Este trabalho tem como principal objetivo apresentar uma abordagem lógico-formal capaz de apreender alguns aspectos do raciocínio abdutivo – o raciocínio responsável pela criação de hipóteses explicativas para fatos surpreendentes -, mediante tanto as noções filosófico-conceituais da canônica abdução peirceana quanto as de explicação científica. No caso desta última, procurarei evidenciar, inicialmente, pontos de contraste entre as concepções de explicação científica de Aristóteles e de Carl Hempel, a fim de elucidar, de modo mais satisfatório, em que medida, de fato, teorias (...) e hipóteses “explicam” algo. Apresentarei, também, um modo de tratar hipóteses explicativas contraditórias, por meio do operador de consistência ○ – próprio da lógica paraconsistente mbC -, o qual amplia o poder expressivo da linguagem-objeto subjacente ao sistema lógico, bem como apresentarei uma abordagem formal alternativa do raciocínio abdutivo pensado como dinâmica de mudança de crenças, especificamente por intermédio da lógica de revisão de crenças AGM. (shrink)

This book investigates Aristotle’s views on abstraction and explores how he uses it. In this work, the author follows Aristotle in focusing on the scientific detail first and then approaches the metaphysical claims, and so creates a reconstructed theory that explains many puzzles of Aristotle’s thought. Understanding the details of his theory of relations and abstraction further illuminates his theory of universals. Some of the features of Aristotle’s theory of abstraction developed in this book include: abstraction is a relation; perception (...) and knowledge are types of abstraction; the objects generated by abstractions are relata which can serve as subjects in their own right, whereupon they can appear as items in other categories. The author goes on to look at how Aristotle distinguishes the concrete from the abstract paronym, how induction is a type of abstraction which typically moves from the perceived individuals to universals and how Aristotle’s metaphysical vocabulary is "relational.’ Beyond those features, this work also looks at how of universals, accidents, forms, causes and potentialities have being only as abstract aspects of individual substances. An individual substance is identical to its essence; the essence has universal features but is the singularity making the individual substance what it is. These theories are expounded within this book. One main attraction in working out the details of Aristotle’s views on abstraction lies in understanding his metaphysics of universals as abstract objects. This work reclaims past ground as the main philosophical tradition of abstraction has been ignored in recent times. It gives a modern version of the medieval doctrine of the threefold distinction of essence, made famous by the Islamic philosopher, Avicenna. (shrink)

Mathematics is becoming increasingly specialized, divided into a vast and growing number of subfields. While this division of cognitive labor has important benefits, it also has a significant drawb...

There is little agreement about Aristotle’s philosophy of geometry, partly due to the textual evidence and partly part to disagreement over what constitutes a plausible view. I keep separate the questions ‘What is Aristotle’s philosophy of geometry?’ and ‘Is Aristotle right?’, and consider the textual evidence in the context of Greek geometrical practice, and show that, for Aristotle, plane geometry is about properties of certain sensible objects—specifically, dimensional continuity—and certain properties possessed by actual and potential compass-and-straightedge drawings qua quantitative and (...) continuous. For their part, the objects of stereometry are potential sensible three-dimensional figures qua quantitative and continuous. (shrink)

This paper has two main goals: first, it reconstructs Aristotle’s account of measurement in his Metaphysics and shows how it connects to modern notions of measurement. Second, it demonstrates that Aristotle’s notion of measurement only works for simple measures, but leads him into a dilemma once it comes to measuring complex phenomena, like mo-tion, where two or more different aspects, such as time and space, have to be taken into account. This is shown with the help of Aristotle’s reaction to (...) one of the problems Zeno’s dichotomy paradox raises: Aristotle implicitly employs a complex measure of motion when solving this problem, while he explicitly characterizes the measure of motion as a simple measure in his Physics. (shrink)

This book presents novel formalizations of three of the most important medieval logical theories: supposition, consequence and obligations. In an additional fourth part, an in-depth analysis of the concept of formalization is presented - a crucial concept in the current logical panorama, which as such receives surprisingly little attention.Although formalizations of medieval logical theories have been proposed earlier in the literature, the formalizations presented here are all based on innovative vantage points: supposition theories as algorithmic hermeneutics, theories of consequence analyzed (...) with tools borrowed from model-theory and two-dimensional semantics, and obligations as logical games. For this reason, this is perhaps the first time that these medieval logical theories are made fully accessible to the modern philosopher and logician who wishes to obtain a better grasp of them, but who has always been held back by the lack of appropriate ‘translations' into modern terms.Moreover, the book offers a reflection on the very nature of logic, a reflection that is prompted by the comparisons between medieval and modern logic, their similarities and dissimilarities. It is thus a contribution not only to the history of logic, but also to the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language and semantics.The analysis of medieval logic is also relevant for the modern philosopher and logician in that, being the unifying methodology used across all disciplines at that time, logic really provided unity to science. It thus presents a unified model of scientific investigation, where logic plays the aggregating role. (shrink)

