The article considers what happened to the Buddhist concept of self-awareness ( svasaṃvedana ) when it was appropriated by Śaiva Siddhānta. The first section observes how it was turned against Buddhism by being used to attack the momentariness of consciousenss and to establish its permanence. The second section examines how self-awareness differs from I-cognition ( ahampratyaya ). The third section examines the difference between the kind of self-awareness elaborated by Rāmakaṇṭha (‘reflexive awareness’) and a kind elaborated by Dharmakīrti (‘intentional self-awareness’). (...) It is then pointed out that Dharmakīrti avails himself not only of intentional self-awareness but also of reflexive awareness. Some remarks on the relationship between these two strands of Dharmakīrtian Buddhism are offered. The conclusion points out that although self-awareness occurs in Buddhism as inextricably linked with anātmavāda , the doctrine of no-self, and sākāravāda , the view that the forms we perceive belong not to external objects but to consciousness, it is used by Rāmakaṇṭha to refute both of these views. An appendix addresses the problem of how precisely to interpret Dharmakīrti’s contention that conceptual cognition is non-conceptual in its reflexive awareness of itself. (shrink)

In the course of his critique of the Buddhist doctrine of universal momentariness, Udayana argues for an isomorphism between our understandings of space and time, which is meant to undercut the Buddhists’ well-known “inference from existence.” The present paper examines these arguments from Udayana’s Ātmatattvaviveka, together with Ratnakīrti’s treatment of them in his Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi Anvayātmikā. As an historical study, the paper aims to elucidate the connections between Udayana and Ratnakīrti, and the implications of those connections for the dependence of the (...) inference from existence upon various arguments which appear elsewhere in Ratnakīrti’s corpus. As a work of philosophical interpretation, the paper will clarify what is at stake in the local debate over the space–time isomorphism. Ratnakīrti’s position will best be understood as an account on which different simple causal properties are ascribed, or indexed, to an allegedly persisting entity at different times, while Udayana will prefer an account on which complex properties indexed to the place and/or time of the effect—for instance, “generating a sprout in this particular place” or “producing a visual awareness at a certain time”—will belong to a persisting thing throughout its entire existence. Furthermore, the acceptance or rejection of space and time as substantial entities in their own right, as distinct from the entities which are conventionally said to exist in space and time, will have important implications for the accounts of causality that each thinker can accept. (shrink)