Over every and each sport event, a dark veil spreads and obfuscates the celebration: doping. Although anti-doping policies have been widely applied, controlling and diminishing this phenomenon has not been achieved yet and the use of doping is commonplace. In this article, I propose the concept of narcissistic civilization as a tool to interpret this phenomenon. I seek for a parallel reading between the Freudian idea of narcissism and its extension to social narcissism by Fromm, together with Heidegger’s analysis of (...) technology, keeping in mind that doping is a technological application. In this way I point out that both theories share a common view in that humans tend to fail in the distinction between the external reality as an object and their own self as the interpreter, that is between the ¨I¨ and the ¨not I¨. By making this fusion of the two theories that originate from different intellectual traditions, I aspire to provide an interpretation tool for the broad use of doping: I conclude that doping can be understood with the assumption of a narcissistic civilization, focused on technology, that calls for the use of PEDs. (shrink)

In 1972 I attended the Pre-Olympic Scientific Congress in Munich. For the first time science and sport were brought together in connection with the Olympic Games. The organizers presented a book Sport in Blickpunkt der Wissenschaften (Sport from a Scientific Point of View) that summarized history and state of the art of the main sport scientific approaches (41). The German philosopher Hans Lenk gave a presentation of a broad array of past and present interpretations of sport from a philosophic viewpoint (...) (49). The congress in Munch and Hans Lenk's presentation of sport as a suitable philosophic topic became decisive for my own lifelong interest in philosophy of sport. Soon after the Munich conference some American philosophers convened to launch the Philosophic Society for the Study of Sport. In 1973 the first issue of Journal of Philosophy of Sport was published (35). In several ways 1972 was a turning point for philosophy of sport as a serious academic discipline and for my own interest in sport philosophy. From here sport philosophy found its way to Norway and through this and along several other roads to other Nordic countries. (shrink)

Morgan has argued that attitudes to the medicalisation of sports are historically conditioned.While the history of doping offers contested versions of when the sports world turned againstconservative forces, Morgan has argued that these attitudes are out of step with prevailingnorms and that the World Anti Doping Agency's policy needs to be modified to better reflectthis. As an advocate of critical democracies in sports, he argues that anti-doping policy mustacknowledge and reflect these shifts in order to secure their legitimacy. In response, (...) wecritically present the World Anti-Doping Agency's policy that incorporates the Prohibited Listof Substances and Methods for athletes. We evaluate the validity of the therapy-enhancementdistinction in relation to its role in both justifying and sustaining the operation of theProhibited List. In particular, we focus on the case of thyroxine, which has been the subjectof controversy in athletic doping. While thyroxine is not currently banned, critics haveclaimed that its use in the absence of a relevant pathology is tantamount to doping. Wechallenge Morgan's claim that a conventionalist defence of the therapy-enhancementdistinction is the best available, and his conclusion that this properly supports a morepermissive stance towards performance-enhancing drug use. Furthermore, we reject hisconventionalist support for democratic line drawing in relation to doping and in particular thestatus of thyroxine with regard to the prohibited list. We offer a modified defence of the statusquo, a qualified, naturalist account of health and disease, where athletes may be prescribeddrugs that are genuine responses to medical necessity that do not, or do not typically, threatenthe goods of athletic excellence. (shrink)

In this article, we critically discuss different versions of the fairness objection to the legalisation of neuro-doping. According to this objection, legalising neuro-doping will result in some enjoying an unfair advantage over others. Basically, we assess four versions. These focus on: 1) the unequal opportunities of winning for athletes who use neuro-doping and for those who do not; 2) the unfair advantages specifically for wealthy athletes; 3) the unfairness of athletic advantages not derived from athletes’ own training ; and 4) (...) the unfair health care costs imposed on everyone as a result of athletes’ use of neuro-doping. We conclude that none of these versions offer a convincing principled fairness-based objection to legalising neuro-doping. (shrink)