This thesis is on the history and philosophy of logic and semantics. Logic can be described as the ‘science of reasoning’, as it deals primarily with correct patterns of reasoning. However, logic as a discipline has undergone dramatic changes in the last two centuries: while for ancient and medieval philosophers it belonged essentially to the realm of language studies, it has currently become a sub-branch of mathematics. This thesis attempts to establish a dialogue between the modern and the medieval traditions (...) in logic, by means of ‘translations’ of the medieval logical theories into the modern framework of symbolic logic, i.e. formalizations. One of its conclusions is that, when properly understood within their own framework, the interest of medieval logical theories for modern investigations go beyond mere historical interest, but that a thorough conceptual analysis of such theories must be undertaken in order to avoid conceptual misprojections. While such translations of medieval into modern logic have been attempted before, the approach presented here is innovative in that attention is paid to the similarities as well as to the dissimilarities between the two traditions, and to what can be learned from the medieval masters for modern investigations in logic and semantics. (shrink)

Nos Segundos Analíticos I. 14, 79a16-21 Aristóteles afirma que as demonstrações matemáticas são expressas em silogismos de primeira figura. Apresento uma leitura da teoria da demonstração científica exposta nos Segundos Analíticos I (com maior ênfase nos capítulo 2-6) que seja consistente com o texto aristotélico e explique exemplos de demonstrações geométricas presentes no Corpus. Em termos gerais, defendo que a demonstração aristotélica é um procedimento de análise que explica um dado explanandum por meio da conversão de uma proposição previamente estabelecida. (...) Em uma estrutura silogística, a proposição previamente estabelecida é a premissa maior e o termo mediador deve ser comensurado ao explanandum. O conjunto da premissa maior e da premissa menor (o explanans) é coextensivo ao explanandum, mas há uma assimetria intensional entre o explanans e o explanandum, de modo que apenas o primeiro explique o último. Por fim, defendo que o elemento identificado no termo mediador deve ser o mais apropriado para explicar precisamente o que certo explanandum é. (shrink)

Yates has recently argued that modal dispositionalism invalidates the axiom. Both Yates and Allen have advanced responses to the objection: Yates’s response proposes installing truth into the possibility biconditional, and Allen’s response requires that all properties be construed as being essentially dispositional. I argue that supporters of Borghini and Williams’s modal dispositionalist theory cannot accept these responses, given critical tenets of their theory. But, since these responses to the objection are the most plausible in the literature, I conclude that the (...) threat that Borghini and Williams’s modal dispositionalist theory invalidates the axiom still looms large. (shrink)

This paper concerns Aristotle's kind‐crossing prohibition. My aim is twofold. I argue that the traditional accounts of the prohibition are subject to serious internal difficulties and should be questioned. According to these accounts, Aristotle's prohibition is based on the individuation of scientific disciplines and the general kind that a discipline is about, and it says that scientific demonstrations must not cross from one discipline, and corresponding kind, to another. I propose a very different account of the prohibition. The prohibition is (...) based on Aristotle's scientific and metaphysical essentialism, according to which a scientific demonstration must take as its starting point a set of per se properties of a subject, if these make up a single, unitary definition. The subject of demonstration here is a kind, although not the general kind associated with a discipline, but rather the particular kind that the particular demonstration is about. (shrink)

The pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanical Problems is the earliest known ancient Greek text on mechanics, principally concerned with the explanation of a variety of mechanical phenomena using a particular construal of the principle of the lever. In the introduction, the author (thought to be an early Peripatetic) quotes the tragic poet Antiphon to summarise a discussion of the techne-physis (art-nature) relationship and the status of mechanics as a techne. I argue that this citation of a poet is an Aristotelian cultural signature, intended (...) to guide its reader(s) towards a better understanding of the nature of mechanics as expounded in the Mechanical Problems. By analysing several instances where Aristotle cites Antiphon (as well as other tragic poets) in the Aristotelian corpus, I propose that both the author of the Mechanical Problems and Aristotle use poets for the purpose of persuasion. This is in turn explained by understanding the homologous relationship between mechanics-as-techne (according to the author of the Mechanical Problems) and poetics-as-techne (according to Aristotle) in terms of their shared status as poietike techne (productive art) and claims to universal knowledge. A final facet of the proposed relationship between mechanics and poetry is hypothesised on the grounds of their mimetic nature. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Aristotle's understanding of mathematical continuity constrains the mathematical ontology he can consistently hold. On my reading, Aristotle can only be a mathematical abstractionist of a certain sort. To show this, I first present an analysis of Aristotle's notion of continuity by bringing together texts from his Metaphysica and Physica, to show that continuity is, for Aristotle, a certain kind of per se unity, and that upon this rests his distinction between continuity and contiguity. Next (...) I argue briefly that Aristotle intends for his discussion of continuity to apply to pure mathematical objects such as lines and figures, as well as to extended bodies. I show that this leads him to a difficulty, for it does not at first appear that the distinction between continuity and contiguity can be preserved for abstract mathematicals. Finally, I present a solution according to which Aristotle's understanding of continuity can only be saved if he holds a certain kind of mathematical ontology. (shrink)

The use of mathematics in economics has been widely discussed. The philosophical discussion on what mathematics is remains unsettled on why it can be applied to the study of the real world. We propose to get back to some philosophical conceptions that lead to a language-like role for the mathematical analysis of economic phenomena and present some problems of interest that can be better examined in this light. Category theory provides the appropriate tools for these analytical approach.

An actual infinity of colliding balls can be in a configuration in which the laws of mechanics lead to logical inconsistency. It is argued that one should therefore limit the domain of these laws to a finite, or only a potentially infinite number of elements. With this restriction indeterminism, energy nonconservation and creatio ex nihilo no longer occur. A numerical analysis of finite systems of colliding balls is given, and the asymptotic behaviour that corresponds to the potentially infinite system is (...) inferred. (shrink)