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De Anima II 5

Phronesis 47 (1):28 - 90 (2002)

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  1. The Non-kinetic Origins of Aristotle’s Concept of Ἐνέργεια.Santiago Chame - 2023 - Apeiron 56 (3):469-494.
    In this paper, I argue that Aristotle was already aware in his earlier texts of the fundamental distinction between motion and activity and of the criterion which structures this contrast. Moreover, I will present textual evidence which suggests that Aristotle’s original concept of ἐνέργεια applies primarily to activities which contain their ends in themselves, and not to motions, which are different from their ends.
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  • 'Nous alone enters from outside' Aristotelian embryology and early Christian philosophy.Sophia Connell - 2021 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 2 (15):109-138.
    In a work entitled On the Generation of Animals, Aristotle remarks that “intellect (nous) alone enters from outside (thurathen)”. Interpretations of this passage as dualistic dominate the history of ideas and allow for a joining together of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine on the soul. This, however, pulls against the well-known Aristotelian position that soul and body are intertwined and interdependent. The most influential interpretations thereby misrepresent Aristotle’s view on soul and lack any real engagement with his embryology. This paper seeks (...)
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  • Aristotle on Light and Vision: An ‘Ecological’ Interpretation.Sean M. Costello - 2022 - Apeiron 55 (2).
    Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of visual perception has traditionally held that Aristotle had a single, static, conception of light and that he believed that illumination occurred prior to and independent of the actions of colours. I contend that this view precludes the medium from becoming actually transparent, thus making vision impossible. I here offer an alternative to the traditional interpretation, using contemporary conceptual tools to make good philosophical sense of Aristotle’s position. I call my view the ‘ecological’ interpretation. It postulates (...)
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  • Hamid Taieb, Relational Intentionality: Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition. [REVIEW]Colin Guthrie King - 2020 - Ancient Philosophy Today 2 (2):183-189.
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  • Can there be a science of psychology? Aristotle’s de Anima and the structure and construction of science.Robert J. Hankinson - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (4):469-515.
    This article considers whether and how there can be for Aristotle a genuine science of ‘pure’ psychology, of the soul as such, which amounts to considering whether Aristotle’s model of science in the Posterior Analytics is applicable to the de Anima.
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  • Aristotle on Self-Change in Plants.Daniel Coren - 2019 - Rhizomata 7 (1):33-62.
    A lot of scholarly attention has been given to Aristotle’s account of how and why animals are capable of moving themselves. But no one has focused on the question, whether self-change is possible in plants on Aristotle’s account. I first give some context and explain why this topic is worth exploring. I then turn to Aristotle’s conditions for self-change given in Physics VIII.4, where he argues that the natural motion of the elements does not count as self-motion. I apply those (...)
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  • What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?Sukaina Hirji - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):671-696.
    It is commonly assumed that Aristotle's ethical theory shares deep structural similarities with neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that this assumption is a mistake, and that Aristotle's ethical theory is both importantly distinct from the theories his work has inspired, and independently compelling. I take neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics to be characterized by two central commitments: (i) virtues of character are defined as traits that reliably promote an agent's own flourishing, and (ii) virtuous actions are defined as the sorts of actions (...)
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  • How Aristotle Changes Anaxagoras’s Mind.Jason W. Carter - 2019 - Apeiron 52 (1):1-28.
    I argue that a common interpretation of DA 3.4, which sees Aristotle as there rejecting Anaxagoras’s account of mind, is mistaken. Instead, I claim that, in providing his solution to the main puzzles of this chapter, Aristotle takes special care to preserve the essential features that he thinks Anaxagoras ascribes to mind, namely, its ability to know all things, its being unmixed, and its inability to be affected by mixed objects.
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  • Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic and modern relevance logic.Philipp Steinkrüger - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1413-1444.
    This paper sets out to evaluate the claim that Aristotle’s Assertoric Syllogistic is a relevance logic or shows significant similarities with it. I prepare the grounds for a meaningful comparison by extracting the notion of relevance employed in the most influential work on modern relevance logic, Anderson and Belnap’s Entailment. This notion is characterized by two conditions imposed on the concept of validity: first, that some meaning content is shared between the premises and the conclusion, and second, that the premises (...)
