Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream story can be read as a skeptical response to the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum solution, for it presents I exist as fundamentally unprovable, on the grounds that the notion about “I” that it is guaranteed to refer to something existing, which Descartes seems to assume, is unwarranted. The modern anti-skepticism of Hilary Putnam employs a different strategy, which seeks to derive the existence of the world not from some “indubitable” truth such as the existence of myself , (...) but from the meaning of some particular assertion I make. In this paper, I argue, however, that Putnam’s argument fails to deliver on the promise of showing the self-refuting nature of the skeptical hypothesis, as it relies on a double use of “I”, a fallacy of equivocation, reflecting an unsolved tension between the argument’s general premise, which is rather Zhuangzian in spirit, and his unwitting adoption of that unwarranted notion about “I”. I try to show further that the skepticism in Zhuangzi’s Butterfly Dream not only can be used to refute the proofs of the existence of the empirical I , but also is effective against accounts concerning the existence of the transcendental I. (shrink)

In recent years, interpreters of the fourth century BCE Chinese Daoist text, the Zhuangzi, have increasingly appropriated the term, 'skepticism' as a label for the philosophical contribution of that text to classical Chinese philosophy. Despite their terminological agreement, these authors differ significantly in what they take to be the substance of this philosophical term, especially in its context as an interpretive device for understanding the Zhuangzi. This dissertation aims to understand the philosophy of the Zhuangzi by reference to the Greek (...) tradition of Pyrrhonian skepticism transmitted to the modern age by Sextus Empiricus. ;I illustrate the limitations of interpreting skepticism merely as negative dogmatism and illuminate the virtues of understanding it as the recommendation of a philosophical attitude of non-assertion and open-mindedness. Robert E. Allinson, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Bryan W. Van Norden, and Chad Hansen interpret skepticism as an anti-intellectual negative dogmatism, and I take issue with the appropriateness of such an interpretation. In so doing, I examine the work of A.C. Graham, Paul Kjellberg, and Lisa Raphals, who understand the skeptical sections of the Zhuangzi as recommendations for living a fulfilling life. These thinkers offer more coherent interpretations in so far as their readings construe Zhuangzi's skepticism as supporting rather than conflicting with the passages that advocate a variety of spiritual practices designed to bring about peace of mind and harmony. While these interpreters have drawn attention to the importance of Zhuangzi's spiritual and moral recommendations for living a productive life, my analysis, in suggesting that Zhuangzi moves from non-dogmatic or aporetic skepticism to way-making , develops this positive result of Zhuangzi's non-dogmatic skepticism further. This positive result is explored in connection with the extent to which non-dogmatic skepticism can serve as a foundation for the adoption of an attitude of philosophical pluralism, which suggests that there are a plurality of different standpoints, attitudes, approaches, perspectives, and 'positions' each of which may be valid in some sense and in some degree, and yet none of which is immune from criticism. I also address the criticism of aporetic skepticism that living a life without dogmatic commitments is impossible. (shrink)

The moral commonly drawn from Zhuangzi’s butterfly dream is that there is no distinction between the subjectivity of the dreamer and the awake. It is, however, tenuous to incorporate this insight into an overall view of Zhuangzi, whether as a perspectival relativist, a mystic, or an anti-rationalist, just to name the more popular positions. The parable, despite its brevity and clarity, is difficult because the assertion about metaphysical distinction in the last two lines does not cohere with the preceding text (...) about knowledge. To cope with this problem, there are recent interpretations that advocate textual revision or adumbrate a non-skeptical Zhuangzi. In this article, I shall evaluate these strategies and explain the discrepancy in understanding the butterfly dream. Besides employing the concept of self-locating belief to account for the paradox of waking and not-knowing, I shall also argue for an epistemic grounding of the metaphysical distinction. (shrink)

This paper follows the tradition of treating Zhuangzi's Butterfly Dream episode as presenting a version of skepticism. However, unlike the prevalent interpretations within that tradition, it attempts to show that the skepticism conveyed in the episode is more radical than it has been conceived, such that the episode can be read as a skeptical response to Descartes' refutation of skepticism based on the _Cogito, ergo sum_ proof. The paper explains how the lack of commitment in Zhuangzi to the dubious assumption (...) about 'I' that it necessarily refers to something existing to which Descartes seems to uncritically adhere allows Zhuangzi to doubt what for Descartes is absolutely indubitable: _I exist_. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with the development of the paradoxical theme of Daoism. Based on Chad Hansen's interpretation of Daoism and Chinese philosophy in general, it traces the history of Daoism by following their treatment of the limit of language. The Daoists seem to have noticed that there is a limit to what language can do and that the limit of language is paradoxical. The 'theoretical' treatment of the paradox of the limit of language matures as Daoism develops. Yet the (...) Daoists seem to have noticed that the limit of language and its paradoxical nature cannot be overcome. At the end, we are left with the paradoxes of the Daoists. In this paper, we jump into the abyss of the Daoists' paradoxes from which there is no escape. But the Daoists' paradoxes are fun! (shrink)

This article draws a parallel between the Zhuangzi’s discussions of having no sense of “oneself” or “I,” on the one hand, and its critique of institutionalized order and visions of the unification of society, on the other. Highlighting the way the text distances itself from rituals and tradition, this article identifies the source of the shift in its view on personhood not simply in the situating of humans in the wider world or in acknowledgment of natural processes of change, but (...) in the character of one’s relation to the wider world and change. Although special attention is given here to the socially and politically disengaged tone of the text, I reject the view that the Zhuangzi’s goal is to help shed the “external,” “social,” or “constructed” layers of one’s person in order to unearth a “natural” or “authentic” core. (shrink)