Contemporary philosophy of religion almost allergically reacts to metaphysics. They do so because of the various critiques of the potential reach of reason, which each in their own way argue that God cannot be appropriately approached via autonomous reason. In this article, I argue, on the one hand, that these critiques are furtively inspired by a certain outlook on transcendence, which I call the ‘Protestant view’ and, on the other hand, that numerous contemporary philosophers of religion are slowly starting to (...) appreciate a more ‘Catholic view’ on transcendence, which allows for a more metaphysically ambitious philosophy of religion. (shrink)

I introduce a distinct challenge to religious belief: the Ethical Argument from evil. By this argument, paradigmatic forms of religious practice constitutively involve failures of ethical acknowledgement with respect to the reality of evil. I show how standard discussions of the problem of evil, as a purely logical or epistemic issue, abstract away from its fundamentally ethical dimensions. Drawing on an analogy with Moore’s paradox, I argue that the Ethical Argument presents a genuine theoretical problem, not merely a practical or (...) pastoral one: the problem of how religious devotion can be compossible with properly acknowledging the reality of evil. I further argue that, in order properly to address this problem, the philosophy of religion needs to take a phenomenological turn. To illustrate this approach, I focus on the case of thankful prayer and draw out from Kierkegaard’s writings a religious ideal of unconditional gratitude. Developing the relevant notion of a failure of ethical acknowledgement in terms of two vices—wishful self-deception and spiritualized self-absorption—I show how Kierkegaard’s account can help us to assess whether expressions of religious devotion are objectionable on these grounds. (shrink)

Phenomenological research on forgiving another is presented with a focus on impetus, outcome, and relationship to reconciliation. Preliminary implications for psychotherapeutic application of the distinction between forgiveness and reconciliation are introduced.