Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Have your cake and eat it too: The old principal principle reconciled with the new.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):368–382.
    David Lewis (1980) proposed the Principal Principle (PP) and a “reformulation” which later on he called ‘OP’ (Old Principle). Reacting to his belief that these principles run into trouble, Lewis (1994) concluded that they should be replaced with the New Principle (NP). This conclusion left Lewis uneasy, because he thought that an inverse form of NP is “quite messy”, whereas an inverse form of OP, namely the simple and intuitive PP, is “the key to our concept of chance”. I argue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Statistical explanation reconsidered.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Synthese 48 (3):437 - 472.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Why Frequentists and Bayesians Need Each Other.Jon Williamson - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):293-318.
    The orthodox view in statistics has it that frequentism and Bayesianism are diametrically opposed—two totally incompatible takes on the problem of statistical inference. This paper argues to the contrary that the two approaches are complementary and need to mesh if probabilistic reasoning is to be carried out correctly.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Doxastic paradoxes without self-reference.Robert C. Koons - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):168 – 177.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (1 other version)Carnap's inductive probabilities as a contribution to decision theory.Joachim Hornung - 1980 - Metamedicine 1 (3):325-367.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance.James Joyce - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (2):187 - 206.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Deference and description.Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1333-1353.
    Consider someone whom you know to be an expert about some issue. She knows at least as much as you do and reasons impeccably. The issue is a straightforward case of statistical inference that raises no deep problems of epistemology. You happen to know the expert’s opinion on this issue. Should you defer to her by adopting her opinion as your own? An affirmative answer may appear mandatory. But this paper argues that a crucial factor in answering this question is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • VIII—Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance.James M. Joyce - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):187-206.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations