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A Routley-Meyer semantics for converse Ackermann property

José M. Méndez

Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (1):65 - 76 (1987)

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Kripke semantics for modal substructural logics.Norihiro Kamide - 2002 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11 (4):453-470.details We introduce Kripke semantics for modal substructural logics, and provethe completeness theorems with respect to the semantics. Thecompleteness theorems are proved using an extended Ishihara's method ofcanonical model construction (Ishihara, 2000). The framework presentedcan deal with a broad range of modal substructural logics, including afragment of modal intuitionistic linear logic, and modal versions ofCorsi's logics, Visser's logic, Méndez's logics and relevant logics. Download Export citation Bookmark 8 citations
Converse Ackermann property and constructive negation defined with a negation connective.Gemma Robles & José M. Méndez - 2006 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (2):113-130.details The Converse Ackermann Property is the unprovability of formulas of the form (A -> B) -> C when C does contain neither -> nor ¬. Intuitively, the CAP amounts to rule out the derivability of pure non-necessitive propositions from non-necessitive ones. A constructive negation of the sort historically defined by, e.g., Johansson is added to positive logics with the CAP in the spectrum delimited by Ticket Entailment and Dummett’s logic LC. Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
(1 other version)Two versions of minimal intuitionism with the CAP. A note.Gemma Robles & José Méndez - 2010 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 20 (2):183-190.details La "Conversa de la Propiedad Ackermann" (CAP) es la no demostrabilidad de proposiciones puramente no-necesitivas a partir de proposiciones necesitivas. En nuestro trabajo definimos las dos restricciones básicas de la lógica intuicionista mínima con la CAP. Download Export citation Bookmark
(1 other version)Two versions of minimal intuitionism with the cap. A note.Gemma Robles & José M. Méndez - 2005 - Theoria 20 (2):183-190.details Two versions of minimal intuitionism are defined restricting Contraction. Both are defined by means of a falsity constant F. The first one follows the historical trend, the second is the result of imposing specialconstraints on F. RelationaI ternary semantics are provided. Download Export citation Bookmark
Normal modal substructural logics with strong negation.Norihiro Kamide - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (6):589-612.details We introduce modal propositional substructural logics with strong negation, and prove the completeness theorems (with respect to Kripke models) for these logics. Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations

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