The present PhD dissertation aims to examine the relation between modality and change in Aristotle’s metaphysics. -/- On the one hand, Aristotle supports his modal realism (i.e., worldly objects have modal properties - potentialities and essences - that ground the ascriptions of possibility and necessity) by arguing that the rejection of modal realism makes change inexplicable, or, worse, banishes it from the realm of reality. On the other hand, the Stagirite analyses processes by means of modal notions (‘change is the (...) actuality of what is virtual insofar as it is virtual’). In other words: to grasp what change is, one has to resort to the modal idiom of potentialities, while the fact that there is change is indicative of the fact that nature is full of modal properties. -/- Aristotle’s modal and kinetic realism finds a negative in the figure of the Megaric Diodorus Kronus. The polemical situation of Greek philosophy has indeed the dialectical advantage of not opposing the Aristotelian position to a sui generis straw man. Both in its reduction of modal judgements to temporal quantifications and in its dissolution of the reality of the state-of-being-in-motion in favour of a cinematographic view of processes, the philosophical figure of reductionist antirealism embodied by Diodorus constitutes an alternative that takes the opposite view of Aristotle’s realism. -/- The present study is structured as a discussion between these two positions. In the face of Diodorus’ antirealist challenges, Aristotle articulates modal and kinetic considerations: the answers he gives to Diodorus’ puzzles thus provide valuable insight into his metaphysics. Moreover, the examination of Aristotle’s and Diodorus’ metaphysics, because of their insight and originality, will not fail to interest the philosopher concerned with the metaphysical foundations of modern physics, insofar as the entanglement between modalities and processes is nowadays at the core of mechanics (phase spaces, path integrals, etc.). (shrink)

RESUMEN Durante buena parte del siglo XX, uno de los grandes debates en el ámbito de los estudios sobre la doctrina del conocimiento según Tomás de Aquino fue aquel que rodeó la cuestión del proceso abstractivo. Particularmente la atención se volcó sobre el rol de este último como causa de la determinación de los objetos de ciencia especulativa. Dejando de lado las particularidades de esta discusión, este trabajo pretende enfocarse en el análisis particular de un texto en el que la (...) abstracción -aun figurando como el fundamento de la distinción de los objetos que estudia la matemática- no parece designar un tipo de operación intelectual; por el contrario, la abstracción figura como una propiedad de las propias esencias o formas matemáticas. En lo sucesivo se esbozará una interpretación de dicho texto y se enumerarán algunas objeciones contra dicha interpretación a las cuales se intentará dar respuesta. Las consecuencias de este hallazgo podrían conllevar la revisión de algunas ideas que se han vuelto comunes en la epistemología tomista. ABSTRACT During the 20th century, one of the most debated issues regarding Aquinas's theory of knowledge was the process of abstraction. Attention was mainly focused on the role of abstraction in the definition of objects of speculative sciences. Leaving aside the particular features of this debate, this paper aims to focus on the analysis of a very peculiar text in which abstraction -still considered as the cause of the distinction of mathematical objects- does not seem to designate some sort of intellectual operation. On the contrary, abstraction there appears as a property of the very mathematical essences or forms. The consequences of this could lead to the revision of some established ideas in Thomistic Epistemology. (shrink)

The author argues that the Platonism that Plotinus inherits – setting aside Ammonius Saccas, of whom we know all too little – is by the later second century distinctly dualist in tendency, and is able, especially in the case of Plutarch, to quote Plato to its purpose. Plato himself, though, as the author maintains, is, despite appearances to the contrary, what one might term a ‘modified monist’. That is to say, he fully recognizes the degree of imperfection and evil in (...) the world, and holds it to be ineradicable, but he does not in the last resort believe in a positive countervailing force to the Good or the One. What we have is simply a negative force, whether Indefinite Dyad, disorderly World-Soul, or Receptacle, which is an inevitable condition of their being a world at all, but which, as a side-effect of introducing diversity, generates various sorts of imperfection. It is this scenario that justifies his follower Hermodorus in declaring that Plato recognizes only a single first principle, and it to this sort of monism – if anything, in a more pronounced form – that Plotinus returns. The article is published in its English version in Vol. I, issue 1. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with answering the question, what is the central argument of Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing that brings its opening ontological approach to the subject of first philosophy to its ultimate theological goal and conclusion? This dissertation contends that it is the function of the fundamental scientific first principles of metaphysics, and in particular the fundamental primary notion necessary, to provide the intelligible link that Avicenna employs to demonstrate the existence and true-nature of the divine necessary existence (...) in itself on the basis of his doctrine of being. This conclusion is pursued through a systematic and cumulative line of inquiry that begins in Part I with Avicenna’s logical–cum–epistemological doctrine of conceptualization and assent, the heuristic order of the basic scientific questions, and his theory of a demonstrative science. The thesis then moves from the wider concentric circles concerned with logical matters into a series of narrowing concentric circles pertaining to the scientific order of the MH. Part II presents a close analysis of the Metaphysics of the Healing’s novel reception and reorganization of Aristotelian metaphysics according to Avicenna’s theory of demonstrative science, which consists in a subject, scientific first principles, and objects of inquiry that includes the species, proper accidents, and the science’s ultimate goal which is the aitiological–cum–theological inquiry into the causes of being. Part III transitions into a still narrower set of concentric circles that provide a detailed explication of the formal and material aspects of the scientific first principles of the Metaphysics of the Healing. Finally, the main argument of the thesis reaches the central point and question of the dissertation in Part IV, which establishes the fundamentality of the primary notion the necessary in the ontology, aitiology, and theology of the Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing. Part IV concludes that the principal function of the fundamental primary notion the necessary is to provide the intelligible link that connects Avicenna’s doctrine of being with the divine necessary existence in itself. (shrink)

