- The Calendar Paradox.Sam Shpall - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):801-825.details
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Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.details
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Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.details
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The limits of limited-blockage Frankfurt-style cases.Michael Robinson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):429-446.details
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Crimes of Negligence: Attempting and Succeeding. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2012 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):387-398.details
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Intention and Volition.Jing Zhu - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):175 - 193.details
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Enough skill to kill: Intentionality judgments and the moral valence of action.Steve Guglielmo & Bertram F. Malle - 2010 - Cognition 117 (2):139-150.details
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(1 other version)La dynamique des intentions.Élisabeth Pacherie - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (3):447-.details
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Skilled activity and the causal theory of action.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.details
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What is mimetic desire?Paisley Livingston - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):291 – 305.details
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Agency, consciousness, and executive control.Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):21-30.details
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The self-referentiality of intentions.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 97 (1):11-51.details
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Unintentional collective action.Sara Rachel Chant - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):245 – 256.details
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Compatibilism and doxastic control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.details
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(1 other version)On trying to save the simple view.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.details
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Free choice, effort, and wanting more.Randolph Clarke - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):20-41.details
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The trouble with externalist compatibilist autonomy.Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):171-196.details
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On why proximal intentions need to remain snubbed: a reply to Mele.Marcela Herdova - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (8):2025-2046.details
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Intentionality and performance: the phenomenology of gait initiation.Patrick Grüneberg - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.details
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Must Choices and Decisions be Uncaused by Prior Events or States of the Agent?David Palmer - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-8.details
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(1 other version)Motivational determinism.Eric Christian Barnes - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (3):211-227.details
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On being able to intend.Alfred R. Mele - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):51-71.details
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Habitual virtuous action and acting for reasons.Lieke Joske Franci Asma - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (7):1036-1056.details
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Is “Free Will” an Emergent Property of Immaterial Soul? A Critical Examination of Human Beings’ Decision-Making Process(es) Followed by Voluntary Actions and Their Moral Responsibility.Satya Sundar Sethy & M. Suresh - 2021 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 38 (3):491-505.details
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Freedom and chance.Mark Wulff Carstensen - unknowndetails
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Anti-intellectualism, instructive representations, and the intentional action argument.Alison Ann Springle & Justin Humphreys - 2021 - Synthese (3):7919-7955.details
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Mapping the Dimensions of Agency.Andreas Schönau, Ishan Dasgupta, Timothy Brown, Erika Versalovic, Eran Klein & Sara Goering - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (2):172-186.details
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The Mismatch Problem: Why Mele's Approach to the Puzzle of Synchronic Self‐control Does Not Succeed.Hannah Altehenger - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (2):243-266.details
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The Spectrum of Responsibility Ascription for End Users of Neurotechnologies.Andreas Schönau - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):423-435.details
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Habitual Actions, Propositional Knowledge, Motor Representations and Intentionality.Gabriele Ferretti & Silvano Zipoli Caiani - 2021 - Topoi 40 (3):623-635.details
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Deliberative Agency, Self‐Control, and the Divided Mind.Hannah Altehenger - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):542-558.details
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Free Will and Luck: Compatibilism versus Incompatibilism.Alfred R. Mele - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):262-277.details
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(2 other versions)Intending Recalcitrant Social Ends.Carlos Núñez - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):477-498.details
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Meaningful human control as reason-responsiveness: the case of dual-mode vehicles.Giulio Mecacci & Filippo Santoni de Sio - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 22 (2):103-115.details
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From Freedom From to Freedom To: New Perspectives on Intentional Action.Sofia Bonicalzi & Patrick Haggard - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:459073.details
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(1 other version)Motor intentionality and the intentionality of improvisation: a contribution to a phenomenology of musical improvisation.Lucia Angelino - 2018 - Continental Philosophy Review 52 (2):203-224.details
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Trigger warning: no proximal intentions required for intentional action.Marcela Herdova - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):364-383.details
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Actions, Reasons, and Intentions: Overcoming Davidson's Ontological Prejudice.John Michael McGuire - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (3):459-479.details
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Chimps as secret agents.Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2129-2158.details
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Animal Mental Action: Planning Among Chimpanzees.Angelica Kaufmann - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):745-760.details
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The illusionist and the folk: On the role of conscious planning in intentionality judgments.Silvia Felletti & Fabio Paglieri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):871-888.details
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Bayesian Sensorimotor Psychology.Michael Rescorla - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (1):3-36.details
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Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy’s Hard Luck. [REVIEW]Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):753-770.details
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Seeing what I am Doing.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):295-318.details
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Side-effect actions, acting for a reason, and acting intentionally.John Michael McGuire - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):317 - 333.details
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Slips.Santiago Amaya - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):559-576.details
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Causal Theories of Intentional Behavior and Wayward Causal Chains.Berent Enç - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):149 - 166.details
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History and Personal Autonomy.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):271 - 280.details
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Omissions and causalism.Carolina Sartorio - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):513-530.details
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Attributions as behavior explanations: Toward a new theory.Bertram Malle - 2003details
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