I argue against elements of Alfred Mele’s picture of the nature of intentions and the triggers of intentional actions. Mele (Philosophical Studies 176:2833–2853, 2019) offers rebuttals to my (Herdova, Philosophical Studies, 173(3), 573–587, 2016; Herdova, Philosophical Explorations, 21(3):364–383, 2018) and Ann Bumpus’s (2001) arguments which limit the scope of proximal intentions as triggers of intentional actions. Here I offer a response to Mele and provide further arguments in favor of my alternative understanding of intentions and the causes of intentional actions. (...) Contra Mele, I argue for the following interrelated theses. First, intentions, including proximal intentions, have an array of functions or dispositions beyond that of triggering intentional actions. Second, states other than proximal intentions can trigger at least some types of intentional actions. Therefore, it is not the case that all intentional actions need to be triggered by proximal intentions. (shrink)