A summary is always incomplete, but in this instance it is essentially so; as is explained in the final chapter, any essential question whatever one could ask about the subjectmatter of this thesis can only be answered by the complete exposition this thesis presents. This summary can, therefore, only indicate the general outline of the thesis. The object of the thesis is to make clear a historical and systematic development of logical and ontological structures concerning force in Leibniz, Kant, and (...) Hegel. Viewed as a whole, this development presents a dynamic conceptual structure which applies to the universe as a totality which determines itself as a self-mediating process of continual change. In Division 1, it is demonstrated that the metaphysical system of the so-called mature period of Leibniz presents this self-mediating process in its implicit form. In this system the universe determines itself by way of a circular structure; the universe as a totality is represented in the complete substances (which constitute the universe) and expressed by them; representation and expression are united in the concept of force (which is the internal activity of the complete substances) - force constitutes the totality the universe is. It is pointed out that this circular structure is in fact a unification of two levels, viz. universality (that is, the universe as one whole) and singularity (that is, the individual parts of the universe), in which each level contains the other; this mutual containment is called hyperception. Typical for Leibniz’s system is the containment of the universal in the singular. The actual mediation which is requested to establish the circularity is not expounded in Leibniz’s system, but remains implicit. In Division 2, it is demonstrated that in the metaphysical system of the so-called pre-critical period of Kant Leibniz’s system is analyzed and that, as a result of this, Kant’s system is the analytical form of the implicit self-mediation which is presupposed in Leibniz’s system. It is pointed out how this analysis leads to the emergence of a third level, which Leibniz’s system lacks, viz. particularity (that is, the actual relatedness of the individual parts, which establishes the universe as a totality). On this level, Kant’s concept of force plays its crucial role of mediating between universality and singularity; however, Kant does not succeed in fitting the three levels together and as a consequence the mediating force stands for itself instead of being actually mediating activity. In Division 3, it is demonstrated how in Hegel’s system the final unification of the three levels is established, how the mediation is conceived in the structure of the self-actualizing essence, and how this system sublates the other two systems (it understands them as forms of reflection; reflection is an essential category in Hegel’s system). It is pointed out that, whereas in Leibniz’s form of hyperception a contradiction is implied (as concerns the containment of the universal in the singular), this is not the case in Hegel’s system (because of the actual mediation between the universal and the singular). (shrink)