Neste texto investigamos a compatibilidade entre o ceticismo de Oswaldo Porchat e outras duas ideias metafilosóficas gerais, a saber, o equilíbrio reflexivo e a visão de solução de problemas. Procuramos mostrar de que modo o ceticismo e as outras duas ideias são compatíveis e iluminam-se mutuamente, e sugerimos uma articulação entre elas. O equilíbrio reflexivo ajuda a compreender a relação de uma filosofia cética e pós-cética, primeiro, com a vida comum e, depois, com o domínio fenomênico. O enfoque de solução (...) de problemas é a perspectiva metafilosófica resgatada por Porchat em sua fase neopirrônica. Mostramos que, se na primeira fase do ceticismo porchatiano, o que está em equilíbrio com a vida comum ainda são teses filosóficas, na segunda fase o que se pretende que esteja em equilíbrio com o domínio fenomênico é outro tipo de unidade epistêmica — os problemas, nomeadamente, aqueles problemas filosóficos que sejam passíveis de retradução a esse domínio fenomênico e oriundos de uma dinâmica de certo tipo. Para levar a cabo a análise, é crucial investigar as noções de fenômeno e de objetividade em Porchat. O texto se encerra com considerações sobre o lugar do conhecimento científico na visão de Porchat. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPolitical rhetoric is underpinned by its relationship to context. Scholars have struggled to articulate this relationship by relying upon an ontological perspective of rhetoric and situation. This paper utilizes a new, problematological philosophy of rhetoric in context that overcomes these limitations. This approach employs a logic of question and answer which articulates the contingency of rhetoric as well as the structuring effects of context, conceived as social distance. This paper makes three conceptual innovations; philosophically redefining the rhetorical situation via a (...) social problematology; developing a relational conception of situation; and originating a rhetorical theory of situatedness. (shrink)

The Adam Smith problem refers to a claimed inconsistency between the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations, regarding the portrayal of human nature in these two books. Previous research predominantly resolved the claimed inconsistency by uncovering virtuous, less selfish character traits in the Wealth of Nations. This article voices caution. I acknowledge – on methodological grounds – fundamental differences regarding the portrayal of human nature in Smith’s behavioral ethics, i.e. the Theory of Moral Sentiments, as compared with (...) Smith’s economic research. The key argument is that Smith’s two books address different research problems and hence do not, need not and cannot adopt the same view of human nature – for methodological reasons, so my argument. Adam Smith scholarship overlooked that Smith himself in considerable degrees understood “economic man” as a heuristic abstraction. I connect to the philosophies of science of Imre Lakatos and Karl Popper. (shrink)

The simplest statement of the relationship between consensus and dissensus is that arguments are supposed to begin in dissensus and end in consensus. This essay introduces a third state for argumentation, learned ignorance. Nicolas of Cusa’s De Docta Ignorantia lays out both a case and a logic for argumentation that is not designed to end in a clear conclusion. Instead, the arguer pursues a matter up to an inconclusive point, and ends there, satisfied with the results. The underlying logic of (...) this view is centered on the “coincidence of opposites,” which requires rejection of the usual logical principle that A and not-A cannot both be true. (shrink)