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  1. Is superintelligence necessarily moral?Leonard Dung - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Numerous authors have expressed concern that advanced artificial intelligence (AI) poses an existential risk to humanity. These authors argue that we might build AI which is vastly intellectually superior to humans (a ‘superintelligence’), and which optimizes for goals that strike us as morally bad, or even irrational. Thus, this argument assumes that a superintelligence might have morally bad goals. However, according to some views, a superintelligence necessarily has morally adequate goals. This might be the case either because abilities for moral (...)
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  • Existential risk from AI and orthogonality: Can we have it both ways?Vincent C. Müller & Michael Cannon - 2021 - Ratio 35 (1):25-36.
    The standard argument to the conclusion that artificial intelligence (AI) constitutes an existential risk for the human species uses two premises: (1) AI may reach superintelligent levels, at which point we humans lose control (the ‘singularity claim’); (2) Any level of intelligence can go along with any goal (the ‘orthogonality thesis’). We find that the singularity claim requires a notion of ‘general intelligence’, while the orthogonality thesis requires a notion of ‘instrumental intelligence’. If this interpretation is correct, they cannot be (...)
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  • Liability for Robots: Sidestepping the Gaps.Bartek Chomanski - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):1013-1032.
    In this paper, I outline a proposal for assigning liability for autonomous machines modeled on the doctrine of respondeat superior. I argue that the machines’ users’ or designers’ liability should be determined by the manner in which the machines are created, which, in turn, should be responsive to considerations of the machines’ welfare interests. This approach has the twin virtues of promoting socially beneficial design of machines, and of taking their potential moral patiency seriously. I then argue for abandoning the (...)
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  • Provably Safe Artificial General Intelligence via Interactive Proofs.Kristen Carlson - 2021 - Philosophies 6 (4):83.
    Methods are currently lacking to _prove_ artificial general intelligence (AGI) safety. An AGI ‘hard takeoff’ is possible, in which first generation _AGI 1 _ rapidly triggers a succession of more powerful _AGI n _ that differ dramatically in their computational capabilities (_AGI n _ _n_+1 ). No proof exists that AGI will benefit humans or of a sound value-alignment method. Numerous paths toward human extinction or subjugation have been identified. We suggest that probabilistic proof methods are the fundamental paradigm for (...)
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