Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Explaining the Misuse of Information Systems Resources in the Workplace: A Dual-Process Approach.Amanda M. Y. Chu, Patrick Y. K. Chau & Mike K. P. So - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 131 (1):209-225.
    The aim of this study is to gain an understanding of why employees misuse information systems resources in the workplace. Rather than consider “intention,” as existing behavioral research commonly does, this study investigates actual behavior and employs IS resource misuse as the dependent variable. Data from a web-based survey are analyzed using the partial least squares approach. In light of the dual-process approach and the theory of planned behavior, the findings suggest that IS resource misuse may be both an intentional (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
    This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a proposition is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   210 citations  
  • The Incompatibility of Omniscience and Intentional Action: A Reply to David P. Hunt.Tomis Kapitan - 1994 - Religious Studies 30 (1):55 - 66.
    In "Omniprescient Agency" (Religious Studies 28, 1992) David P. Hunt challenges an argument against the possibility of an omniscient agent. The argument—my own in "Agency and Omniscience" (Religious Studies 27, 1991)—assumes that an agent is a being capable of intentional action, where, minimally, an action is intentional only if it is caused, in part, by the agent's intending. The latter, I claimed, is governed by a psychological principle of "least effort," viz., that no one intends without antecedently feeling that (i) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Incompatibility of Omniscience and Intentional Action: A Reply to David P. Hunt: Tomis Kapitan.Tomis Kapitan - 1994 - Religious Studies 30 (1):55-66.
    In ‘Omniprescient Agency’ David P. Hunt challenges an argument against the possibility of an omniscient agent. The argument – my own in ‘Agency and Omniscience’ – assumes that an agent is a being capable of intentional action, where, minimally, an action is intentional only if it is caused, in part, by the agent's intending. The latter, I claimed, is governed by a psychological principle of ‘least effort’, namely, that no one intends without antecedently feeling that deliberate effort is needed to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Agency and omniscience.Tomis Kapitan - 1991 - Religious Studies 27 (1):105-120.
    It is said that faith in a divine agent is partly an attitude of trust; believers typically find assurance in the conception of a divine being's will, and cherish confidence in its capacity to implement its intentions and plans. Yet, there would be little point in trusting in the will of any being without assuming its ability to both act and know, and perhaps it is only by assuming divine omniscience that one can retain the confidence in the efficacy and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations