This chapter considers Wittgenstein’s philosophy, particularly as elaborated in Philosophical Investigations and later works, as it has obtained relevance in science education research. The specific focus is on contributions related to students’ learning of science. Wittgenstein’s writings have been used in science education in several ways: to argue for an alternate conception of rationality in theories of learning science, to support theories examining the discursive and social nature of learning, to advocate for investigations of science classrooms that parallel ethnographic and (...) sociological investigations of professional science labs, and to develop alternative research methodologies. An examination of this influence in science education necessitates discussion of the frequent implicit attempts made to reconcile Wittgenstein’s analytic philosophy with empirical habits firmly grounded in a cognitivist tradition. Particular attention is given to the way in which a typical focus in science education on students’ “meaning making” is likely at odds with Wittgensteinian philosophy. It is argued that the exemplars provided in his later work suggest that conceptual clarity is necessary for coherence in asking empirical questions and interpreting results and that they imply an alternative, descriptive orientation for researchers. (shrink)