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  • Aristotle on Sounds.Mark A. Johnstone - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (5):631-48.
    In this paper I consider two related issues raised by Aristotle 's treatment of hearing and sounds. The first concerns the kinds of changes Aristotle takes to occur, in both perceptual medium and sense organs, when a perceiver hears a sounding object. The second issue concerns Aristotle 's views on the nature and location of the proper objects of auditory perception. I argue that Aristotle 's views on these topics are not what they have sometimes been taken to be, and (...)
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  • Aristotle on 'First Transitions' in De Anima II 5.John Bowin - 2012 - Apeiron 45 (3):262-282.
    At De Anima II 5, 417b17, Aristotle says, ‘The first transition (πρώτη μεταβολή) in that which can perceive is brought about by the parent, and when it is born it already has [the faculty of] sense-perception in the same way as it has knowledge. Actual sense-perception is so spoken of in the same way as contemplation.’ The purpose of this paper is to determine the nature of first transitions.
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  • Aristotle on Various Types of Alteration in De Anima II 5.John Bowin - 2011 - Phronesis 56 (2):138-161.
    In De Anima II 5, 417a21-b16, Aristotle makes a number of distinctions between types of transitions, affections, and alterations. The objective of this paper is to sort out the relationships between these distinctions by means of determining which of the distinguished types of change can be coextensive and which cannot, and which can overlap and which cannot. From the results of this analysis, an interpretation of 417a21-b16 is then constructed that differs from previous interpretations in certain important respects, chief among (...)
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  • The Middle Included - Logos in Aristotle.Ömer Aygün - 2016 - Evanston, Illinois, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri: Northwestern University Press.
    The Middle Included is a systematic exploration of the meanings of logos throughout Aristotle’s work. It claims that the basic meaning is “gathering,” a relation that holds its terms together without isolating them or collapsing one to the other. This meaning also applies to logos in the sense of human language. Aristotle describes how some animals are capable of understanding non-firsthand experience without being able to relay it, while others relay it without understanding. Aygün argues that what distinguishes human language, (...)
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  • Euclides e a geometria do raio visual.Guilherme Rodrigues Neto - 2013 - Scientiae Studia 11 (4):873-892.
    Este ensaio introdutório faz uma breve apresentação do tratado de óptica atribuído a Euclides de Alexandria, inserindo-o no contexto das teorias sobre a visão formuladas pelas doutrinas filosóficas antigas. Ressalta-se o antagonismo entre a análise geométrica da visão, empreendida por Euclides, e as considerações filosóficas acerca dos processos físicos subjacentes à sensação visual. Pretende-se mostrar que o objeto da óptica euclidiana é a percepção visual daquilo que Aristóteles denomina "sensível comum". This introductory essay provides an abridged presentation of the optical (...)
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  • Reminiscenze di Aristotele, Metafisica IX 6.1048b18–35 in autori neoplatonici.Alessandro Linguiti - 2022 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 43 (2):363-367.
    In Proclus’Platonic Theology(V 17, 62. 22–63. 2) one can detect a clear recollection of the well-known and much discussed passage 1048b18–35 fromMetaphysicsIX 6. This passage is transmitted in only one branch of the manuscript tradition and some scholars maintain that it is not by Aristotle or that it does not belong to hisMetaphysics. On the other hand, Proclus’ testimony, supported by other passages by Neo-Platonic authors, provides an argument for the original location of the discussed section in Aristotle’sMetaphysics.
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  • Change, Agency and the Incomplete in Aristotle.Andreas Anagnostopoulos - 2017 - Phronesis 62 (2):170-209.
    Aristotle’s most fundamental distinction between changes and other activities is not that ofMetaphysicsΘ.6, between end-exclusive and end-inclusive activities, but one implicit inPhysics3.1’s definition of change, between the activity of something incomplete and the activity of something complete. Notably, only the latter distinction can account for Aristotle’s view, inPhysics3.3, that ‘agency’—effecting change in something, e.g. teaching—does not qualify strictly as a change. This distinction informsDe Anima2.5 and imparts unity to Aristotle’s extended treatment of change inPhysics3.1-3.
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  • Soul and Elemental Motion in Aristotle's Physics VIII 4.Errol G. Katayama - 2011 - Apeiron 44 (2):163-190.