The formation of the World Anti-Doping Agency in 1999 was spurred by the 1998 revelation of widespread use in professional cycling of erythropoietin. The drug was supposedly a real danger. The long-term consequences were unknown, but rumor said it made athletes’ blood thick as jam with clots and other circulatory fatalities likely consequences. Today the fear of EPO has dampened. However, new scientific avenues such as ‘neuro-doping’ have replaced EPO as emergent and imagined threats to athletes and to the integrity (...) of sport. In this paper, we analyze the alleged threat from ‘neuro-doping’ in the following steps: First, we outline an understanding of ‘neuro-doping’ in a narrow sense, which we then put into context by looking at the phenomenon in a broader sense. Second, we highlight examples of societal perceptions of sport and science in order to shed light on where the concern for ‘neuro-doping’ comes from. Third, we address the more general fear of technology as a root for this concern. Fourth, we examine the evidence for the performance enhancing capacities of ‘neuro-doping’, where after we look at the obstacles for a ban on this technology. We conclude the analysis by stating that at present ‘neuro-doping’ cannot be considered a threat to the integrity of sport. Finally, however, we put this conclusion into perspective by examining what the most reasonable response would be if in the future neuro-stimulation techniques becomes an effective performance-enhancing mean in sport. (shrink)

Brent Kious has recently attacked several arguments generally adduced to support anti-doping in sports, which are widely supported by the sports medicine fraternity, international sports federations, and international governments. We show that his attack does not succeed for a variety of reasons. First, it uses an overly inclusive definition of doping at odds with the WADA definition, which has global, if somewhat contentious, currency. Second, it seriously misconstrues the position it attacks, rendering the attack without force against a more balanced (...) construal of an anti-doping position. Third, it makes unwarranted appeals to matters Kious considers morally ‘clear’, while simultaneously attacking a position many others take to be equally morally ‘clear’, namely that of anti-doping. Such an inconsistency, attacking and appealing to the moral status quo as befits one’s argument, is not acceptable without further qualification. Fourth, his position suffers from a general methodological flaw of over-reliance upon argumentation by analogy. Moreover, it is argued that the analogies, being poorly selected and developed, fail to justify his conclusion that the anti-doping lobby lacks philosophical and moral authority for its stance. These issues are symptomatic of a more fundamental problem: any attempt at providing a blanket solution to the question of whether doping is morally acceptable or not is bound to run up against problems when applied to highly specific contexts. Thus, rather than reaching any particular conclusion for or against doping products or processes in this article, we conclude that an increased context-sensitivity will result in a more evenhanded appraisal of arguments on the matter. (shrink)

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, Volume 6, Issue 1, Page 78-81, February 2012.

Though many scholars have made claims as to the nature of sport, this article argues that these claims tend to narrowly focus on modern ideas derived primarily from Western competitive sport. Thus, most notions of sport fail to capture how various historical and non-Western cultures valued sport. In an attempt to provide a broader and more durable description of the nature of sport, this article argues that sports are fundamentally about telling a story about ourselves. These stories are meaningful narratives. (...) Meaningful narratives, the article argues, exist in three ways: the individual, the collaborative, and the collective. By seeing sport as inherently about ‘a story we tell ourselves about ourselves’, the article concludes that not only do philosophers realize a more complete understanding of what sport is about but also receive and apply this understanding to normative debates within sport ethics. (shrink)

The current ban on certain performance enhancing substances in sport such as erythropoietin faces a line-drawing problem: what is the moral difference between taking an EPO injection to incre...

This article strives to make novel headway in the debate concerning esports' relationship to sports by focusing on the relationship between esports and physicality. More precisely, the aim of this article is to critically assess the claim that esports fails to be sports because it is never properly “direct” or “immediate” compared to physical sports. To do so, I focus on the account of physicality presented by Jason Holt, who provides a theoretical framework meant to justify the claim that esports (...) is never properly immediate and therefore never sports. I begin by motivating Holt's account of physicality by contrasting it with a more classical way of discussing physicality and sports, namely in terms of physical motor skills. Afterwards, I introduce Holt's account of physicality as immediacy and engage with its assumptions more thoroughly to problematize the claim that esports is fundamentally indirect. Lastly, I argue that the assumption that esports necessarily lacks immediacy is based on a narrow understanding of body and, consequently, of space. In response, I offer a different way of thinking about body and space, focusing on the subjective, bodily engagement of the esports practitioners with their practice, whereby physical space and virtual space can be appreciated as immediately interconnected during performance in a hybrid manner. In providing such an account, the article contributes directly to the broader, growing discussion on the relationship between physicality and virtuality in an increasingly digital world. (shrink)