It is only in the last few decades that analytic philosophers in particular have begun to pay any serious attention to the topic of life’s meaning. Such philosophers, however, do not usually attempt to answer or analyse the traditional question ‘What is the meaning of life?’, but rather the subtly different question ‘What makes a life meaningful?’ and it is generally assumed that the latter can be discussed independently of the former. Nevertheless, this paper will argue that the two questions (...) are indeed connected, and that identifying and expanding upon the most plausible analysis of the former will provide the resources necessary to determine the most plausible answer to the latter. Specifically, this paper will argue that the traditional question is simply a request for the information which constitutes a coherent answer to one or more of a certain set of questions regarding human existence that were salient to the asker. In simpler language, the meaning of life itself is the information a person needs to make sense of it. This analysis can then also be applied to individual lives, such that asking for the meaning of X’s life is an analogous request for the information necessary to make sense of that life in particular. Running with this concept of the ‘meaning’ of something as its ‘sense’, the paper then outlines an accompanying theory of ‘meaningfulness’ as ‘sensefulness’: a measure of the richness of certain aspects of the life, multiplied by their intelligibility. (shrink)

On note, dans certains courants de la philosophie contemporaine, un intérêt croissant pour les aspects passifs et réceptifs de la condition humaine. Cet intérêt s’accompagne souvent d’une critique selon laquelle la philosophie «occidentale» négligerait à tort ces aspects en raison d’un «biais d’agentivité». Cette critique a également été émise à l’endroit de la philosophie de Charles Taylor. J’entends montrer ici que cette critique, bien qu’elle ait en principe une certaine force, ne peut raisonnablement s’appliquer dans le cas de Taylor. J’analyserai (...) dans un premier temps le concept fort influent de «projet de vie» et montrerai comment le biais d’agentivité s’y applique. Dans un second temps, en présentant comment les moments actifs et passifs sont liés dans ses concepts d’articulation et de narration, je montrerai que ce biais ne saurait valoir pour The Language Animal de Taylor. (shrink)

Eating local food has become a mainstream proxy for virtue and a reliable model of sustainable dieting. It suffers, nonetheless, from genuine criticisms and limitations. In this paper, we suggest theoretical amendments to reorient the local food movement and turn eating local into a robust concept—comprehensive, coherent, and inclusive, affording a firm grip over structural aspects of the food chain. We develop our argument in three parts. The first contends that ‘local’ can be said of lots of entities (e.g. whole (...) or multi-ingredient foods, recipes, menus) and that its meaning varies depending on which entities are under consideration. The second examines three dimensions of being local: the distance from the place of production; the geographical origins; the social links to consumers and producers. The third presents our robust conception of eating local, grounded on a more realistic model that accommodates for heterogeneous and complex actors. (shrink)

Debates concerning digital automation are mostly focused on the question of the availability of jobs in the short and long term. To counteract the possible negative effects of automation, it is often suggested that those at risk of technological unemployment should have access to retraining and reskilling opportunities. What is often missing in these debates are implications that all of this may have for individual autonomy understood as the ability to make and develop long-term plans. In this paper, I argue (...) that if digital automation becomes rapid, it will significantly undermine the legitimate expectation of stability and consequently, the ability to make and pursue long-term plans in the sphere of work. I focus on what is often taken to be one of the main long-term plans, i.e. the choice of profession, and I argue that this choice may be undermined by the pressure to continuously acquire new skills while at the same time facing a diminishing range of professions that one can choose from. Given that the choice of profession is significant for not-work related spheres of life, its undermining can greatly affect individual autonomy in these other spheres too. I argue that such undermining of individual planning agency constitutes a distinctive form of harm that necessitates a proactive institutional response. (shrink)

This is a long review of a long book, the longest to my knowledge on what educational aims and the curriculum that flows from them should be. The first half of the review is devoted to a brief summary of each of the eleven chapters. The second half raises some critical points. These cover remarks about R.S. Peters' alleged traditionalism; the salience of climate change considerations among educational aims; the claim that the arts, like the sciences, make progress; seeing the (...) elements of morality as a toolbox. The longest critical discussion is about Kitcher's notion of human fulfillment and whether he is right in his view that we should see it in terms of a successful life-plan aimed at furthering ‘the human project’. (shrink)