This article considers the issue of expanded access to innovative treatments in the context of recent legislative initiatives in the United Kingdom and the United States. In the United Kingdom, the supporters of legislative change argued that the common law principles governing medical negligence are a barrier to innovation. In an attempt to remove this perceived impediment, two bills proposed that innovating doctors sued for negligence should be able to rely in their defence on the fact that their decision to (...) innovate was “responsible.” A decision to innovate would be regarded as responsible if it followed a specified process. Although these changes to the law of medical negligence were not passed, this article argues that the idea of a process-based approach was sound. In the United States, a number of states have passed “Right to Try” laws that permit doctors to prescribe and companies to provide investigational products without the need for FDA approval. These laws do not purport to and nor are they able to alter the obligations of individuals and companies under federal law. They are consequently unlikely to achieve their stated aim of expanding access to investigational products. This article argues that they nevertheless have a cogent rationale in so far as they highlight the need for rights-based reform to federal regulations governing access. (shrink)

Demands for improved access to innovative therapies have prompted a discourse that claims patients have rights to access treatments that may be of benefit, even if evidence that demonstrates safety and efficacy is lacking. This rights-based discourse is grounded in accounts of autonomy and assertions claiming that the state ought to not interfere with the free choices of patients and clinical decision-making. In this essay, we scrutinise these arguments to defend the ethical and legal permissibility of interference in contexts where (...) the uncertainty of benefit and potential for harm creates vulnerabilities that undermine patient capacity for self-determination. In support of this argument, we draw on two theoretical approaches to explore the limits of autonomy in innovative contexts and analyse the legal bases of the rights-based discourse. We then apply this analysis to the case example of stem cell transplantation as an innovative treatment for multiple sclerosis. (shrink)

The bioethics literature has paid little attention to matters of informed reproductive decision-making among women of childbearing age who have chronic kidney disease (CKD), including women who are on dialysis or women who have had a kidney transplant. Women with CKD receive inconsistent and, sometimes, inadequate reproductive counseling, particularly with respect to information about pursuing pregnancy. We identify four factors that might contribute to inadequate and inconsistent reproductive counseling. We argue that women with CKD should receive comprehensive reproductive counseling, including (...) information about the possibility of pursuing pregnancy, and that more rigorous research on pregnancy in women with CKD, including women on dialysis or who have received a kidney transplant, is warranted to improve informed reproductive decision making in this population. (shrink)

Introduction The bioethics literature reflects significant interest in and concern with the use of genetic and genomic information in various settings. Because psychiatric treatment and research raises unique ethical, legal, and social issues, we conducted a scoping review of the biomedical, bioethics, and psychology literature regarding the application of genetic and genomic tools to psychiatric disorders (as listed in the DSM-5) and two associated behaviors or symptoms to provide a more detailed overview of the state of the field. Objectives The (...) primary objective was to examine the available bioethics, biomedical, and psychology literature on applying genetic and genomic tools to psychiatric disorders (other than neurodevelopmental disorders) and two behaviors or symptoms sometimes associated with them (aggression or violence and suicidality) to identify the disorders to which these tools have been applied, the contexts in or purposes for which they have been applied, the ethical, legal, or social concerns associated with those uses, and proposed recommendations for mitigating those concerns. Methods We used Arksey and O’Malley’s scoping review framework: (1) identify the research question; (2) identify relevant studies; (3) select studies; (4) chart the data; and (5) collate, summarize, and report results (2005). We relied on Levac et al. to inform our application of the framework (2010). The PRISMA extension for scoping reviews checklist informed our reporting (2018). We searched three electronic databases MEDLINE (PubMed), Embase, and PsycInfo (EbscoHost) for peer-reviewed journal articles in English to identify relevant literature. One author screened the initial results and additional screening was done in consultation with other authors. A data extraction form using DSM-5 diagnostic categories (excluding neurodevelopmental disorders) was developed and two authors independently each reviewed approximately half of the articles. Inter-rater reliability was ensured by double-coding approximately 10% of the papers. An additional author independently coded 10% of the articles to audit the data. Results In 365 coded publications, we identified 15 DSM-5 diagnostic categories in addition to the two pre-selected behaviors or symptoms (aggression or violence and suicidality) to which genetic or genomic tools have been applied. We identified 11 settings in or purposes for which these tools were applied. Twenty-two types of ethical, legal, or social concerns associated with the application of genetic or genomic tools to these disorders or behaviors/symptoms were identified along with 13 practices or policies that could mitigate these concerns. Conclusion Genetic and genomic tools have been applied to a wide range of psychiatric disorders. These raise a range of ethical, legal, and social concerns. Additional research is warranted to better understand the concerns and effective ways to address them. Advancing the literature to identify relevant ethical, legal, or social concerns and solutions to those problems likely requires greater attention to specific applications of genetic or genomic tools to particular psychiatric disorders and associated behaviors/symptoms as well as broad stakeholder engagement. (shrink)

Improving surgical interventions is key to improving outcomes. Ensuring the safe and transparent translation of such improvements is essential. Evaluation and governance initiatives, including the IDEAL framework and the Macquarie Surgical Innovation Identification Tool have begun to address this. Yet without a definition of innovation that allows non-surgeons to identify when it is occurring, these initiatives are of limited value. A definition seems elusive, so we undertook a conceptual study of surgical innovation. This indicated common conceptual areas in discussions of (...) innovation, that we categorised alliteratively under the themes of “purpose”, “place”, “process”, “product” and “person”. These conceptual areas are used in varying—sometimes contradictory—ways in different discussions. Highlighting these conceptual areas of surgical innovation may be useful in clarifying what should be reported in registries of innovation. However our wider conclusion was that the term “innovation” carries too much conceptual baggage to inform normative inquiry about surgical practice. Instead, we propose elimination of the term “innovation” from serious discourse aimed at evaluation and regulation of surgery. In our view researchers, philosophers and policy-makers should consider what it is about surgical activity that needs attention and develop robust definitions to identify these areas: for our own focus on transparency and safety, this means finding criteria that can objectively identify certain risk profiles during the development of surgery. (shrink)

The case of Charlie Gard, an infant with a genetic illness whose parents sought experimental treatment in the USA, brought important debates about the moral status of parents and children to the public eye. After setting out the facts of the case, this article considers some of these debates through the lens of parental rights. Parental rights are most commonly based on the promotion of a child’s welfare; however, in Charlie’s case, promotion of Charlie’s welfare cannot explain every fact of (...) the case. Indeed, some seem most logically to extend from intrinsic parental rights, that is, parental rights that exist independent of welfare promotion. I observe that a strong claim for intrinsic parental rights can be built on arguments for genetic propriety and children’s limited personhood. Critique of these arguments suggests the scope of parental rights remains limited: property rights entail proper use; non-personhood includes only a small cohort of very young or seriously intellectually disabled children and the uniqueness of parental genetic connection is limited. Moreover, there are cogent arguments about parents’ competence to make judgements, and public interest arguments against allowing access to experimental treatment. Nevertheless, while arguments based on propriety may raise concerns about the attitude involved in envisioning children as property, I conclude that these arguments do appear to offer a prima facie case for a parental right to seek experimental treatment in certain limited circumstances. (shrink)