The Byzantine philosopher Michael Psellos wrote a brief treatise entitled An Explanation of the Drive of the Soul Chariot and the Army of Gods According to Plato in the Phaedrus. The treatise consists of a compilation of excerpts from Hermias’ commentary on the Phae­drus. Psellos does not mention Hermias’ name but rather traces the origins of the treatise back to some “Greek theologians”. Psellos’ text presents a great interpretative challenge: the order of the myths about the charioteer and the parade (...) of gods is reversed so that the former explicates the latter in such a way that the whole Platonic argument is dismissed as “absurd”. The Phaedrus in the Neo ‑Platonic tradition is considered to be a strictly theological dialogue. Yet, Psellos’ arrangement shows that he was not interested in the mythographical or allegorical dimension of the excerpts. He rath­er focused on the epistemic problem, i.e., a reduction of the trichotomy of the soul into a duality of principles. Thus, he followed certain Aristo­telian commentators. Psellos suggests a reduction that is subjectivist or individualist in its nature and he refuses to identify individual intellect with any particular piety. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss some features of the doctrines of the agrapha dogmata in Neoplatonism, starting from the reading of an anecdote, presented in the Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, in which Plato dreams that close to death he becomes a swan which hunters are unable to catch. In fact, the dream is an explanation of the development of the Platonic tradition, and, more precisely, it presents a story of several exegetical disagreements that have survived till (...) the present day. Compared to modern interpretation of the Aristotelic testimony on the “so-called unwritten doctrines”, we can state that the late antique interpretations of them focus and depend on what Plato has left us in his written dialogues, which are the best living images of his oral dialogues. This conclusion is, then, a consequence of a study carried out on Ancient and Neoplatonic texts that leads to the acknowledgement of a Platonic philosophical system as well as to an overview of modern secondary bibliography produced by the esoteric interpretation of Plato and various views of scholars who are against this account. (shrink)

Recientemente, Gerson y Catana proponen el destierro de la categoría “neoplatonismo” de las historias de la filosofía a partir del análisis de la génesis histórica de su surgimiento como término peyorativo. En este artículo sostengo, por el contrario, que no basta con un mero análisis historiográfico para desactivar la marginalización de los neoplatónicos, sino que es necesario atacar, más que la noción de “neoplatonismo”, la de “originalidad”. Esta noción ha sido importada de modelos externos a los filosóficos y guarda semejanzas (...) importantes con la concepción de originalidad de algunas propuestas de los teóricos de los derechos de autor. (shrink)

RESUMEN Según Furio Jesi y Giorgio Agamben, la máquina antropológica es un dispositivo histórico que produce imágenes del hombre. En este artículo nos proponemos retomar esta categoría y mostrar que existen dos grandes modelos de máquina según la naturaleza de la imagen generada: la máquina teológica-bíblica, que funciona hasta el siglo XIX y que produce al hombre como ícono; la máquina ateológica, posterior a la muerte de Dios, que produce al hombre como fantasma. ABSTRACT According to Furio Jesi and Giorgio (...) Agamben, the anthropological machine is a historical dispositive that produces images of man. This paper aims at returning to this category and demonstrating that two models of the machine can be found depending on the nature of the image produced: the theological-biblical machine that operates until 19th century and that produces man as icon, and the a-theological machine, after disappearance of God, that produces man as phantasm. (shrink)

Kitarō Nishida is the most important and representative philosopher in modern Japan, who now attracts increasing attention internationally. He endeavored to give a logical foundation to the Eastern way of thinking through his confrontation with Western philosophers. The aim of this paper is to recover the modern and intercultural significance of Plotinus’ philosophy in the light of Nishida’s philosophy. Nishida refers to Plotinus repeatedly, expressing his deep empathy, though his philosophy, which professes itself to be highly critical, is not mysticism. (...) When we compare him with Plotinus, we can find a great affinity in their fundamental structure. ‘Absolute nothingness (zettai mu)’, the basis of all reality in Nishida’s philosophy, is prior to both subjectivity and objectivity, and corresponds to the Plotinian One, which transcends both thinking and being. The correspondence between their logical structures consists in regarding subjectivity and objectivity as developments of an indefinite principle that transcends and precedes the discrimination of the two, and determination as determination of what is indeterminate. However, differing from Plotinus, Nishida lays stress on corporality, ordinariness and individuality. Though Plotinus was never pessimistic about this world, the experience emphasized in theEnneadswas not earthly, while Nishida’s ‘radical ordinariness’ was the standpoint to which we should attain in a mundane life. When we compare Plotinus with Nishida, we encounter the intersection of the West and the East, antiquity and modernity, and mysticity and ordinariness. (shrink)