ABSTRACTOur contemporary culture has been labelled as one of “greed.” Our challenge, it is argued, is even more formidable if we recall Rousseau’s argument that it is the desire for esteem and fame that is the driving force of modern societies. This striving for recognition is the direct offspring of l’amour-propre, here translated as egoism. Contemporary economic systems thrive on this corrupted form of self-love, which is often sugarcoated as ambition, or even courage and vision. The development of l’amour-propre can (...) be partly prevented and checked through the cultivation of l’amour-de-soi, conceived by Rousseau as being the source of the humane passions, a clear-sighted reason, and a mature conscience. At the cultural and institutional level, Rousseau’s thought implies a radical transformation that consists in the detachment of self-fulfillment from economic achievements, and the subordination of economic life and interests to other human ends, such as the good and virtuous human life. The corrupting effects of luxury and the loss of liberty caused by the multiplication of needs are therefore especially highlighted. Conversely, the alternative, non-military and non-materialist ethos in Rousseau’s works is emphasized. (shrink)

It is often said that the claims of man and citizen are irreconcilable in the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This view, most famously articulated by Judith Shklar, holds that the making of a man and the making of a citizen are to be understood as rival enterprises or competing alternatives. This reading has recently been challenged by Frederick Neuhouser. He argues that one can make a man and a citizen, but only if the education of each is performed in the (...) absence of the other. In his view, Emile is raised to be a man first before his subsequent instruction in citizenship. This paper challenges both views. I argue that the making of man and citizen are, in principle, neither rival enterprises nor competing alternatives, and that although Neuhouser is indeed correct to argue for a successive system of education, the making of a citizen is not completed in Emile, but extends into the Social Contract. His account diminishes the crucial role the Lawgiver plays in the fashioning of citizens capable of discerning the general will. I show that although raising individuals under a system of private instruction does not preclude their transformation into citizens but makes such a transformation possible, it is on its own incapable of making citizens. (shrink)

There is a great deal of room for misunderstanding in the pages of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work. His prose is not as weighed down by jargon as Heidegger’s or as difficult to wade through as Hegel’s — by all accounts his writing is easy to parse! And yet, at times, his writing seems to leave too much up in the air. As such, his work has been both a guiding star for the political left and decried as a wolf in sheep’s (...) clothing. Much of this disparity in opinion can be traced back to a common concern that Rousseau’s attempt to create a basis for legitimate political power seems to take place at the expense of individual freedom. But this raises a question: What is freedom for Rousseau? (shrink)