In an analysis of recent work on nudging we distinguish three positions on the relationship between nudging founded in libertarian paternalism and the protection of personal autonomy through informed consent. We argue that all three positions fail to provide adequate protection of personal autonomy in the clinical context. Acknowledging that nudging may be beneficial, we suggest a fourth position according to which nudging and informed consent are valuable in different domains of interaction.

The paper argues that care ethics should be subsumed under virtue ethics by construing care as an important virtue. Doing so allows us to achieve two desirable goals. First, we preserve what is important about care ethics. Second, we avoid two important objections to care ethics, namely, that it neglects justice, and that it contains no mechanism by which care can be regulated so as not to be become morally corrupt.

In this chapter, I argue that care ethics offers useful resources for developing alternative models of responsibility for of structural injustice. I begin in Section 2 by providing an overview of what 'structural injustice' is and of the ‘forward-looking’ models of responsibility that have been developed for dealing with it. In Section 3, I give an overview of (my interpretation of) care ethics. This will reveal several points of resonance between care ethics and existing forward-looking theories of responsibility for structural (...) injustice. In Section 4, I weave these two threads together, explicitly enumerating several care ethical insights that can be brought to bear on forward-looking theories of responsibility for structural injustice. (shrink)

Self-advocacy organisations support people in a wide range of political activities, alongside providing key social networks. The emergence of formalised self-advocacy for intellectually disabled people marked an important cultural shift. These groups soon became associated with the pursuit of social change and the attainment of rights. The role of the self-advocacy support worker, working together with self-advocates, has been pivotal. However, studies have shown there has been concern over the relationship between self-advocates and those who advise or support them. Both (...) parties are aware of the potential tensions of supporters teaching people skills to take control, to manage their workers, whilst, perhaps inadvertently, assuming a powerful position in the relationship. This interesting paradox hints at ethical complexities inherent in the role. A key challenge facing these support workers is how they can support their employers to run successful organisations, without ?taking over?. Using material from both Chapman and Tilley's research of self-advocacy organisations in the UK, this article problematises some key ethical issues within the role. (shrink)

Despite clear parallels between Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics and recent scholarship in feminist ethics, feminists are often suspicious of discourse ethics and have kept themselves mostly separate from the field. By developing a sustained application of Habermas's discourse ethics to friendship, Keller demonstrates that feminist misgivings of discourse ethics are largely misplaced and that Habermas's theory can be used to develop a compelling moral phenomenology of interpersonal relations.

This paper addresses whether universal, general education programs are enough to satisfy basic criteria of human rights, or whether comprehensive family planning programs, in conjunction with universal education programs, might also be morally required. Even before the Reagan administration instituted the ‘global gag rule’ at the 1984 conference in Mexico City, prohibiting funding to nongovernmental organizations that included providing information about abortion as a possible method of family planning, the moral acceptability of family planning programs has been called into question. (...) This paper makes a moral argument for family planning by appealing to both data and to theory: data about the efficacy of universal and comprehensive family planning education programs at reducing fertility and infant mortality, and theory about what is required for the establishment of autonomy. It reasons that universal educational programs are insufficient for the promotion of autonomy, and therefore argues on substantive autonomy grounds for comprehensive family planning programs in addition to universal education programs. (shrink)

In this article it is argued that much research into processes of moral learning and development in organisations has been conducted under somewhat controlled conditions, and that these do not permit testing of individuals' thought and action under more extreme circumstances. Therefore in practice one needs to acknowledge the effect of the actual organisational context. Three aspects or issues concerning the effect of this context on interventions are identified: first, systemic factors, especially corporate culture, impact on individual behaviour; second, consultants (...) and developers may have difficulty when working with people at different levels of moral development; and, third, differential influence among members of an organisation affects the possibility of, and the enactment of, moral development programmes.Each of these considerations is discussed while employing conceptualisations based on Kohlberg's ideas. However the question of influence and power is not one which has been addressed to any significant extent by writers in this particular area. The essential argument in this article is that this must be done if the full potential of research into moral development in organisations is to be realised. (shrink)