industry and climate change health hazards. Second, we will present a panorama of Torchio’s significant intellectual contribution to bioethics. Menico Torchio’s concept of bioethics synthesized work of both Jahr and Potter, advocating “the need to expand our ethical obligations and embrace the most developed groups of animals, not only physically but also psychologically.” Third, we will reflect on the lasting legacy of “bioethics” on biomedical and environmental bioethics today. Thematic elements such as interconnectedness of planetary health and human health, dedication to living in harmony with nature, and emphasis on systems and symbiosis remain unchanged from the legacy of Tochio onward. Conclusion Our conclusion will underscore the necessity of understanding the connections between planetary, environmental, and human health. (shrink)

In this paper I analyse who should be able to control the use of human embryonic stem cell lines. I distinguish between different kinds of control and analyse a set of arguments that purport to show that the donors of gametes and embryos should not be able to control the use of stem cell lines derived from their embryos. I show these arguments to be either deficient or of so general a scope that they apply not only to donors but (...) also to those who derived the stem cell lines. Since we normally think that stem cell derivers have the right to control the use of the cell lines they derived, we have no justification for denying donors similar rights of control. In the final section I briefly discuss why informed consent is not an appropriate vehicle for transferring or alienating control rights. (shrink)

Discussion of the ethics of forgoing medically provided nutrition and hydration tends to focus on adults rather than infants and children. Many appellate court decisions address the legal propriety of forgoing medically provided nutritional support of adults, but only a few have ruled on pediatric cases that pose the same issue.The cessation of nutritional support is implemented most commonly for patients in a permanent vegetative state ). An estimated 4,000 to 10,000 American children are in the permanent vegetative state, compared (...) to 10,000 to 25,000 adults. Yet the dearth of literature, case reports, and court decisions suggests that physicians and families of pediatric patients stop medically provided nutrition or seek court orders much less frequently. (shrink)

This essay argues on behalf of a hybrid theory for an ethics of self-defense understood as the Forfeiture-Partiality Theory. The theory weds the idea that a malicious attacker forfeits the right to life to the idea that we are permitted to prefer one's life to another's in cases of involuntary harm or threat. The theory is meant to capture our intuitions both about instances in which we can draw a moral asymmetry between attacker and victim and cases in which we (...) cannot. I develop the theory by attending to instances of intentional, villainous harm and instances of involuntary danger—the latter of which are a matter of bad luck. I call some bad luck cases "Interpersonal Lottery Conflicts." These cases refer to potentially lethal conflicts into which parties are thrown as victims of circumstance. Although neither party has a moral advantage over another, that fact does not preclude permissible self-defense. (shrink)

ABSTRACT“Ideals” are often invoked in contemporary theological discussion of moral norms, especially but not exclusively regarding norms of marriage/sex ethics. Seemingly absent from the discussion, however, is focused critical analysis of the distinction between ideal and mandatory normativity. Attempting to address this oversight, the following paper begins by highlighting a serious inconsistency between recent Catholic magisterial documents. It is proposed that the inconsistency is largely due to understanding the respective norms—relating to marriage and euthanasia—in divergent ways: per the very different (...) orders of ideal and mandatory normativity. After a philosophical clarification of the distinguishing features of ideal and mandatory normativity, one particularly indebted to the work of Joseph Raz, the paper illustrates how divergence between them operates to create the aforementioned magisterial inconsistency. This inconsistency is paralleled by neglect of—and consequent incoherence around—the ideal-mandatory norm distinction within wider moral theology. The last section considers how the distinction bears upon and helps illuminate the relationship between principles, rules, and rules' exceptions. (shrink)