1 Non-reductive physicalists deny that there is any explanation of mentality in purely physical terms, but do not deny that the mental is entirely determined by and constituted out of underlying physical structures. There are important issues about the stability of such a view which teeters on the edge of explanatory reductionism on the one side and dualism on the other (see Kim 1998). 2 Save perhaps for eliminative materialism (see Churchland 1981 for a classic exposition). In fact, however, while.

Russellian panpsychism, the view that concrete reality is entirely physical and fundamental physical entities are intrinsically experiential, is faced with the combination problem – the challenge of explaining how the experiences of microphysical entities combine to form the experiences of macro-physical entities such as humans. While such combination is deemed impossible by critics of panpsychism, a ‘Leibnizian’ response to the problem – that microphysical (and micro-experiential) entities never combine – has received little attention. This paper seeks to evaluate the viability (...) of such a Leibnizian panpsychism. After motivating the view, we outline and respond to two kinds of objections a critic of the view might have: (a) mereological nihilism, the view that individuals never combine, is an unviable position independent of panpsychism, (b) Leibnizian panpsychism entails the unacceptable view that human experiences are physical simples. We argue that both sets of objections can be addressed, and that Leibnizian panpsychism ought to be taken more seriously as a metaphysics of consciousness. (shrink)

I analyse six different senses in which a conscious mind can be said to be either 'bounded' or 'unbounded', and evaluate how well they might capture what people mean when they say either that human consciousness is necessarily bounded, that it introspectively appears bounded, or that mystical and psychedelic experiences remove its apparent boundedness. I then argue that, although human consciousness is certainly bounded in one important sense (informational boundedness), this does not entail that it is phenomenally bounded, in the (...) sense of being divided into separate fields of experience. In fact, if panpsychists are right that consciousness is fundamental and nature is uniform, it is likely that human consciousness is phenomenally unbounded: the whole universe is likely to be a single field of consciousness, with each of us being an informationally dense region of it. I close by noting some ways that this claim of phenomenal unboundedness ('continuism') impacts debates among panpsychists about how to solve the combination problem. (shrink)

Many philosophers today accept that phenomenal truths cannot be explained in terms of ordinary physical truths. Two possible routes to accounting for consciousness have received much attention: the emergentist route is to accept that ordinary experience is inexplicable in physical terms but that microscopic entities as described in physics nonetheless bring about conscious experience. The second route is to argue that microscopic entities have features not described in physics which can fully explain conscious experience. The view associated with panprotopsychism is (...) that microscopic entities have no phenomenal properties. The view associated with panpsychism is that microscopic entities do have phenomenal properties. In this paper it is argued that if consciousness is extended in space only the latter view is possible. According to this argument for micropsychism, if phenomenal truths are not merely structural, all truths about a whole are truths about its parts plus structural relational truths. If there are phenomenal truths about the whole, this must be because there are phenomenal truths about its parts. It wouldn’t follow that panpsychism is true, since it does not follow that consciousness exists outside the wholes we know to be conscious, but it does follow that emergentism and protopanpsychism are false. (shrink)

I argue that it is metaphysically necessary that: (i) every fundamental entity is conscious, and (ii) every fundamental property is a phenomenal property.

I explore some surprising convergences between apparently opposite theories of consciousness—panpsychism and eliminativism. I outline what a ‘Dennettian panpsychism’ might look like, and consider some of the challenging but fertile questions it raises about determinacy, holism, and subjecthood.What unites constitutive panpsychism and the multiple drafts model is that both present the unitary consciousness we can report as resting atop a multiplicity of independent processes; both reject as misguided the search for a definite threshold between processing that is truly conscious and (...) that which is merely preconscious. What divides them is that Dennett regards it as unreasonable to posit inaccessible consciousness, but reasonable to doubt or deny the existence of consciousness, while panpsychists think the opposite. (shrink)

In this journal S Siddharth has recently argued that the phenomenal bonding response to the subject summing argument for panpsychism is question begging, therefore we should reject constitutive forms of panpsychism. The argument specifically focuses on the proposals of Goff and Miller. In this reply, I show that the argument is unsound.

Panpsihizam, gledište da je fenomenalna svijest prisutna na fundamentalnoj fizičkoj razini, suočava se s problemom kombinacije subjekata—pitanjem mogu li se (i kako) subjekti iskustva kombinirati. Iako su predložena različita rješenja za taj problem, često se čini da se temelje na pogrešnom razumijevanju izazova koji predstavlja problem kombinacije subjekata. Primjer je razmjena u ovom časopisu između Siddhartha (2021) i Millera (2022). Siddharth je tvrdio da rješenje fenomenalnog povezivanja nije uspjelo riješiti problem kombinacije subjekata, dok je Miller odgovorio da je Siddharth (između (...) ostalog) pogrešno razumio problem koji je rješenje fenomenalnog povezivanja pokušavalo riješiti. U ovom radu nastojim razjasniti stvarni problem kombinacije subjekata s kojim se suočava panpsihizam i na temelju toga procijeniti različite pokušaje obrane mogućnosti sastava subjekata. (shrink)