The article begins with a reflection on the ‘conversation between mythologies’ present in the debate between C. Robert Mesle and John Hick on the role of Irenaean theodicy and process theology to tackle convincingly the problem of evil in the contemporary and future context of scientific advancement. I argue that, although these two authors consider their mythological perspectives to be widely different, there is a possibility of advancing toward conciliating the two views. I call the resulting myth the ‘aesthetic myth,’ (...) which focuses on the Trinitarian God, seen concomitantly as omnipotent and limited. Inspired also by the thought of St. Francis of Assisi and St. Maximus the Confessor, this myth asserts nature’s free initiative as co-creator with the Logos and the natural evil emerging from this initiative. Moral evil comes from natural evil; thus, ‘original sin’ shows no unsurpassable gap between God and humanity. (shrink)

In The Principle of Hope, Ernst Bloch claims that the Russian Orthodox Christian Church was theologically more open towards the ideas of October than its Western counterpart. The remark is intriguing, but Bloch does not offer any detailed explanation except to say that Orthodoxy considers the revelation “unconcluded.” This article is an attempt to provide a slightly more detailed background to Bloch’s remark and present some elements of Orthodox Christianity and its utopianism by way of comparative critical hermeneutics, a method (...) that looks at the interpretative differences between Orthodox and Western Christianity with respect to some basic shared dogmas and their de-alienating and alienating effects. (shrink)

Some contemporary Baptists (Medley and Kharlamov) argue that the conservative Baptists in North America need to incorporate the concept of deification into their traditional soteriology because they failed to present the continual and transforming nature of salvation. However, many leading conservative Baptist systematicians (Garrett, Erickson, Demarest, and Keathley) demonstrate their concern about a possible pantheistic connotation of the doctrine of deification. Unlike the conservative Baptists, I argue for the necessity of working with the concept of deification in the traditional Baptist (...) soteriology. The concept of deification is not something foreign to the Baptist tradition because Keach, Gill, Spurgeon, and Maclaren already demonstrated the patristic exchange formula ‘God became man so that man may become like God’. They considered the hypostatic union of two natures in Christ as the source and model of becoming like God or Christ, the true Image of God. Christians are called to be united with the glorified humanity of Christ by their adopted sonship and participation in the divine nature. Christification speaks of the real transformation of Christians in terms of a change in the mode of existence, not in nature. The four Baptists taught that Christian could participate in the communicable attributes of God, but not in the essence or incommunicable attributes of God. Therefore, Christification never produces another God-Man. Conservative Baptists do not have to compromise their traditional commitment to sola scriptura and the forensic nature of justification in their employment of the theme of deification. This paper concludes with four suggestions for contemporary Baptist discussions on deification. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a possible a/theological response to what Nietzsche called the ‘death of God’—or Hölderlin’s and Heidegger’s ‘flight of the gods’—through a juxtaposition of the Christian-Pauline concept of kenōsis and the ancient Greek-Platonic notion of chōra, and by taking Nishida Kitarō’s appropriations of these concepts as a clue and starting point. Nishida refers to chōra in 1926 to initiate his philosophy of place and then makes reference to kenōsis in 1945 in his final work that culminates—without necessarily (...) completing—his oeuvre. What he had thereby accomplished is an inversion of Platonism resulting in the collapse of the transcendent/immanent—idea/genesis and by implication the Heaven/Earth—dichotomy. I then unpack the ethical implication of this kenotic chōra Nishida has left us with. It suggests from us a certain response to the desacralization or secularization of the world. I shall build upon this suggestion and unfold its implications by drawing from a variety of sources, starting with Nishida but including others, such as Meister Eckhart, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, Gianni Vattimo, Reiner Schürmann, Mark Taylor, Jürgen Moltmann, and other philosophical and theological sources. (shrink)

Pseudo-Dionysius’ first principle is hyperousios. By definition, that concept is not theistic. In his oeuvre, however, Pseudo-Dionysius promotes Trinitarianism. A majority of Pseudo-Dionysius’ interpreters have maintained that these concepts are compatible. This article makes a case for the incoherence of that position.

Does an affirmation of theistic evolution make the task of theodicy impossible? In this article, I will review a number of ancient and contemporary responses to the problem of evil as it concerns animal suffering and suggest a possible way forward which employs the ancient Jewish insight that evil—as resistance to God's will that results in suffering and alienation from God's purposes—precedes the arrival of human beings and already has a firm foothold in the nonhuman animal world long before humans (...) are ever tempted to go astray. This theological intuition is conferred renewed relevance in light of the empirical reality of evolutionary gradualism and continuity and in view of the recent findings of cognitive ethology. Consequently, I suggest that taking biological evolution seriously entails understanding “moral evil” as a prehuman phenomenon that emerges gradually through the actions and intentions of “free creatures” which—as evolutionary history unfolded—increasingly possessed greater levels of freedom and degrees of moral culpability. (shrink)

The essay is an analysis of John of Damascus’ reasoning for venerating the icons. Under the subtitle ‘reasoning for venerating the icons’ the essay conducts the analysis in three parts. First, John's definition of ‘veneration’ is presented and examined. Second, the OT ‘veneration’ passages he cites are critically evaluated. Third, the apparent incoherence of John's case is demonstrated from the Eastern Orthodox notion of scripture. This is a follow-up study to a previous essay (i.e., ‘Handmade: a critical analysis of John (...) of Damascus’ reasoning for making icons’) which analyzes a problem in Orthodox aesthetics closely related to the one I examine here. (shrink)

The essay is an analysis of John of Damascus’ justification for venerating the icons. Under the subtitle ‘reasoning for venerating the icons’ the essay conducts the analysis in three parts. First, John's definition of ‘veneration’ is presented and examined. Second, the OT ‘veneration’ passages he cites are critically evaluated. Third, the apparent incoherence of John's case is demonstrated from the Eastern Orthodox notion of scripture. This is a follow-up study to a previous essay (i.e., ‘Handmade: a critical analysis of John (...) of Damascus’ reasoning for making icons’) which analyzes a problem in Orthodox aesthetics closely related to the one I examine here. (shrink)