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  1. Schadenfreude: The (not so) Secret Joy of Another’s Misfortune.Marie Dasborough & Paul Harvey - 2017 - Journal of Business Ethics 141 (4):693-707.
    Despite growing interest in emotions, organizational scholars have largely ignored the moral emotion of schadenfreude, which refers to pleasure felt in response to another’s misfortune. As a socially undesirable emotion, it might be assumed that individuals would be hesitant to share their schadenfreude. In two experimental studies involving emotional responses to unethical behaviors, we find evidence to the contrary. Study 1 revealed that subjects experiencing schadenfreude were willing to share their feelings, especially if the misfortune was perceived to be deserved. (...)
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  • Striving for Consistency Shapes Emotional Responses to Other’s Outcomes.Bogdan Wojciszke & Agnieszka Pietraszkiewicz - 2014 - Polish Psychological Bulletin 45 (3):296-305.
    Based on the balance theory, we hypothesized that emotions induced by other person’s outcomes function as responses restoring balance within cognitive units consisting of the perceiver, other persons and their outcomes. As a consequence, emotional reactions towards others’ outcomes depend on the perceiver’s attitudes in such a way that outcomes of a well-liked person rise congruous responses, while outcomes of a disliked other lead to incongruous responses. Our participants recalled a situation from their past in which somebody they liked or (...)
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  • An Emotional-Freedom Defense of Schadenfreude.Earl Spurgin - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):767-784.
    Schadenfreude is the emotion we experience when we obtain pleasure from others’ misfortunes. Typically, we are not proud of it and admit experiencing it only sheepishly or apologetically. Philosophers typically view it, and the disposition to experience it, as moral failings. Two recent defenders of Schadenfreude, however, argue that it is morally permissible because it stems from judgments about the just deserts of those who suffer misfortunes. I also defend Schadenfreude, but on different grounds that overcome two deficiencies of those (...)
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