Here is something puzzling. Still Lifes can be expressive. Expression involves movement. Hence, (some) Still Lifes move. This seems odd. I consider a novel explanation to this ‘static-dynamic’ puzzle from Mitchell Green (2007). Green defends an analysis of artistic expressivity that is heavily indebted to work on intermodal perception. He says visual stimuli, like colours and shapes, can elicit experienced resemblances to sounds, smells and feelings. This enables viewers to know how an emotion feels by looking at the picture. The (...) hypothesis is intriguing, but I show that his suggestion that we empathize with the pictorial content is implausible and that this exposes a flaw in the way his argument moves from experiential mappings to experiential-affective mappings. Consequently, I register some reservations about the way Green supposes we detect these cross-modal qualities. (shrink)

Synesthesia is a phenomenon in which an additional nonstandard perceptual experience occurs consistently in response to ordinary stimulation applied to the same or another modality. Recent studies suggest an important role of semantic representations in the induction of synesthesia. In the present proposal we try to link the empirically grounded theory of sensory-motor contingency and mirror system based embodied simulation to newly discovered cases of swimming-style color synesthesia. In the latter color experiences are evoked only by showing the synesthetes a (...) picture of a swimming person or asking them to think about a given swimming style. Neural mechanisms of mirror systems seem to be involved here. It has been shown that for mirror-sensory synesthesia, such as mirror-touch or mirror-pain synesthesia, concurrent experiences are caused by the overactivity in the mirror neuron system responding to the specific observation. The comparison of different forms of synesthesia has the potential of challenging conventional thinking on this phenomenon and providing a more general, sensory-motor account of synesthesia encompassing cases driven by semantic or emulational rather than pure sensory or motor representations. (shrink)

When Gadamer speaks of the “unavoidability” or “uncircumventability” [Unhintergehbarkeit] of art,Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer . there are at least two claims involved: he has in mind both the concrete autonomy of a given artwork—its independence from systems of signification and representation—as well as the crucial importance that art bears for any account of human understanding. Yet even if this central significance remains a distinct concern and peculiar inheritance of the continental philosophical tradition as such, it still remains unclear what it would (...) even mean for the question of art to be properly raised, let alone resolved. If anything, art’s significance currently lies in its continuing questionability.In Between Word and Image, Dennis Schmidt attunes the reader to this questionability and ends up bolstering the validity of Gadamer’s claims, broadly carrying the latter’s legacy forward in a number of ways: by extending the inquiry concerning the ontology of the artwork into .. (shrink)