    By defending the following views – that Aristotle identifies the generator and perhaps the obstacle remover as an essential cause of the natural sublunary elemental motion in Physics VIII 4; that this view is consistent with the view of Physics II 1 that the sublunary simple bodies have a principle of internal motion; and that the sublunary and the celestial elements have a nature in the very same way – I shall offer what has so far eluded Aristotelian commentators: a (...)
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  • Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief, Affect and Rationality.Ian Mccready-Flora - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):394-435.
    I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared with non-rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition (...)
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  • Aristotle on Perception and Perception-like Appearance: De Anima 3.3, 428b10–29a9.Evan Keeling - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    It is now common to explain some of incidental perception’s features by means of a different capacity, called phantasia. Phantasia, usually translated as ‘imagination,’ is thought to explain how incidental perception can be false and representational by being a constitutive part of perception. Through a close reading of De Anima 3.3, 428b10–29a9, I argue against this and for perception first: phantasia is always a product of perception, from which it initially inherits all its characteristics. No feature of perception is explained (...)
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  • Aristotle on God's life-generating power and on pneuma as its vehicle.Abraham P. Bos - 2018 - Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
    Proposes an innovative rethinking of Aristotle’s work as a system that integrates his theology with his doctrine of reproduction and life. In this deep rethinking of Aristotle’s work, Abraham P. Bos argues that scholarship on Aristotle’s philosophy has erred since antiquity in denying the connection between his theology and his doctrine of reproduction and life in the earthly sphere. Beginning with an analysis of God’s role in the Aristotelian system, Bos explores how this relates to other elements of his philosophy, (...)
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  • Are Events Things of the Past?Julian Bacharach - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):381-412.
    A popular claim in recent philosophy of mind and action is that events only exist once they are over. This has been taken to have the consequence that many temporal phenomena cannot be understood ‘from the inside’, as they are unfolding, purely in terms of events. However, as I argue here, the claim that events exist only when over is incoherent. I consider two ways of understanding the claim and the notion of existence it involves: one that ties existence to (...)
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  • Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mind.Alberto Jori - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (6):1525-1538.
    In an attempt to reject Cartesian Dualism, some philosophers and scientists of the late twentieth century proposed a return to the ancient position that Descartes had opposed, i.e., Aristotle’s psychological hylomorphism, which applied to living beings the ontological thesis, according to which every substance is a compound of matter (hyle) and form (morphe). In this perspective, the soul is actual possession of the body’s capacity to perform a series of life functions. Therefore, according to Aristotle, soul and body are reciprocally (...)
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  • ¿Una imagen dualista en el De Anima de Aristóteles?Jorge Mittelmann - 2014 - Quaderns de Filosofia 1 (2):11-33.
    This paper deals with a seeming contradiction that may seriously impair Aristotle’s definition of the soul in his De Anima. While this definiens has been widely regarded as providing a non-dualistic account of life-functions, grounded in a hylomorphic approach to living beings, Aristotle sticks to an instrumental language vis-à-vis the body, which he consistently refers to as a tool of the soul. It is argued that this philosophical way of talking should be taken at face value, without dismiss- ing it (...)
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  • Actuality, Potentiality and De Anima II.5.Robert Heinaman - 2007 - Phronesis 52 (2):139-187.
    Myles Burnyeat has argued that in De Anima II.5 Aristotle marks out a refined kind of alteration which is to be distinguished from ordinary alteration, change of quality as defined in Physics III.1-3. Aristotle's aim, he says, is to make it clear that perception is an alteration of this refined sort and not an ordinary alteration. Thus, it both supports his own interpretation of Aristotle's view of perception, and refutes the Sorabji interpretation according to which perception is a composite of (...)
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  • Capacity and Potentiality: Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ.6–7 from the Perspective of the De Anima.Thomas K. Johansen - 2012 - Topoi 31 (2):209-220.
    The notion of a capacity in the sense of a power to bring about or undergo change plays a key role in Aristotle’s theories about the natural world. However, in Metaphysics Θ Aristotle also extends ‘ capacity ’, and the corresponding concept of ‘activity’, to cases where we want to say that something is in capacity, or in activity, such and such but not, or not directly, in virtue of being capable of initiating or undergoing change. This paper seeks to (...)
