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Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms?

In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2018)

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  1. Accuracy and Epistemic Conservatism.Florian Steinberger - 2018 - Analysis:any094.
    Epistemic utility theory (EUT) is generally coupled with \emph{veritism}. Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: Norms of epistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly has epistemic value, while believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect of true belief against the (...)
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  • Accuracy and Epistemic Conservatism.Florian Steinberger - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):658-669.
    Epistemic utility theory is generally coupled with veritism. Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: norms of epistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly has epistemic value, while believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect of true belief against the risk (...)
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  • Accuracy, probabilism, and the insufficiency of the alethic.Corey Dethier - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2285-2301.
    The best and most popular argument for probabilism is the accuracy-dominance argument, which purports to show that alethic considerations alone support the view that an agent’s degrees of belief should always obey the axioms of probability. I argue that extant versions of the accuracy-dominance argument face a problem. In order for the mathematics of the argument to function as advertised, we must assume that every omniscient credence function is classically consistent; there can be no worlds in the set of dominance-relevant (...)
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  • Downwards Propriety in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - forthcoming - Mind.
    Epistemic Utility Theory is often identified with the project of *axiology-first epistemology*—the project of vindicating norms of epistemic rationality purely in terms of epistemic value. One of the central goals of axiology-first epistemology is to provide a justification of the central norm of Bayesian epistemology, Probabilism. The first part of this paper presents a new challenge to axiology first epistemology: I argue that in order to justify Probabilism in purely axiological terms, proponents of axiology first epistemology need to justify a (...)
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  • Epistemic Utility Arguments for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia.
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