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Why is Sellars's essay called "empiricism and the philosophy of mind"?

In Willem A. DeVries (ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford University Press (2009)

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  1. A Myth to Kill a Myth? On McDowell's Interpretation of Sellars' Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Paolo Tripodi - 2012 - Theoria 79 (4):353-377.
    According to McDowell, in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind the myth of Jones has the purpose of completing the account of experience that Sellars needs to argue against traditional empiricism. In particular, on McDowell's view the myth of Jones should explain how to conceive of non-inferentially knowable experiences as containing propositional claims. This article argues that the myth of Jones does not succeed in providing such an account, especially on McDowell's own terms: assuming McDowell's epistemological distinction between inferential and (...)
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  • McDowell’s new conceptualism and the difference between chickens, colours and cardinals.Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Morten S. Thaning - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):88-105.
    McDowell recently renounced the assumption that the content of any knowledgeable, perceptual judgement must be included in the content of the knowledge grounding experience. We argue that McDowell’s introduction of a new category of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge is incompatible with the main line of argument in favour of conceptualism as presented in Mind and World [McDowell, John. 1996. Mind and World. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]. We reconstruct the original line of argument and show that it rests on (...)
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  • A Paradox of Inferentialism.Giacomo Turbanti - 2015 - AL-Mukhatabat 16:163-195.
    John McDowell articulated a radical criticism of normative inferentialism against Robert Brandom’s expressivist account of conceptual contents. One of his main concerns consists in vindicating a notion of intentionality that could not be reduced to the deontic relations that are established by discursive practitioners. Noticeably, large part of this discussion is focused on empirical knowledge and observational judgments. McDowell argues that there is no role for inference in the application of observational concepts, except the paradoxical one of justifying the content (...)
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