The justification for harm reduction as an approach to drug use and addiction is seen by many to be consequentialist in form and it has been claimed that as a deontologist Kant would reject harm reduction. I argue this is wrong on both counts. A more nuanced understanding of harm reduction and Kant shows them compatible. Kant’s own remarks about intoxication reinforce this. Moreover, there is a Kantian argument that harm reduction is not only morally permissible but more consistent with (...) the Kantian duty of respect for autonomy than mandatory abstinence approaches. (shrink)

The World Professional Association for Transgender Health’s Standards of Care, now in its seventh edition, is a frequently cited, internationally recognized, evidence-based document that details a comprehensive framework for gender-related care of trans people. However, the WPATH SOC still relies heavily in some cases on gatekeeping practices, dubbed “triadic therapy,” or a process where a trans patient is encouraged to seek out psychotherapy, and hormone therapy, and only then be able to engage in surgical options for transitioning. I use G. (...) Alan Marlatt’s harm reduction framework to argue that the triadic process creates its own set of harms that trans people have to contend with, especially insofar as it focuses on resolving gender dysphoria in a demanding, moralizing, and top-down way as opposed to enriching trans lives by reducing harms that prevent us from flourishing. Using Marlatt’s criterion that harm reduction ought to be bottom-up, low threshold, and not moralizing, I develop a list of suggestions for what ought to be centrally considered in treating trans patients. (shrink)

Harm reduction has been advocated to address a diverse range of public health concerns. The moral justification of harm reduction is usually presumed to be consequentialist because the goal of harm reduction is to reduce the harmful health consequences of risky behaviors, such as substance use. Harm reduction is contrasted with an abstinence model whose goal is to eradicate or reduce the prevalence of such behaviors. The abstinence model is often thought to be justified by ‘deontological’ considerations: it is claimed (...) that many risky behaviors are morally unacceptable, and therefore that we have a moral obligation to recommend abstinence. Because harm reduction is associated with a consequentialist justification and the abstinence model is associated with a deontological justification, the potential for a deontological justification of harm reduction has been overlooked. This paper addresses this gap. It argues that the moral duty to protect autonomy and dignity that has been advocated in other areas of medical ethics also justifies the public health policy of harm reduction. It offers two examples—the provision of supervised injection sites and the Housing First policy to address homelessness—to illustrate the argument. (shrink)