Commentary in reply to an article by Jeff McMahan and Julian Savulescu.

Volume 24, Issue 8, August 2024, Page 63-65.

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In their target article, Jeff McMahan and Julian Savulescu (2024) deploy careful metaphysical analysis in defending significant normative theses—a relative rarity in the bioethics literature. The a...

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A number of philosophers argue for a Two-Tier View: that there is some difference between individual-affecting and non-individual-affecting choices. But it is challenging to know the degree of moral difference, and to determine for some cases into which category they fall. I refer to this as the “Two Tier Problem.” In this paper, I develop and defend a “Two-Tier Deontic View.” On that view, the higher tier applies to a subset of individual-affecting cases. We have stronger reason to bring about (...) an individual-affecting rather than a non-individual-affecting benefit, but only in cases where we have agent-relative duties to the individuals so affected. In other cases (and I argue that this applies to most policy decisions affecting reproduction) there is no moral difference between individual- and non-individual-affecting choices. (shrink)

According to what McMahan and Savulescu (2024) call the “popular position”, embryo selection is less ethically problematic than gene editing (other things being equal). The Two-Tier View, defended by McMahan and Savulescu, implies that the popular position is mistaken. The authors treat gene editing of embryos similarly to standard cases of medical treatments that promise expected benefits for the (subsequent) person even though gene editing also may create risks of harmful side effects for her. McMahan and Savulescu assume that if (...) gene editing is (successfully) done, it is better for the person who developed from the beneficently edited embryo. And, if the editing had not been done, although it was possible, that would have been worse for the same person in question. Thus, the comparator must always be a possible, even if unlikely, world in which she would have existed. That is why gene editing, in their view, resembles medical treatments. Therefore, assuming that standard medical treatments are not more ethically problematic than embryo selection, they conclude that (in general) gene editing should also be treated as not more problematic than embryo selection. In this paper, I am taking one step further than McMahan and Savulescu in questioning the central assumptions in the bioethical debates about new reproductive technologies. In the previous work, we argued that the very distinction between person-affecting and identity-affecting interventions is based on a questionable form of material-origin essentialism (Żuradzki and Dranseika 2022). Here, I argue that the bipartite distinction between person-affecting and impersonal reasons, as used by McMahan and Savulescu, insufficiently represents different possible counterfactual comparisons between real and merely possible outcomes. In particular, I argue that the evaluation of gene editing requires counterfactual comparisons to situations in which the benefited person might or might not exist. Such evaluation requires an additional class of reasons, let me call them “semi-person-affecting,” that cannot be reduced to either person-affecting or impersonal ones. This aspect of gene editing makes it dissimilar to standard cases of medical treatments. (shrink)

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