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In this paper I focus on the fallacy known as Complex Question or Many Questions. After a brief introduction, in Sect. 2 I highlight its pragmatic dimension, and in Sect. 3 its dialectical dimension. In Sect. 4 I present two accounts of this fallacy developed in argumentation theory, Douglas Walton’s and the Pragma-Dialectics’, which have resources to capture both its pragmatic and its dialectical nature. However, these accounts are unsatisfactory for various reasons. In Sect. 5 I focus on the pragmatic (...) |
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Within the Gricean framework in pragmatics, communication is understood as an inferential activity. Other approaches to the study of linguistic communication have contended that language is argumentative in some essential sense. My aim is to study the question of whether and how the practices of inferring and arguing can be taken to contribute to meaning in linguistic communication. I shall suggest a two-fold hypothesis. First, what makes of communication an inferential activity is given with its calculability, i.e. with the possibility (...) |
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In this article I scrutinise a crucial tension in understanding the debate over shale gas production in Europe. On the one hand, analyses predominantly grasp the debate in terms of pro-and-con dialectics, as if the pro-shale gas camp faced the anti-shale gas camp in a dyadic clash of opposing voices. On the other hand, it is commonly recognised that this debate is driven by multi-party and multi-position argumentative dynamics. In this broader context, I focus on one pivotal contribution to the (...) |
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La concepción predominante de la argumentación sigue privilegiando la dimensión representacional del lenguaje y, en consecuencia, ignora o infravalora las funciones compromisorias, directivas o expresivas de la argumentación. En este artículo examino los usos de la argumentación en la esfera pública -con especial atención a la deliberación y a la negociación- para poner de manifiesto y reivindicar la importancia de las funciones no persuasivas de la argumentación, entre las que se destaca la construcción y moldeado de identidades sociales. |
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The article develops and justifies, on the basis of the epistemological argumentation theory, two central pieces of the theory of evaluative argumentation interpretation: 1. criteria for recognizing argument types and 2. rules for adding reasons to create ideal arguments. Ad 1: The criteria for identifying argument types are a selection of essential elements from the definitions of the respective argument types. Ad 2: After presenting the general principles for adding reasons (benevolence, authenticity, immanence, optimization), heuristics are proposed for finding missing (...) |
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Making arguments makes reasons apparent. Sometimes those reasons may affect audiences’ relationships to claims (e.g., accept, adhere). But an over-emphasis on audience effects encouraged by functionalist theories of argumentation distracts attention from other things that making arguments can accomplish. We advance the normative pragmatic program on argumentation through two case studies of how early advocates for women’s suffrage in the U.S. made reasons apparent in order to show that what they were doing wasn’t ridiculous. While it might be possible to (...) |
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We all seem to have a sense of what good and bad arguments are, and there is a long history—focusing on fallacies—of trying to provide objective standards that would allow a clear separation of good and bad arguments. This contribution discusses the limits of attempts to determine the quality of arguments. It begins with defining bad arguments as those that deviate from an established standard of good arguments. Since there are different conceptualizations of “argument”—as controversy, as debate, and as justification—and (...) |
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A broad assumption in argumentation theory is that argumentation primarily regards resolving, confronting, or managing disagreement. This assumption is so fundamental that even when there does not appear to be any real disagreement, the disagreement is suggested to be present at some other level. Some have questioned this assumption (most prominently, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Doury), but most are reluctant to give up on the key idea that persuasion, the core of argumentation theory, can only regard disagreements. We argue here (...) |
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Which factors are relevant for the assessment of the exercise of our capacities to reason and argue? And what do these factors reveal about the nature of these capacities? The aim of this paper is to address these questions. In order to do this, we will try to explain, without presupposing the unviable use of sophisticated conceptual capacities, how a person can aim to identify correct reasons or arguments and properly satisfy such purpose. The contribution of our proposal resides in (...) |
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ABSTRACT Speakers’ autonomy as arguers is impaired when they are not recognized as arguers, they can’t get their arguments heard, and their arguments are ignored, dismissed, or used against them. How do speakers cultivate conditions to secure their autonomy as arguers? This article submits that they marshal normative pragmatic force or the practical efficacy of normative materials. To support this claim, this article explains what speakers’ autonomy as arguers comprises. The article then describes three legitimate sources of force in arguing (...) |
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Arguments may sometimes be advanced with a non-standard function. One such function, it is suggested, is the expression of identity, a practice which may play a significant role in political representation. This paper sets out to examine a number of short addresses given at the High-Level segment of the Cop26 conference, which are considered to contain instances of such argumentation. Their content is analysed and evaluated by means of the Comprehensive Assessment Procedure for Natural Argumentation (CAPNA), and an attempt is (...) |
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At a recent rally, Donald Trump resumed a habit he had developed during his election-rallies and read out the lyrics to a song. It tells the Aesopian fable of The Farmer and the Snake: A half frozen snake is taken in by a kind-hearted person but bites them the moment it is revived. Trump tells the fable to make a point about Islamic immigrants and undocumented immigrants from Southern and Central America: He claims the immigrants will cause problems and much (...) |
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We develop a novel argument scheme tailored to debates surrounding public votes on a state action. It can be used to propose reasons for voting “yes” or “no” and allows for natural reconstructions of such debates. These reconstructions are of particular use to voters trying to weigh the pros and cons of the proposed state action. The scheme for proposing reasons helps answering two questions: What changes will the proposed state action bring with it? And are these changes good or (...) |
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Who is the best moral reasoner, the judge or the legislator? The aim of this paper is to refine this question, by distinguishing between different metaethical assumptions. If the meta-ethical assumptions of arguers are incompatible or if their institutional goal is to establish some truth, there is no way of entering in a constructive argumentative activity. My claim is that only when arguers renounce any epistemic temptation and feel empathy with respect to others’ arguments, can institutions improve the quality of (...) |
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In today’s ‘networked’ public sphere, arguers are faced with countless controversies roaming out there. Knowing what is at stake at any point in time, and keeping under control the contribution one’s arguments make to the different interrelated issues requires careful craft Keeping in touch with Pragma-Dialectics. In honor of Frans H. van Eemeren. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, 2011). In this paper, I explore the difficulty of determining what is at stake at any moment of the argumentative situation and explore the challenge (...) |
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