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  • Aristotle’s First Moves Regarding Perception: A Reading of (most of) De Anima 2.5.Andreas Anagnostopoulos - 2023 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 105 (1):68-117.
    Whereas scholars often look to De Anima 2.5 to support one or another understanding of the sense in which perception, for Aristotle, qualifies as an alteration and qualitative assimilation to the sense-object, I ask the more basic question of what the chapter is meant to establish or accomplish with respect to the question whether perception is an alteration. I argue that the chapter does not presuppose or legitimate the view that perception is an alteration where it is thought to, and (...)
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  • On a Possible Argument for Averroes's Single Separate Intellect.Stephen R. Ogden - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 4 (1).
    Averroes held the controversial thesis that there is only one separate material or possible intellect for all humans. This paper analyzes a passage from his Long Commentary on the De Anima which has been thought to constitute a primary philosophical argument for the view. It is called the Determinate Particular Argument, because it contends that the material intellect cannot be a determinate particular if it is to be the ontological receptacle of universal intelligible forms. After defending one crucial premise, it (...)
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  • Aristotle on the Truth About Practical Ends.Christiana Megan Meyvis Olfert - 2018 - Apeiron 51 (2):221-244.
    Aristotle holds that rational agents can think true thoughts about their practical ends. Specifically, we can think true thoughts about whether our ends are good and able to be brought about in action. But what makes these thoughts true? What sort of thing is a practical end, such that it both is good, and also may be brought about in the future? These questions are difficult to answer. They are metaphysical questions about Aristotle’s practical philosophy: they ask what practical ends (...)
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  • (1 other version)Las Quaestiones III 2 y 3 de Alejandro de Afrodisia y el problema de la alteración sensitiva.Marco Zingano - 2009 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 40:279-298.
    Cuando Alejandro examina De anima II 5 de Aristóteles, se enfrenta al problema de explicar qué tipo de alteración es la sensación. Su respuesta fue muy influyente, especialmente después de la Quaestio III 3 que había sido traducida al latín por Gerardo de Cremona basada en una versión árabe. De hecho, aún es muy influyente, pues en general es tomada en cuenta por los comentadores modernos del De anima. Pero un examen detallado de De anima II 5 puede generar dudas (...)
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  • Aristotle’s Naïve Somatism.Alain E. Ducharme - unknown
    Aristotle’s Naïve Somatism is a re-interpretation of Aristotle’s cognitive psychology in light of certain presuppositions he holds about the living animal body. The living animal body is presumed to be sensitive, and Aristotle grounds his account of cognition in a rudimentary proprioceptive awareness one has of her body. With that presupposed metaphysics under our belts, we are in a position to see that Aristotle in de Anima (cognition chapters at least) has a di erent explanatory aim in view than that (...)
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  • Aristotle on the Truth and Falsity of Three Sorts of Perception.Evan Keeling - 2022 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 39 (4):305-322.
    Aristotle's theory of perception is complicated by the fact that he recognizes three kinds of perceptible object: special, common, and incidental, all of which have different levels of reliability. Focusing on De Anima 3.3, 428b17–25, this paper discusses why these three sorts of perception are true and false. It argues that perceptions of special objects can be false because of the blind-spot phenomenon and that common objects are typically perceived as predicated of an incidental object. This helps explain why perceptions (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Quaestiones III 2 and 3 of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the problem of the sensitive alteration.Marco Zingano - 2009 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 40:279-298.
    Cuando Alejandro examina De anima II 5 de Aristóteles, se enfrenta al problema de explicar qué tipo de alteración es la sensación. Su respuesta fue muy influyente, especialmente después de la Quaestio III 3 que había sido traducida al latín por Gerardo de Cremona basada en una versión árabe. De hecho, aún es muy influyente, pues en general es tomada en cuenta por los comentadores modernos del De anima. Pero un examen detallado de De anima II 5 puede generar dudas (...)
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  • A Self-Forming Vessel: Aristotle, Plasticity, and the Developing Nature of the Intellect.S. F. Kislev - 2020 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 51 (3):259-274.
    Highlighting the relations between De Anima II.5 and De Anima III.4, this paper argues that Aristotle held a surprisingly dynamic view of the intellect. According to this view, the intellect is in...
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