Night: The presence of the absence, the dissolution of the person in the night, the horror of being, the reality of the unreal, it takes us more to the absence of God than to God, to the absence of every entity. Dawn: Not being conscious of the existence of that unchangeable supposed centre of the person within time does not mean that we cannot be able to explain the not static changeable and relational personal identity in other ways. Day: It (...) is me who flows, but I am not in the flow like a support from where life flows, I am flowing in my own reality. This is not similar to an egology, it does not mean that everything exists and is loved to me, but it does mean that everything is seen and loved for me. (shrink)

Apophaticism in mainstream analytic theology and philosophy of religion has come to denote a metaphysical and semantic thesis: that, due to divine transcendence, God is ineffable, inconceivable, or incomprehensible. But this conception fails to properly take account of the central claim of apophaticism as a special type of _mystical _theology. As such, the apophatic commitments to divine ineffability are instrumental. More fundamental is the function of theological ignorance to uniquely inform the task of theology and transform the theologian in union (...) with God. Taking Jonathan Jacobs’ recent account as a test case, I argue that reconstructions of apophaticism need to be supplemented by an account of this informational and personally transformative value that apophatic mysticism places on its commitment to divine incomprehensibility. I supply the needed account of apophatic valuing in terms of wonder as the appropriate emotional attitude toward divine transcendence. (shrink)

The studies of mysticism have traditionally emphasized a common core centered around experiences of ego dissolution and unity. However, this focus on a central set of experiences tends to downplay the non-central aspects, resulting in a limited understanding that may not encompass many other types of extraordinary experiences. This article proposes a layered hierarchy model of mysticism, which reverts to the fundamental definition of mysticism and resonates with the Jamesian characteristics of mysticism as noetic and ineffable. Consequently, an extended definition (...) is put forth to characterize mysticism as the transcendence of perceived reality and the transformation of the perceiver. Within this proposed model, four layers of mysticism are delineated. Monistic Mysticism is characterized by the perception of oneness in all existence and the dissolution of selfhood, exemplified by perennialist mystical unity. Nondualistic Mysticism involves the recognition of a higher reality beyond the mundane world and the subjugation of the ego to an idealized divine, exemplified by religious experiences. Dualistic Mysticism encompasses a world of spirits in contrast to human reality, where the self detaches from and interacts with spiritual beings, exemplified by psychedelic experiences and spiritism. Pluralistic Mysticism entails numerous coexisting realities, and the self is understood to have many facets and boundless potentials, exemplified by psychic phenomena and non-physicalism. This expanded framework broadens the scope of mysticism and makes it a versatile tool for studying a wide range of human experiences under a unified framework. (shrink)

The first part of the article examines how Augustine’s notion of the everyday is mediated by his mystical ascensions, which give him the sense of height against which everydayness appears as oriented downward or fallen. These are the coordinates that make up the fundamental verticality of Augustine’s view. Heidegger’s understanding of everydayness was influenced by Augustine, particularly its inherent tendency to fall. In the article’s second part, it is argued that Heidegger explicitly avoids all references to metaphysical or religious heights. (...) For his reason, his notion of falling appears problematic as it both invokes and abandons verticality. Arguably, Heidegger’s turning from verticality to horizontality comes with a cost, as it must renounce the possibility of conceiving the radicality of the fall from a perspective from above. However, as the article’s final part shows, Heidegger and Augustine do not only provide a view of everydayness as falling, but they both share the conviction that there is more to it: Heidegger speaks of the enigmas rooted in everydayness itself, which, however, do not point above, but toward its overlooked sense of Being; Augustine invokes ordinary events as traces of wonder that point from the lowly up to the transcendence of God. (shrink)

This article challenges the widely held view that mysticism is essentially characterized by intense, ineffable, subjective experiences. Instead, I show that mysticism has undergone a series of social constructions, which were never innocent of gendered struggles for power. When philosophers of religion and popular writers on mysticism ignore these gendered constructions, as they regularly do, they are in turn perpetuating a post-Jamesian understanding of mysticism which removes mysticism and women from involvement with political and social justice.

The task of this article is a two-fold approach to Augustine’s theory of knowledge, often called that of ‘divine illumination’, with particular attention to one of its seminal sources, his Soliloquia. The first approach is historical- and text-critical; we consider the text of the Soliloquia, its meaning and significance, the questions to which Augustine was implicitly responding at the time, and especially how this work broaches themes which are revisited and further developed in Augustine’s later works. In the second part, (...) we take the results of the foregoing analysis and apply to them a systematic-theological and philosophical method. First we contextualize Augustine’s theory of illumination, both in relation to his own works and beyond. We then argue for a distinction between two senses of illumination, namely ‘principal’ and ‘gradual’, which helps to account for the different ways in which illumination is applied by Augustine. Finally, we show how Augustine’s insights can be relevant to contemporary philosophy and theology, and how his ideas are implicated in contemporary debates. The upshot is an historical, philosophical, and theological consideration of Augustine’s theory of divine illumination, which aspires to strike a balance between doing justice to the text from an historical perspective and interpreting and applying it in the present day. (shrink)