Kant on sex gives most philosophers the following associations: a lifelong celibate philosopher; a natural teleological view of sexuality; a strange incorporation of this natural teleological account within his freedom-based moral theory; and a stark ethical condemnation of most sexual activity. Although this paper provides an interpretation of Kant’s view on sexuality, it neither defends nor offers an apology for everything Kant says about sexuality. Rather, it aims to show that a reconsidered Kant-based account can utilize his many worthwhile insights (...) and that making Kant’s account of sexuality more consistent with his own basic philosophical commitments results in a compelling approach to the complex and complicated phenomena of sexual love, sexual identity, and sexual orientation. (shrink)

Kant's conception of women is complex. Although he struggles to bring his considered view of women into focus, a sympathetic reading shows it not to be anti-feminist and to contain important arguments regarding human nature. Kant believes the traditional male-female distinction is unlikely to disappear, but he never proposes the traditional gender ideal as the moral ideal; he rejects the idea that such considerations of philosophical anthropology can set the framework for morality. This is also why his moral works clarifies (...) that all citizens, including women have the right, and should be encouraged to strive towards an active condition. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

As feminist scholars, we hope that our own work is exempt from structural problems such as racism, sexism, and Eurocentricism, that is, the kind of problems that are exemplified and enacted by Kant’s works. In other words, we hope that we do not re-enact, implicitly or explicitly, Kant’s problematic claims, which range from the unnaturalness of a female philosopher, “who might as well have a beard,” the stupid things that a black carpenter said “because he was black from head to (...) foot,” the poor women “living in the greatest slavery in the Orient,” to the “sheep-like existence of the inhabitants of Tahiti.” In this piece, I argue that we cannot simply hope to avoid these problems unless we are vigilant about incorporating the full picture of Kant’s and Kantian philosophy into our feminist appropriations. I will show that one way to minimize if not altogether avoid this risk is to follow the model of a new methodology that establishes the continued relevance of all of Kant’s claims for our present. Inspired by Spivak’s A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, I will call this alternative methodology the “constructive complicity” approach. (shrink)

There has been the recurrent suspicion that community, harmony, cohesion, and similar relational goods as understood in the African ethical tradition threaten to occlude difference. Often, it has been Western defenders of liberty who have raised the concern that these characteristically sub-Saharan values fail to account adequately for individuality, although some contemporary African thinkers have expressed the same concern. In this chapter, I provide a certain understanding of the sub-Saharan value of communal relationship and demonstrate that it entails a substantial (...) allowance for difference. I aim to show that African thinkers need not appeal to, say, characteristically Euro-American values of authenticity or autonomy to make sense of why individuals should not be pressured to conform to a group’s norms regarding sex and gender. A key illustration involves homosexuality. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

In ‘What is Enlightenment?’, Kant claims that no women are currently enlightened. Here I argue that this exclusion is due to certain legal restrictions guiding Kant’s conception of enlightenment. As enlightenment is intended to take place in society, it appears that Kant has a specific legal context in mind that affects its enactment. His twofold conception of citizenship and the dimension of subordination he puts forward by restricting the private use of reason will prove useful in clarifying those legal restrictions. (...) It thus seems unlikely that Kant intended women to take an active part in enlightenment. (shrink)

Este artigo tem o objetivo de apresentar e desenvolver as críticas feministas à Teoria da Justiça de John Rawls, especialmente por meio do diálogo e das contribuições de Martha Nussbaum e Susan Okin para um liberalismo feminista. Para tanto, discutimos três pontos centrais no debate entre essas duas filósofas feministas e Rawls: a) a noção de família como uma instituição básica da sociedade; b) a distinção entre doutrinas morais abrangentes razoáveis e não razoáveis; e c) a concepção de pessoa política (...) com autonomia plena. As críticas à teoria rawlsiana feitas por feministas demonstram a riqueza e a profundidade de Rawls para o liberalismo contemporâneo, ao mesmo tempo em que apontam para os problemas que teorias que tradicionalmente não desenvolvem um olhar crítico para a situação generificada dos sistemas democráticos encontram ao abordar a situação da cidadania das mulheres. As demandas do feminismo liberal, relacionadas à situação de mulheres ao redor do mundo, são muito bem-articuladas por Nussbaum a partir de sua crítica interna ao liberalismo rawlsiano, enfatizando que algumas das disposições teóricas desse autor não parecem ser radicais o suficiente para garantir a disponibilidade integral dessas capacidades para mulheres e crianças. Da mesma forma, o diálogo de Nussbaum com as críticas de Okin aprofundaram o debate sobre os limites da teoria da justiça rawlsiana. (shrink)

Spinoza, Dutch philosopher of the seventeenth century, and Kant, the hero of enlightenment, have dealt with women and their differences with men in their works. In a few places, Spinoza pointed out the matter of women and the sexual difference between people. Among Spinoza's works, there is no work that talks about just this matter. However, in the case of Kant, there are some works on this matter. Dealing with the matter of women and their social states according to these (...) European philosophers of modern time, this essay tried to find out the similarities and differences of their attitudes. Thus, it has resulted that although their similar attitudes on the case of women, Spinoza's philosophy has some features which have made it the source and supporter of feminist philosophers and saved it from severe criticism of feminists have been proposed against Kant. (shrink)