In this dissertation I critically engage and draw insights from classical Indian, Anglo-American, phenomenological, and cognitive scientific approaches to the topic of self-awareness. In particular, I argue that in both the Western and the Indian tradition a common and influential view of self-awareness---that self-awareness is the product of an act of introspection in which consciousness takes itself as an object---distorts our understanding of both self-awareness and consciousness as such. In contrast, I argue for the existence and primacy of pre-reflective self-awareness (...) ---a form of self-awareness that is an effect of both our embodiment and the basic structure of consciousness. In arguing for this account of self-awareness, I take up, among other things, the following: the semantics of the first-person and of indexicals in general, qualia and phenomenal consciousness; the possibility of non-conceptual self-awareness, the nature of introspection; the importance of embodiment and agency for our understanding of self-awareness, and the consequences of my account for the metaphysics of personal identity. (shrink)