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Plato's Phaedo, 74b7-c6

Phronesis 2 (2):128-147 (1957)

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  1. Self-Predication and Productive Metonymy.Saul Rosenthal - 2018 - Apeiron 51 (1):1-36.
    What does Plato mean in saying that, for all forms, “F-ness is F”? In such claims, I argue, ‘F’ is being used metonymically to refer to the property of being productive of F-ness rather than to the property of being F, in a way consistent with univocity and the rejection of a genuine Self-Predication Assumption. I explain and defend this productive metonymy reading and show how it can resolve the troubling argument at Phaedo 74b7-c6.
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  • Copresença de opostos em república V, 478e-480a.Breno Andrade Zuppolini - 2015 - Manuscrito 38 (3):81-110.
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  • Commentary on Kelsey.Raphael Woolf - 2000 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 16 (1):122-133.
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  • A Reconstruction of the Non–Identity Argument at Phaedo 74b–c.Ryan Bitetti Putzer - 2024 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis:1-30.
    At Phaedo 74b–c an important argument is given for the non–identity of perceptible equals and equality. The argument is usually understood as an application of Leibniz’s Law in which the predicate appears unequal is affirmed of perceptible equals but not equality. But this reading requires explaining why the plural locution the equals themselves is initially used for equality, and why the additional predicate appears as inequality is denied of it. In this paper, an account of the equality premise is given (...)
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  • The Phaedo and Republic V on essences.F. C. White - 1978 - Journal of Hellenic Studies 98:142-156.
    Towards the close of Book V of theRepublicPlato tells us that the true philosopher has knowledge and that the objects of knowledge are the Forms. By contrast, the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’, he tells us, have no more than belief, the objects of which are physical particulars. He then goes on to present us with some very radical-sounding assertions about the nature of these physical particulars. They are bearers of opposite properties, he says, in so thorough-going a manner that (...)
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