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  1. Completeness and incompleteness for intuitionistic logic.Charles Mccarty - 2008 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 73 (4):1315-1327.
    We call a logic regular for a semantics when the satisfaction predicate for at least one of its nontheorems is closed under double negation. Such intuitionistic theories as second-order Heyting arithmetic HAS and the intuitionistic set theory IZF prove completeness for no regular logics, no matter how simple or complicated. Any extensions of those theories proving completeness for regular logics are classical, i.e., they derive the tertium non datur. When an intuitionistic metatheory features anticlassical principles or recognizes that a logic (...)
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  • Intuitionistic completeness for first order classical logic.Stefano Berardi - 1999 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (1):304-312.
    In the past sixty years or so, a real forest of intuitionistic models for classical theories has grown. In this paper we will compare intuitionistic models of first order classical theories according to relevant issues, like completeness (w.r.t. first order classical provability), consistency, and relationship between a connective and its interpretation in a model. We briefly consider also intuitionistic models for classical ω-logic. All results included here, but a part of the proposition (a) below, are new. This work is, ideally, (...)
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  • Intuitionism and logical syntax.Charles McCarty - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):56-77.
    , Rudolf Carnap became a chief proponent of the doctrine that the statements of intuitionism carry nonstandard intuitionistic meanings. This doctrine is linked to Carnap's ‘Principle of Tolerance’ and claims he made on behalf of his notion of pure syntax. From premises independent of intuitionism, we argue that the doctrine, the Principle, and the attendant claims are mistaken, especially Carnap's repeated insistence that, in defining languages, logicians are free of commitment to mathematical statements intuitionists would reject. I am grateful to (...)
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  • Intuitionistic completeness of first-order logic.Robert Constable & Mark Bickford - 2014 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165 (1):164-198.
    We constructively prove completeness for intuitionistic first-order logic, iFOL, showing that a formula is provable in iFOL if and only if it is uniformly valid in intuitionistic evidence semantics as defined in intuitionistic type theory extended with an intersection operator.Our completeness proof provides an effective procedure that converts any uniform evidence into a formal iFOL proof. Uniform evidence can involve arbitrary concepts from type theory such as ordinals, topological structures, algebras and so forth. We have implemented that procedure in the (...)
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  • Krivine's intuitionistic proof of classical completeness.Stefano Berardi & Silvio Valentini - 2004 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 129 (1-3):93-106.
    In 1996, Krivine applied Friedman's A-translation in order to get an intuitionistic version of Gödel completeness result for first-order classical logic and countable languages and models. Such a result is known to be intuitionistically underivable 559), but Krivine was able to derive intuitionistically a weak form of it, namely, he proved that every consistent classical theory has a model. In this paper, we want to analyze the ideas Krivine's remarkable result relies on, ideas which where somehow hidden by the heavy (...)
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