This chapter argues that dual-use emerging technologies are distributing unprecedented offensive capabilities to nonstate actors. To counteract this trend, some scholars have proposed that states become a little “less liberal” by implementing large-scale surveillance policies to monitor the actions of citizens. This is problematic, though, because the distribution of offensive capabilities is also undermining states’ capacity to enforce the rule of law. I will suggest that the only plausible escape from this conundrum, at least from our present vantage point, is (...) the creation of a “supersingleton” run by a friendly superintelligence, founded upon a “post-singularity social contract.” In making this argument, the present chapter offers a novel reason for prioritizing the “control problem,” i.e., the problem of ensuring that a greaterthan-human-level AI will positively enhance human well-being. (shrink)

Мета роботи полягає в аналітиці сучасних когнітивних та філософських досліджень патологічності суб’єкта. За допомогою феноменологічного методу були досліджені онтологічні умови конституювання суб’єкта в філософсько-клінічному дискурсі та смисл його існування. Проте, виявилося, що феноменологія не долає об’єктність фізикалізму, формально стверджуючи унікальність Dasein, але фактично ізолюючи девіантів у межах особистісного внутрішнього простору. У статті використовувалися методи міждисциплінарної епістемології насамперед структурно-семіотичні, які дозволили осмислити матеріали, де традиційна філософська проблематика суб’єкта синтезована із клінічними текстами. Науковою новизною є філософсько-клінічна аналітика патологічності суб’єкта, яка спрямована на (...) елімінацію категоріальної матриці фізикалізму в контексті інтеграції різноспрямованих філософських дискурсів. У діахронічному зрізі філософської традиції визначені діагностичні та терапевтичні стратегії переосмислення метафізики суб’єкта, що утворили предмет парадигмального узагальнення філософсько-клінічного дискурсу у горизонті сучасності. Показана необхідність трансформація концептуалізацій суб’єкта з орієнтованих на власне ствердження та автономію (тобто патологічних суб’єктів) у теорії, які нормальність суб'єкта пов'язують із відповідальністю та турботою про суще. Досліджено, що когнітивістська реставрація біологізму в клінічних теоріях суб’єктивності є симптомом того, що сучасна філософія втратила актуальний зв’язок з дискурсом клініки. Проаналізований філософський дискурс патології суб’єкта, який сформований доробками екзистенціально-феноменологічної традиції та представниками соціокультурної антропології хвороби парадигми. Доведено розуміння вад особистісного розвитку, за виключенням органічних патологій, як вкорінених не в тілесності особистості, а як похідних від системи відносин, у яких даний суб’єкт бере участь. (shrink)

Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness – the main aim of this article –into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and useful in action (...) (pragmatically functional), is a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. A gradational approach, however, despite its explanatory advantages, can lead to some counterintuitive consequences and theoretical problems. In most such conceptions consciousness is extended globally (attached to primitive organisms or artificial systems), but also locally (connected to certain lower-level neuronal and bodily processes). For example, according to information integration theory (as introduced recently by Tononi and Koch, 2014), even such simple artificial systems as photodiodes possess miniscule amounts of consciousness. The major challenge for this article, then, is to establish reasonable, empirically justified constraints on how extended the range of a graded consciousness could be. It is argued that conscious systems are limited globally by the ability to individuate information (where individuated information is understood as evolutionarily embedded, socially altered, and private), whereas local limitations should be determined on the basis of a hypothesis about the action-oriented nature of the processes that select states of consciousness. Using these constraints, an abstract concept of consciousness is arrived at, hopefully contributing to a more unified state of play within consciousness studies itself. (shrink)

Accelerating environmental uncertainty and the need to cope with increasingly complex market and social demands, combine to create high value for the intuitive approach to decision-making at the strategic level. Research on intuition suffers from marked fragmentation, due to the existence of disciplinary silos based on diverse, apparently irreconcilable, ontological and epistemological assumptions. Not surprisingly, there is no integrated interdisciplinary framework suitable for a rich account of intuition, contemplating how affect and cognition intertwine in the intuitive process, and how intuition (...) scales up from the individual to collective decision-making. This study contributes to the construction of a broad conceptual framework, suitable for a multi-level account of intuition and for a fruitful dialogue with distant research areas. It critically discusses two mainstream conceptualizations of intuition which claim to be grounded in a cross-disciplinary consensus. Drawing on the complexity paradigm, it then proposes a conceptualization of intuition as emergence. Finally, it explores the theoretical and practical implications. (shrink)

This article presents a new conceptual view on the conscious will. This new concept approaches our will from the perspective of the requirements of our neural-muscular system and not from our anthropocentric perspective. This approach not only repositions the will at the core of behavior control, it also integrates the studies of Libet and Wegner, which seem to support the opposite. The will does not return as an instrument we use to steer, but rather as part of the way we (...) learn new automatic behavior and of how our neural system steers us. The new concept suggests that understanding of our will is more about understanding of our daily behavior than about the will itself. (shrink)

This article presents a new conceptual view on the conscious will. This new concept approaches our will from the perspective of the requirements of our neural-muscular system and not from our anthropocentric perspective. This approach not only repositions the will at the core of behavior control, it also integrates the studies of Libet and Wegner, which seem to support the opposite. The will does not return as an instrument we use to steer, but rather as part of the way we (...) learn new automatic behavior and of how our neural system steers us. The new concept suggests that understanding of our will is more about understanding of our daily behavior then about the will itself. (shrink)

Mental causation is a predominantly theoretical topic rather than a topic studied in the laboratory. The purpose of this paper is to outline a general approach for studying mental causation by empirical means for philosophers and scientists interested in the topic. The aim is to outline how we can infer mental causation by empirical methods given an unknown solution to the mind-body problem. The approach is based on the principles of causal inference to find causal relations among observed variables used (...) in all branches of science. With these principles, it is possible to estimate the causal effects of mental events: Make an experimental manipulation of a mental event, control confounding variables, and estimate causal effects on the outcome. The caveat is that we cannot separate the causal effects of a mental event from the physical base of the mental event, independent of whether we assume mental events can be reduced to their physical base. A challenge to estimating causal effects of mental events is that measured physical variables, such as electrophysiological potentials from the brain, might reflect processes that are part of “higher-order” phenomena, such as mental events. This means that controlling “downwards” for confounding variables is challenging. It is, however, not impossible. It also means that inferring non-mental causes of action cannot be done by measuring only physical variables alone. Keeping the mind-body problem in mind when designing experiments, it is possible to infer mental causation. (shrink)