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Kamm on the Morality of Killing:Morality, Mortality, Vol. 2, Rights, Duties, and Status. Frances M. Kamm

Ethics 108 (1):197- (1997)

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Kamm and Miller on Rights' Compatibility.Rowan Cruft - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):393 - 401.details In their recent books, National Responsibility and Global Justice (2007) and Intricate Ethics (2007), David Miller and Frances Kamm give two similar arguments aimed at preventing their favoured accounts of the moral justification of rights from justifying an excess of demanding assistance rights. Both arguments appeal to the fact that a proliferation of assistance rights would conflict with other rights. In this paper, I show that these arguments fail. As Miller recognises in a footnote, the failure of such arguments appears (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Kamm and Miller on Rights’ Compatibility.Rowan Cruft - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):393-401.details In their recent books, National Responsibility and Global Justice and Intricate Ethics, David Miller and Frances Kamm give two similar arguments aimed at preventing their favoured accounts of the moral justification of rights from justifying an excess of demanding assistance rights. Both arguments appeal to the fact that a proliferation of assistance rights would conflict with other rights. In this paper, I show that these arguments fail. As Miller recognises in a footnote, the failure of such arguments appears to support (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Egalitarian nonconsequentialism and the levelling down objection.David O'Brien - 2018 - Ratio 32 (1):74-83.details Telic egalitarianism is famously threatened by the levelling down objection. In its canonical form, the objection purports to show that it is not, in itself, an improvement if inequality is reduced. In a variant that is less often discussed, the objection is that telic egalitarians are committed to believing that sometimes one ought to reduce inequality, even when doing so makes no one better off. The standard egalitarian response to this ‘all things considered’ variant of the levelling down objection is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Kamm on inviolability and agent-relative restrictions.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2009 - Res Publica 15 (2):165-178.details Agent-relative restrictions prohibit minimizing violations: that is, they require us not to minimize the total number of their violations by violating them ourselves. Frances Kamm has explained this prohibition in terms of the moral worth of persons, which, in turn, she explains in terms of persons’ high moral status as inviolable beings. I press the following criticism of this account: even if minimizing violations are permissible, we need not have a lower moral status provided other determinants thereof boost it. Thus, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Self-Sacrifice and the Trolley Problem.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):662-672.details Judith Jarvis Thomson has recently proposed a new argument for the thesis that killing the one in the Trolley Problem is not permissible. Her argument relies on the introduction of a new scenario, in which the bystander may also sacrifice herself to save the five. Thomson argues that those not willing to sacrifice themselves if they could may not kill the one to save the five. Bryce Huebner and Marc Hauser have recently put Thomson's argument to empirical test by asking (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 20 citations

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