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Causalism and Intentional Omission.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):15-26.details
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Précis of The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):225 - 238.details
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On the verisimilitude of artificial intelligence.Roger Vergauwen & Rodrigo González - 2005 - Logique Et Analyse- 190 (189):323-350.details
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Intentional mind-wandering as intentional omission: the surrealist method.Santiago Arango-Muñoz & Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7727-7748.details
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Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action.Michael Brent & Candace Upton - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):52-71.details
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Remembering as a mental action.Santiago Arango-Munoz & Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 75-96.details
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The Ontology of Intentional Agency in Light of Neurobiological Determinism: Philosophy Meets Folk Psychology.Dhar Sharmistha - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (1):129-149.details
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Moral responsibility for actions and omissions: a new challenge to the asymmetry thesis.Taylor W. Cyr - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3153-3161.details
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Are abilities dispositions?Barbara Vetter - 2019 - Synthese 196 (196):201-220.details
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Intentional Action and the Post-Coma Patient.Zoe Drayson - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):23-31.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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Deciding: how special is it?Alfred R. Mele - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):359-375.details
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Mental Causation, Autonomy and Action Theory.Dwayne Moore - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):53-73.details
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Passive action and causalism.Jing Zhu - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (3):295-314.details
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Act and Intentionality.Benjamin Sheredos - 2016 - Dissertation, University of California, San Diegodetails
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Doing Things with Thoughts: Brain-Computer Interfaces and Disembodied Agency.Steffen Steinert, Christoph Bublitz, Ralf Jox & Orsolya Friedrich - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (3):457-482.details
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Two kinds of intentions: a new defense of the Simple View.Santiago Amaya - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1767-1786.details
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Free choice, effort, and wanting more.Randolph Clarke - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):20-41.details
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Animal Mental Action: Planning Among Chimpanzees.Angelica Kaufmann - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):745-760.details
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The Davidsonian Challenge to the Non-Causalist.Guido Löhrer & Scott Sehon - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1):85-96.details
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Deciding to act.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (1):81–108.details
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Sense of agency for mental actions: Insights from a belief-based action-effect paradigm.Edmundo Lopez-Sola, Rubén Moreno-Bote & Xerxes D. Arsiwalla - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 96 (C):103225.details
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Trigger warning: no proximal intentions required for intentional action.Marcela Herdova - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):364-383.details
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Freedom and trying: Understanding agent-causal exertions. [REVIEW]Meghan Griffith - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (1):16-28.details
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Libertarianism, action theory, and the loci of responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (2):153-174.details
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