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Working Out the Details of Hume and Smith on Sympathy

John McHugh

Journal of the History of Philosophy 56 (4):683-696 (2018)

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Sympathy and Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment.Tatsuya Sakamoto - 2023 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 21 (1):53-74.details For the first time, in Hume and Smith, ‘sympathy’ occupies a central position as the principle of moral judgment. The key to solving the relationship between sympathy and economic thought lies in the theory of justice. Hume and Smith inherited Hutcheson’s criticism of the Hobbesian selfish system and considered humans selfish and social. For both, the relationship between selfishness and sympathy is neither a contradiction nor a subordinate structure in which selfishness ultimately dominates sympathy. In this joint project, Hume’s institutional (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
III—Sympathy, Empathy, and Twitter: Reflections on Social Media Inspired by an Eighteenth-Century Debate.Lisa Herzog - 2023 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 123 (1):51-72.details How can the harm caused by waves of fake news or derogatory speech on social media be minimized without unduly limiting freedom of expression? I draw on an eighteenth-century debate for thinking about this problem: Hume and Smith present two different models of the transmission of emotions and ideas. Empathetic processes are causal, almost automatic processes; sympathy, in contrast, means putting oneself into the other person’s position and critically evaluating how one should react. I use this distinction to argue that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Hume's General Point of View, Smith's Impartial Spectator, and the Moral Value of Interacting with Outsiders.John McHugh - 2020 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 19 (1):19-37.details Here is an appealing position: one reason to pursue interaction with people from backgrounds that differ from our own is that doing so can improve our moral judgment. As some scholars have noticed, this position seems pedigreed by support from the famed philosophers of human sociability, David Hume and Adam Smith. But regardless of whether Hume or Smith personally held anything like the appealing position, neither might have had theoretically grounded reason to do so. In fact, both philosophers explain moral (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Impartiality through ‘Moral Optics’: Why Adam Smith revised David Hume's Moral Sentimentalism.Christel Fricke & Maria Alejandra Carrasco - 2021 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 19 (1):1-18.details We read Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as a critical response to David Hume's moral theory. While both share a commitment to moral sentimentalism, they propose different ways of meeting its main challenge, that is, explaining how judgments informed by (partial) sentiments can nevertheless have a justified claim to general authority. This difference is particularly manifest in their respective accounts of ‘moral optics’, or the way they rely on the analogy between perceptual and moral judgments. According to Hume, making (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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