Recent decades have seen a shift away from the traditional view that Aquinas's theory of the natural law is meant to supply us with normative guidance grounded in a substantive theory of human nature. In the present essay, I argue that this is a mistake. Expanding on the suggestions of Jean Porter and Ralph McInerny, I defend a derivationist reading of ST I-II, Q. 94, A. 2 according to which Aquinas takes our knowledge of the genuine goods of human life (...) and their proper ordering to one another to be self-evident only to the wise who are able to discern the truth about our God-given human nature. I then show that this reading provides a better account of Aquinas's view than two recent alternatives: John Finnis's brand of inclinationism and Daniel Mark Nelson's virtue-based interpretation. (shrink)

Current discussions of business ethics usually only consider deontological and utilitarian approaches. What is missing is a discussion of traditional teleology, often referred to as virtue ethics. While deontology and teleology are useful, they both suffer insufficiencies. Traditional teleology, while deontological in many respects, does not object to utilitarian style calculations as long as they are contained within a moral framework that is not utilitarian in its origin. It contains the best of both approaches and can be used to focus (...) on the individual''s role within an organization. More work is needed in exposing students and faculty to traditional teleology and its place in business ethic''s discussions. (shrink)

Cultural diversity is an inescapable reality and a concern in many businesses where it can often raise ethical questions and dilemmas. This paper aims to offer suggestions to certain problems facing managers in dealing with cultural diversity through the inspiration of Thomas Aquinas. Although he may be perceived as a voice from the distant past, we can still find in his writings helpful and original ideas and criteria. He welcomes cultural differences as a part of the perfection of the universe. (...) His systemic approach leads one to place the problem in its proper context, and to reflect on it from the perspective of virtue ethics, with a central role for practical wisdom and giving primacy to neighborly love and natural moral law. Rather than a set of rigid standards with no consideration of diversity Aquinas focuses on the common human ground, which allows for the indispensable dialogue between different positions. When dealing with practical questions, the problem is one of finding the right balance between general principle and cultural specifics, tolerance, and dialogue, always guided by practical wisdom. In this way, Aquinas’ approach is neither rigid ethical universalism with no consideration for diversity nor moral relativism with no place for any transcultural and absolute morals. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that if and only if agents are motivated to act by good reasons for acting, they flourish, since, in so doing, they consciously act in accordance with their nature through virtuous actions. I offer an account of what good reasons for acting consist of reconsidering Aquinas’ natural inclinations. Based on a critical analysis of Anjum and Mumford’s work on dispositions in analytic metaphysics, I argue, contra Hume’s law, that Aquinas’ natural inclinations show (...) that metaphysics is foundational for ethics. I claim that agents flourish as human beings if and only if they consciously act in accordance with natural inclinations. Natural inclinations naturally tend towards goods that depend on the metaphysical structure of human nature, by virtue of which agents have some powers that they should actualise in order to flourish. Intellect and will are the rational powers that distinguish human beings from other living beings. The will naturally desires what is good. If the will, through the input of the intellect, desires what is genuinely good for human beings according to their nature, it also directs the other powers to their own actualisation. Natural inclinations do not strictly necessitate agents to act in accordance with them, because, by virtue of their rational powers, agents should also recognise that they have a reason for acting in accordance with them. Thus, I will suggest that we can best appreciate the importance of natural inclinations from the first-person perspective. (shrink)

