The practice of merit-transference in Sri Lankan Therav?da Buddhism has evolved over three important stages of development, namely, assigning of dakkhi??, giving of patti, and direct transferring of merit. These stages are generally understood as similar practices but are significantly different from each other. It is not the merit but the meritorious act that is dedicated to, or shared with the departed ones in first two stages. Pattid?na, in this context, does not strictly mean giving merit or giving what is (...) obtained or achieved, as it has so far been interpreted, but giving a share of or stake in the ownership of a meritorious act. It is in the third stage that the idea of merit-transference appeared in Buddhist practice in Sri Lanka. Understanding this historical development is important for interpreting Buddhist texts in their historical contexts as well as for realizing the larger role assigned to the living in the contemporary practice of merit-transference and its influence on other arena of social and cultural life in Sri Lanka. This idea of merit-transference transformed mourning and sorrowful funerals into merit-making events. Practices related to this idea of merit-transference also successfully fulfill the psychological needs of the living to assist departed relatives and to maintain some form of relationship with them. It also allowed local beliefs to be assimilated into the Buddhist fold and shaped the social structure of the living, particularly the lay-monastic relationship. (shrink)

In recent years, scholars have become increasingly interested in reconstructing a Buddhist stance on the free will problem. Since then, Buddhism has been variously described as implicitly hard determinist, paleo-compatibilist, neo-compatibilist and libertarian. Some scholars, however, question the legitimacy of Buddhist free will theorizing, arguing that Buddhism does not share sufficiently many presuppositions required to articulate the problem. This paper argues that, though Buddhist and Western versions of the free will problem are not perfectly isomorphic, a problem analogous to that (...) expressed in Western philosophy emerges within the Buddhist framework. This analogous problem concerns the difficulty of explaining karmic responsibility in a world governed by dependent origination. This paper seeks to reconstruct an approach to free will consistent with Madhyamaka philosophy and, in so doing, to demonstrate that the mutual exclusivity of positions such as hard determinism and libertarianism is, from the Madhyamaka perspective, merely superficial. By building on the perspectivalist theory advanced by Daniel Breyer, it is clear that a Madhyamaka stance on free will demands the wholesale abandonment of perspectives, such that the idea of any one solution as definitive is disavowed. Taken to its logical conclusion, therefore, perspectivalism entails the relative truth of perspectivalism itself. (shrink)

The article examines a fundamental problem in classical Jaina philosophy, namely, the ontological status of dead matter in the hylozoistic and at the same time dualistic Jaina worldview. This question is of particular interest in view of the widespread contemporary Jaina practice of venerating bone relics and stūpas of prominent saints. The main argument proposed in this article is, that, from a classical doctrinal point of view, bone relics of renowned ascetics are valuable for Jainas, if at all, because of (...) their unique physical attributes, rather than the presumed presence of the deceased in the remains as posited in much of the extant literature on relic worship across cultures. The specific focus of the article are Jaina and non-Jaina explanations of the qualities of special matter in terms of karmic and natural processes of transformation. (shrink)