This paper defends an account of forgiveness that is sensitive to recent work on anger. Like others, we claim anger involves an appraisal, namely that someone has done something wrong. But, we add, anger has two further functions. First, anger communicates to the wrongdoer that her act has been appraised as wrong and demands she feel guilty. This function enables us to explain why apologies make it reasonable to forgo anger and forgive. Second, anger sanctions the wrongdoer for what she (...) has done. This function allows us to explore the moral status of forgiveness, including why forgiveness is typically elective. (shrink)

In ‘“Sneering, or Other Social Pelting”’, Lucy O’Brien understands sneering acts as ways of making feel that are aimed at socially downgrading a target. Sneers are essentially expressions of contempt. Although typically thought of as vicious, O’Brien argues they can also be used virtuously to disrupt social hierarchies, especially when taken up by people with low social status. I examine satire as a potentially effective means of carrying out this virtuous activity. I examine O’Brien’s account while exploring the conditions that (...) must obtain to make satire an efficacious tool for social recalibration. (shrink)

In this essay, I will focus on the two main objections that have been adduced against the moral acceptability of contempt: the fact that it embraces a whole person and not merely some deed or aspect of a person’s character, and the way that when addressed to a person in this way, it amounts to a denial of the very personhood of its target.