Alasdair MacIntyre asks, if all individuals are in fact potential authorities of natural law and agree on its fundamentals, how can we explain manifest moral disagreement? Contemporary Thomistic natural law theorists have not attempted to address this particular issue to a significant degree. MacIntyre, taking this large-scale rejection seriously, focuses on the communal factors that allow individuals to recognize their need for and commitment to Thomistic natural law. By doing so, he attempts to give reasons for why we should expect (...) natural law to be widely denied in contemporary society. In this paper, I argue that MacIntyre’s approach to natural law is capable of accounting for the seemingly paradoxical claim that these per se nota first principles of natural law might suffer apparent widespread rejection. Moreover, I will argue that MacIntyre’s account is also capable of explaining why we should actually expect such rejection to occur. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to show the relevance that Aquinas's theory of natural inclinations can play in the contemporary debate for the inquiry on human flourishing, which consists in the realisation of the proper end that human beings have as human beings. We will engage in dialogue with several authors, belonging to the analytic tradition (Elizabeth Anscombe, John Finnis, Ralph McInerny, Anthony Lisska) or, nevertheless, culturally close to it (Alasdair MacIntyre), who have reconsidered the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (...) in the contemporary debate in order to inquire what enables human flourishing. We will argue that the proper consideration of natural inclinations leads, on the one hand, to overcome the problems posed by Hume's law by identifying human nature as a normative criterion common to all human beings, and, on the other hand, to recognise the role of the first-person perspective in identifying what enables the human flourishing of each agent. Natural inclinations do not express agents' psychological preferences, but consist in the fact that human beings naturally tend towards the realisation of their nature as a good to be realised. In order to flourish, human beings are required to act in accordance with their natural inclinations, since natural inclinations are tendencies that human beings have towards a set of goods that are grounded in human nature. Revisiting a recent proposal put forward by Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum in the field of analytic metaphysics, we will argue that agents develop a virtuous conduct if and only if they act in accordance with their natural inclinations; in doing so, they flourish as human beings, that is, they actualise the powers they have by virtue of their nature. However, human beings are not strictly necessitated to act in accordance with their natural inclinations. Indeed, in order to flourish, agents should also recognise, by virtue of their rational capacities, that acting in accordance with their natural inclinations is a reason for acting for them and they should act in accordance with these reasons. Furthermore, we will argue that there is no single way to flourish for all human beings, because, although flourishing requires that human beings act in accordance with their nature, nevertheless, the way in which agents can flourish varies according to their individual characteristics and according to the circumstances and contexts in which they act, that is, according to the practices in which they participate in their lived experience. In the last part of this thesis, we will test the theoretical proposal developed in the previous parts through a critical analysis of Alasdair MacIntyre's thought. (shrink)

This paper aims to consider the boundary role of metaphysics in the realm of ethics within the contemporary debate of analytic Thomism in regard to the naturalistic fallacy. Two interpretations of Aquinas's natural law and natural inclinations will be critically analysed. On the one hand, John Finnis's interpretation – New Natural Law Theory –, which excludes the metaphysical realm in the consideration of Aquinas's natural law; on the other hand, Ralph McInerny and Anthony Lisska's approach, which acknowledges the unavoidability of (...) metaphysics in Aquinas’s ethics. Finally, through the analysis of Thomistic natural law made by Dario Composta (1971), the relevance of the first-person experience in identifying what normatively pertain to human nature will be shown. (shrink)

The aim of this article1 is to provide insight into the anthropological framework that could inform the pastoral and therapeutic care of those we encounter, professionally or in our personal lives, who experience same-sex attraction. Our question here is not whether or not persons are free to ignore the natural order but to consider how to minister to those who wish to engage in the struggle to conform themselves to it—or those whom we hope to persuade to do so. Since (...) entering into such conversations often requires a starting place in experience, we need an approach that will permit us to integrate human experience into a fuller account of the human person. The thesis of this article is that the account of the human person proposed by Pope St. John Paul II, as the philosopher Karol Wojtyła provides the answers we need. I demonstrate that his approach permits us to acknowledge the experience of actual existing persons without compromising the more properly “ontological” framework that we know reveals the unchanging truth about human personhood.2 I show that his account gives us the foothold we are seeking in our efforts to help those struggling with SSA. (shrink)

Gender greatly impacts access to opportunities, potential, and success in corporate leadership roles. We begin with a general presentation of why such discussion is necessary for basic considerations of justice and fairness in gender equality and how the issues we raise must impact any ethical perspective on gender in the corporate workplace. We continue with a breakdown of the central categories affecting the success of women in corporate leadership roles. The first of these includes gender-influenced behavioral factors, such as the (...) requirements and expectations of gendered verbal and nonverbal communication styles as well as appearance. We move on to address the impact of family on corporate leadership opportunities and success, discussing the asymmetrical evaluation of an individual’s potential, authority, and competence based on gender stereotypes of familial obligations and expectations. Finally, we address how gender impacts access to networking and sponsorship opportunities and the long-term effects of systematic limitations on women’s inclusion in the upper echelons of corporate leadership. We conclude with a summary of the questions and issues raised by our discussion and direct individuals to consider how different ethical systems and moral requirements might influence their interpretations of gender and leadership in the corporate workplace. (shrink)